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Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

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Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#201

Post by rockemsockem »

gnfargbl wrote: post #9

> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…

So these people who are coordinating and transferring CSAM are presumably bringing others into the fold to more effectively distribute things. Otherwise digital technology would not make distribution and coordination easier. So law enforcement just needs to infiltrate these groups exactly the same way that they did in the past. The only difference is they don't even need to meet these creeps face to face until they arrest them. They can do it safely behind a screen and they can also scale their own efforts far more effectively.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#202

Post by dimmke »

phpisthebest wrote: post #162
gnfargbl wrote: post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Most child abuse comes from family members (which must be solved at the source) Yes. Since becoming an abuser is a process and not a moment, part of the solution must be making access to CSAM much harder. > And no, we are not 'condoning' it when we declare E2EE an overall good thing. Agreed. I'm sorry if I worded things in a way that caused you to see an implication which was not intended. To be clear: E2EE is a go…

>>That position says that to achieve privacy, I must tolerate CSAM. I want both privacy and for us not to tolerate CSAM. I want to have more money than Elon Musk..... sometimes life is not fair and we can not always get what we want... Any "backdoor" or "frontdoor" in encryption is a total failure of encryption. That is a immutable truth, more fixed in reality than the speed of light is in physics.

This is the part that's really infuriating to me that I've seen in several comments - this implication that the onus is on programmers or people who work in technology to somehow figure out a way to do this impossible thing, as if nobody has tried. And then they have the gall to say something like "I want both privacy and for us not to tolerate CSAM." without proposing any kind of theoretical solution.

If you can't even propose a hypothetical science fiction-esque way of achieving this, much less one that might actually be implementable now or in the near future (like, 5-10 years), you shouldn't get to have that opinion.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#203

Post by afavour »

tzs wrote: post #193

I'm curious about the new parental control features they announced at the same time as the iCloud photo scanning. My recollection is that when they withdrew the iCloud scanning they also withdrew the new parental controls. I'm curious why they also withdrew those. For those who don't remember the parental control, which were largely overshadowed by the controversy over the cloud stuff, they were to work like this: 1.…

I imagine they’d withdraw it because it’s a total PR nightmare.

“Apple knew my 14 year old was receiving sexual material and did nothing about it?!”

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#204

Post by tstrimple »

BLKNSLVR wrote: post #165
gnfargbl wrote: post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Most child abuse comes from family members (which must be solved at the source) Yes. Since becoming an abuser is a process and not a moment, part of the solution must be making access to CSAM much harder. > And no, we are not 'condoning' it when we declare E2EE an overall good thing. Agreed. I'm sorry if I worded things in a way that caused you to see an implication which was not intended. To be clear: E2EE is a go…

> Since becoming an abuser is a process and not a moment, part of the solution must be making access to CSAM much harder. In my opinion CSAM is a symptom, not a cause. It's difficult to "stumble across" that kind of material unless you're already actively looking for it, which means some amount of "damage" is already done. I also highly doubt that someone with no proclivities in that direction would 'turn' as a resul…

> It's difficult to "stumble across" that kind of material unless you're already actively looking for it

It's entirely likely that borderline cases (15-17 years old) are seen by millions of people without them realizing it. Pornhub is a popular "mainstream" porn website that has issues with CSAM and routinely removes it when found. It's entirely possible for "normal" consumers of pornographic material to stumble into CSAM in places like that unknowingly. When you're talking about obviously prepubescent children, I'm in full agreement that it's almost always restricted to folks who seek it out explicitly.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#205

Post by gonehome »

matwood wrote: post #163
_m8fo wrote: post #16

I’m not sure I understand Apple’s logic here. Are iCloud Photos in their data centers not scanned? Isn’t everything by default for iCloud users sent there automatically to begin with? Doesn’t the same logic around slippery slope also apply to cloud scans? This is not to say they should scan locally, but my understanding of CSAM was that it would only be scanned on its way to the cloud anyways, so users who didn’t use…

You are correct, the original method would only have scanned items destined to iCloud and only transmitted some hash of matching hashes. And yes, similar slippery arguments exist with any providers that store images unencrypted. They are all scanned today, and we have no idea what they are matched against. I speculated (and now we know) when this new scanning announced, that it was in preparation for full E2EE. Apple…

There are also ways to detect matches even with e2ee iirc and I suspect they found doing that instead easier than dealing with the previous approach.

At the time I also thought it was obvious it was in preparation for e2ee (despite loud people on HN who disagreed).

I do wonder if they had intended to have it be default on though, maybe not since probably better for most users to have a recovery option.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#206

Post by shuckles »

sneak wrote: post #13

The vast majority (99%+) of iCloud Photos are not e2ee and are readable to Apple. You can rest assured that they are scanning all of it serverside for illegal images presently. The kerfuffle was around clientside scanning, something that it has been reported that they dropped. I have thus far seen no statements from Apple that they actually intended to stop the deployment of clientside scanning. Serverside scanning h…

To be clear, they positively stated that they do not perform any server side scanning when this feature was first announced.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#207

Post by yyyk »

traceroute66 wrote: post #129
ben_w wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But the criminals ? Do you honestly think they'll think "oh no, game over" ? > No of course not. They'll pay some cryptographer in need of some money to develop a new E2EE tool and carry on. Business as usual. I used to think this, I changed my mind: just as it's difficult to do security correctly even when it's a legal requirement, only the most competent criminal organisations will do this correctly. Unfortunatel…

> only the most competent criminal organisations will do this correctly. All it takes is for one criminal to write a one-page guide to using GPG and circulate it to the group .... I know I mentioned paying a cryptographer earlier, but in reality downloading and using GPG is a crude and effective way of defeating an E2EE backdoor. Are the GPG devs going to backdoor GPG to satisfy governments ? Probably not.

>one-page guide to using GPG

GPG is infamous for being difficult to use correctly and for an antiquated design (IIRC forward secrecy is impossible?). And assuming E2EE backdoor actually exists, the gov is likely to be able to get at your key.

>Are the GPG devs going to backdoor GPG to satisfy governments?

No, but most users are unlikely to verify their GPG build is the right build.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#208

Post by janalsncm »

FredPret wrote: post #151
gnfargbl wrote: post #9

> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…

No, no, no. There is no parallel to be drawn between better encryption and worse outcomes for kids. Should we also outlaw high-performance cars because these sometimes serve as effective getaway vehicles for criminals? CSAM producers and consumers should be found and punished via old-fashioned methods. How was this done in the past? Did we just never catch any human traffickers / rapists? No, we had detectives who we…

> Should we also outlaw high performance cars

Yes. If consumer cars’ speed was capped to 100 mph it would affect a very small percentage of people and zero legitimate use.

The difference with encryption is that while it protects criminals from the police, it also protects legitimate users from criminals.

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#209

Post by judge2020 »

tzs wrote: post #193

I'm curious about the new parental control features they announced at the same time as the iCloud photo scanning. My recollection is that when they withdrew the iCloud scanning they also withdrew the new parental controls. I'm curious why they also withdrew those. For those who don't remember the parental control, which were largely overshadowed by the controversy over the cloud stuff, they were to work like this: 1.…

I believe they pulled that back as well, but now there is "Communication Safety" and "Sensitive Content Warning" available to everyone in iOS 17, coming out sometime on or after Sept 12: https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-17-preview/ ctrl-f "Sensitive Content Warning"

Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos

#210

Post by judge2020 »

gonehome wrote: post #205
matwood wrote: post #163

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You are correct, the original method would only have scanned items destined to iCloud and only transmitted some hash of matching hashes. And yes, similar slippery arguments exist with any providers that store images unencrypted. They are all scanned today, and we have no idea what they are matched against. I speculated (and now we know) when this new scanning announced, that it was in preparation for full E2EE. Apple…

There are also ways to detect matches even with e2ee iirc and I suspect they found doing that instead easier than dealing with the previous approach. At the time I also thought it was obvious it was in preparation for e2ee (despite loud people on HN who disagreed). I do wonder if they had intended to have it be default on though, maybe not since probably better for most users to have a recovery option.

> There are also ways to detect matches even with e2ee

By definition, encryption (with unique user keys) means you can't infer nor check what the content of the message is. Not without client cooperation, which is what this feature would have been.

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