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Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

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Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#81

Post by AlbertCory »

twelve40 wrote: post #80
AlbertCory wrote: post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think there's something there, and I did enjoy your article. WW I had a lot of causes, at the head of which I'd put the Kaiser's stupidity and weakness. But yeah, Cannae did (and still does) exert a big influence on military planners. As others have pointed out, Schlieffen depended on massive luck and adherence to The Plan, neither of which obtained. It was not machine guns that made it fail.

it's a fascinating topic, but how can one person's stupidity and weakness cause millions and millions to go die far away from their homes in dirt? I could never understand that. surely there must have been some massive underlying reasons why a self-respecting burgher would suddenly leave his cozy family to die a terrible miserable ugly death in a faraway foreign land?

That's not how it was sold to them.

Different times than we live in, for sure.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#82

Post by Archelaos »

icegreentea2 wrote: post #28
benbreen wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Author here - yes, this is what I was getting at. The false promise of a rapid victory over the French via encirclement from the right flank (in the style of Hannibal) really was a major factor in justifying the risks of war for the German General Staff. And because Schlieffen was preoccupied with the idea that an ancient battle could be a model for that approach, it distracted from the now-obvious technological chan…

How does machine guns = defensive warfare make the "Schlieffen Plan" impossible? The Germans were able to advance to the doorstep of Paris. They continuously tried to engage the Entente in a decisive battle (from the Frontier all the way to the Marne). They were unable to do so because the Entente refused to be engaged that way, and because the Entente had superior strategic/operational mobility (they were retreating…

I agree with everything, except that I would not call the German reaction to Russia's fast mobilization "panicking". The German war planning was very aware of the meager prospects of a two-front war and that in order for a fast victory it was mandatory to beat France before Russia was (supposedly) ready. The fast Russian advance into Germany was just unexpected, and there existed simply no developed plan for such a situation. And of course no one would have wanted to simply let the Russians march through to Berlin.

To add to the debate about Cannae: Talking strategy is talking about abstract principles. The abstract patterns are here "frontal assault" vs. "flank movement" with the aim of encirclement. This is the only relevant and quite vage analogy of the Schlieffen plan and Cannae. However, the Schlieffen plan as it was adopted (and modified) by the German army was a plan of an assault with a very strong and fast right wing, but at Cannae, the battle began with a frontal attack by both armies, with Hannibal subsequently having his centre retreat and later advancing both flanks and finally his cavalry into the back of the Romans to complete the encirclement. So the analogy between Cannae and the so-called Schlieffen plan is not very far-reaching.

If we are looking for a better analogy to Cannae, the German invasion of the Low Countries and France in May 1940 comes surprisingly close. Here the advancing Belgian, English and French armies failed to cover their right flank sufficiently. A hazardous, rapid German tank advance on this flank cut them off from possible lines of retreat and threatened to envelop them from behind. Only the beach at Dunkirk remained as a way of escape for some.

The German plan of May 1940 has been described by some historians such as Antony Beevor as a variant of the Schlieffen plan. Beevor writes in "The Second World War" (2012): "Manstein's [the author of the plan] left-hook Sichelschnitt was thus a reversal of the version of the right-hook Schlieffen plan attempted 1914, which the French now expected them to try a second-time." (p. 97) -- In other words: The French expected another attempt like 1914, they operated accordingly, for that very reason walked into a trap and were defeated by an exactly opposite flanking manoeuvre.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#83

Post by MichaelZuo »

Someone wrote: post #41
ethbr1 wrote: post #22

It's curious how people are responding to the title, rather than the post, which touches on the title but is mostly about another thing: >> There’s something beguiling about the thought that a simple arrangement of lines might explain the world — like seeing human history as an enormous game of Civilization 6. But of course, that’s also the problem with using maps as a way of understanding history. If you’re not care…

That isn’t limited to maps, but applies to all models of reality, such as Newtonian physics, spherical cows, models of the economy that are used to guide policy or large language models. Also, oftentimes creators of models do not know what details are necessary for a model’s purpose, and may omit ones they aren’t aware of.

In fact it's almost always the case, since the world is so complex with so many competing and overlapping models.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#84

Post by icegreentea2 »

Archelaos wrote: post #82
icegreentea2 wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does machine guns = defensive warfare make the "Schlieffen Plan" impossible? The Germans were able to advance to the doorstep of Paris. They continuously tried to engage the Entente in a decisive battle (from the Frontier all the way to the Marne). They were unable to do so because the Entente refused to be engaged that way, and because the Entente had superior strategic/operational mobility (they were retreating…

I agree with everything, except that I would not call the German reaction to Russia's fast mobilization "panicking". The German war planning was very aware of the meager prospects of a two-front war and that in order for a fast victory it was mandatory to beat France before Russia was (supposedly) ready. The fast Russian advance into Germany was just unexpected, and there existed simply no developed plan for such a s…

Right, "panicked" was a bad word. I think their choice was sound (or at least very defensible). I meant "panicked" as even greater degree of "unexpected" (beyond even surprised).

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#85

Post by pests »

cmrdporcupine wrote: post #36
jprete wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not an expert, but I think for World War I the military strategy questions - and in particular the misconceptions - were very relevant to the decision to go to war. My understanding is that the various combatant powers believed that the war would be quick and decisive in the way that prior wars had been; none expected or prepared for a four-year slog of trench warfare, defensive supremacy, or total depletion of w…

"none expected or prepared for a four-year slog of trench warfare" Yet another parallel with what's happening in Ukraine right now. Both Russia (and some in NATO) I think expected this to end in days with an ugly military defeat, capture of the capital, and then years of guerilla and political battles. We appear to be at a similar juncture as WWI in geopolitics and military organization/technology, where the relative…

Both Russia and who?

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#86

Post by Spooky23 »

icegreentea2 wrote: post #28
benbreen wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Author here - yes, this is what I was getting at. The false promise of a rapid victory over the French via encirclement from the right flank (in the style of Hannibal) really was a major factor in justifying the risks of war for the German General Staff. And because Schlieffen was preoccupied with the idea that an ancient battle could be a model for that approach, it distracted from the now-obvious technological chan…

How does machine guns = defensive warfare make the "Schlieffen Plan" impossible? The Germans were able to advance to the doorstep of Paris. They continuously tried to engage the Entente in a decisive battle (from the Frontier all the way to the Marne). They were unable to do so because the Entente refused to be engaged that way, and because the Entente had superior strategic/operational mobility (they were retreating…

The Germans had the right plan at the wrong time. It worked when they had meth and trucks in 1940.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#87

Post by hguant »

This was a fun article, but I think the core argument - indeed the article as a whole - is lacking because it fails to mention the actual major influence on the German general staff; Clausewitz, who did not rely on ancient battles and poorly drawn maps, but his own experiences and the immediate experience of those who were decimated by maneuver warfare in the Napoleonic wars.

If there was a battle that the German high command was obsessed with, it was Austerlitz, where Napoleon showed how maneuver and control of his armies could decimate larger forces. That's, well, the reason the German general staff came into existence - analysis of Napoleon's victories and style of leadership showed that just amassing troops wasn't enough, here had to be a plan, and an operational art of war, beyond mere tactics.

Many studies, even the very first war games, were done by the German high command, using exquisitely drawn maps (again, one of the things they learned from the preceding wars, actually knowing what terrain you're on, and where you are kind of matters a great deal) looking at the battles of the Napoleonic wars, and the power of maneuver over fires.

The issue comes, not from machine guns, but from the absolutely devasting power of artillery, which turns nearly maneuvering blocks of infantry into, well, horrible casualties. Generals on both sides of the war looked for that one crushing engagement, that one sweep where they could break the enemy morale and carry the day. Of course they looked to Cannae, and spoke of victory to match it, it's one of the great battles and is taught for a reason. However, I think it's a mistake to look at the speeches and letters extolling a battle from 2000 years ago while ignoring entirely the world changing war that happened in their nation's recent memory, the one they literally wrote the book about.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#88

Post by jojobas »

I don't get the point, the author seems to make the point that double envelopment was not relevant by WW1. Guess what, it was relevant in WW2 and is still relevant today.

The Reds were all about maneuver warfare in Russian Civil War and kept dreaming of it throughout the Cold War. A number of double envelopments has happened in the Ukraine war.

When you're economically weaker the war of annihilation is your only bet.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#89

Post by jcranmer »

gustavus wrote: post #15
ftxbro wrote: post #4

This blogpost seemed tenuous to me. - cannae is a famous historical battle - the map of the battle was drawn sixty years after the battle - a german military leader studied the battle - germany was in ww1

The argument is a little bit stronger than that if your familiar with the specifics. Which goes more like - Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen is obssesed with the battle of Canne - Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen's entire life's work is to figure out how to beat France and Russia. - Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen writes a plan which becomes the sacred text of how the German army is to conduct a two front w…

Not really.

The causes of WWI are complex, but the simplest summary is that the great powers of Europe reached a point where a war between any two of them would necessitate a war between all of them. To argue that Schlieffen contributed to WWI, you need to first argue that Schlieffen is the only thing that makes the German military believe it can win a two front war (which I think reverses cause and effect), and also argue that a German military believing that a two-front war is unwinnable would have caused the German government to work assiduously to keep war from breaking out (which I find unbelievable, given the tenor of Wilhelm's foreign policy).

In the actual event, Belgium doesn't play a major role in Britain's entry into the war (it's an easier sell than "diplomatic reasons we haven't exactly been telling you about" though, which is why it's played up so heavily). But look at a topographic map of Europe, and you'll realize that the easiest route from Germany to France is to go through northern Belgium [1], avoiding the more difficult terrain of eastern France. Even absent the specific Schlieffen plan, it's likely that German war plans would involve going through Belgium anyways, especially if your goal is as rapid a capture of Paris as possible.

If you look at the history of German war plans against France, essentially every modification is about pulling yet more troops from the invasion through Belgium to other sectors of the war, whether it be somewhere on the Eastern Front, or the direct border with France. This is really at odds with the mythologization of the Schlieffen plan, and I suspect that some of that myth-making comes from the apparent near-success of the German advance on Paris. People can look at how close it came to Paris and think that, had only Moltke not diverted yet another division of troops elsewhere, the Germans could have made it. Ignoring the fact that it failed because German logistics was literally keeling over dead [2], and pushing any more Germans into that army would have broken the logistics system faster.

[1] Incidentally, probably the biggest blow to the "original" Schlieffen plan (the actual war plans change considerably over time) is removing the plan to also march through the Dutch province of Limbourg, which now requires the entire Germany army to squeeze through a 12 mile gap near Liège.

[2] This of course referring to horse-drawn wagons, with the horses dying from overwork.

Re: Historical maps probably helped cause World War I

#90

Post by soco »

lo_zamoyski wrote: post #74
jacquesm wrote: post #68

I remember crossing from France into Spain and back again somewhere in the early 80's, when Europe definitely still had physical borders and not realizing I had done so until it had happened. My surprise stemmed in part from the fact that on the map there was a clear line and in real life there was absolutely nothing at all. It really helped me to understand once and for all that maps are just pieces of paper and tha…

I'm not sure what the profound insight is supposed to be here. Everyone knows that borders are established by convention and agreement. That doesn't mean they don't matter. Borders exist for the sake of the common good, in a way that's analogous to private property, which also exists for the sake of the common good. I realize this must be a strange notion for those of us raised in a culture that's been shot through w…

I would very much appreciate an explanation about why the above comment was so downvoted. You might disagree with them but it's a laid out argument definitely deserving more than an arrow down. So please tell, what is wrong with it? You disagree with the stated aim of a state? With the private vs common property? With long comments?
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