31–40 of 336 posts
False positives would constitute a huge invasion of privacy. Even actual positives would be, a mom taking a private picture of her naked baby, how can you report that. They did well dropping this insane plan. The slippery slope argument is also a solid one.
> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
Much like other 'tough on crime' measures (of which destroying E2EE is one) the real problems need to be solved not at the point of consumption (drugs, guns, gangs, cartels) but at the root causes. Getting rid of E2EE just opens the avenue for the abuse of us by the government but in no way guarantees we'll meaningfully make children safer.
And no, we are not 'condoning' it when we declare E2EE an overall good thing. Real life is about tradeoffs not absolutes, and the tradeoff here is protection from the government for potentially billions vs. maybe arresting a few thousand more real criminals. This is a standard utilitarian tradeoff that 'condones' nothing.
> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
Indeed, they are correct. And they were also brought up when Apple announced that they would introduce this Orwellian system. Now they act like they just realized this.
> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
It's an incredibly bad thing. It's also an incredibly poor excuse to justify backdooring phones. Cops need to investigate the same way they always have, look for clues, go undercover, infiltrate, find where this stuff is actually being made, etc. Scanning everyone's phones would make their jobs significantly easier, no doubt, but it simply isn't worth the cost to us as a society and there is simply no good counter-ar…
"Apple" wasn't scanning your phone, neither was there a "backdoor".
If you would've had iCloud upload enabled (you'd be uploading all your photos to Apple's server, a place where they could scan ALL of your media anyway), the phone would've downloaded a set of hashes of KNOWN and HUMAN VERIFIED photos and videos of sexual abuse material. [1]
After THREE matches of known and checked CSAM, a check done 100% on-device with zero data moving anywhere, a "reduced-quality copy" would've been sent to a human for verification. If it was someone sending you hashbombs of intentional false matches or an innocuous pic that matched because some mathematical anomaly, the actual human would notice this instantly and no action would've been taken.
...but I still think I was the only HNer who actually read Apple's spec and just didn't go with Twitter hot-takes, so I'm fighting windmills over here.
Yes, there is always the risk that an authoritarian government could force Apple to insert checks for stuff other than CSAM to the downloaded database. But the exact same risk exists when you upload stuff to the cloud anyway and on an even bigger scale. (see point above about local checks not being enabled unless iCloud sync is enabled)
[1] It wasn't an SHA-1 hash where changing a single bit in the source would make the hash invalid, the people doing that were actually competent.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Where do you get this number?
e2ee for iCloud is currently opt-in, without prompts/nudging. Most power users don't even have it turned on or are aware of its existence. The setting is buried/hidden in submenus. Approximately no one uses it. Hopefully Apple will begin promoting users to migrate in future updates.
Mind sharing where it is on an iPhone and Mac? I have not been able to find it.
> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
I think that companies might need to enable some kind of mechanism for offline investigation of the devices though. The CSAM is a real problem, there are real predators out there, the only risks isn't CSAM and law enforcement does really need to have a way to investigate devices. Previously, my proposal was the ability to force the device scan the user content for fingerprints of the suspected content but only with physical access. Physical access enforces the law enforcement to actually have a real and official investigation with strong enough reasons to spend resources and risk repercussions when done improperly.
However, the project of scanning all the user content for policing the users was one thing that irked and later relieved when Apple abandoned the project.
Apple's explanation is good and I agree with them but IMHO the more important aspects are:
1) Being able to trust your devices being on your side. That is, your device shouldn't be policing you and shouldn't be snitching on you. At this time you might think that the authorities who would have controlled yor device are on your side but don't forget that those authorities can change. Today the devices may be catching CSAM, some day the authorities can start demanding catching people opposing vaccines and an election or a revolution later they can start catching people who want to have an abortion or having premarital sexual relations or other non-kosher affairs.
2) Being free of the notion that you are always watched. If your device can choose to reveal your private thoughts or business, be it by mistake or by design, you can no longer have thoughts that are unaligned with the official ones. This is like the idea of a god who is always watching you but instead of a creator and angels you get C level businessmen and employees who go through your stuff when the devices triggers decryption of your data(by false positives or by true positives).
Anyway, policing everyone all the time must be an idea that is rejected by the free world, if the free world doesn't intent to be as free as Democratic People's Republic of Korea is democratic.
> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
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