Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it seems inevitable to conclude that learning systems ... generally experience consciousness. I don't think so. There's no reason to assume a nematode or an LLM is conscious. The latter doesn't even have anything to be conscious of. Ages ago, Minksy has half-jokingly said that consciousness is probably a feedback loop. It makes sense, but it does require the learning system to be able to observe itself in sufficien…
> There's no reason to assume a nematode or an LLM is conscious. It has inputs. It need not necessarily understand them -- that is a separate question to that of consciousness. See the note for laypeople. > It's not the hypothesis we know to be true. I don't think this is a best-faith response to my comment. If I was unclear I can clarify: in absence of further evidence it's a good starting place. I don't think I imp…
> How is it possible you know this with such certainty? People whose lives and careers begin and end with this question don't have any such knowledge.
It is technically unknown, because there isn't a definition, certainly not an operationalizable one. Assuming consciousness is another physical force makes it fundamentally unknowable. It is the easy way out.