I think it’s useful to think in terms of what we are conscious of . Meaning, that there is a subject and an object of consciousness. For example, I’d argue that qualia is not an inherent part of consciousness, it’s merely something we are conscious of . It’s plausible that qualia are inner workings in our brain that our brain is itself perceiving, and thus is conscious of. What I think confuses people is that we are…
> It’s plausible that qualia are inner workings in our brain that our brain is itself perceiving, and thus is conscious of. This seems circular. Why would those inner workings not themselves give rise to consciousness, in the way you suppose second-order workings of the brain do? > we are also conscious of our consciousness. That doesn’t need to mean that the subject and the object of consciousness are the same in th…
I don’t think that “consciousness” exists other than in the form of “perceiving inner workings”. (That’s basically the point I was trying to make. And that “perceiving” itself constitutes “inner workings”, and is thus partly subject to itself.) In that sense, there is nothing that arises. I’m one of those who don’t think there’s a hard problem of consciousness. My impression is that, for the most part, it’s the recursivity that leads us to believe there is something extra there which really there isn’t.