False positives would constitute a huge invasion of privacy. Even actual positives would be, a mom taking a private picture of her naked baby, how can you report that. They did well dropping this insane plan. The slippery slope argument is also a solid one.
Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
11–20 of 336 posts
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#12> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
It's an incredibly bad thing. It's also an incredibly poor excuse to justify backdooring phones.
Cops need to investigate the same way they always have, look for clues, go undercover, infiltrate, find where this stuff is actually being made, etc.
Scanning everyone's phones would make their jobs significantly easier, no doubt, but it simply isn't worth the cost to us as a society and there is simply no good counter-argument to that.
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#13The vast majority (99%+) of iCloud Photos are not e2ee and are readable to Apple.
You can rest assured that they are scanning all of it serverside for illegal images presently.
The kerfuffle was around clientside scanning, something that it has been reported that they dropped. I have thus far seen no statements from Apple that they actually intended to stop the deployment of clientside scanning.
Serverside scanning has been possible (and likely) for a long time, which illuminates their "slippery slope" argument as farce (unless they intend to force migrate everyone to e2ee storage in the future).
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#14The vast majority (99%+) of iCloud Photos are not e2ee and are readable to Apple. You can rest assured that they are scanning all of it serverside for illegal images presently. The kerfuffle was around clientside scanning, something that it has been reported that they dropped. I have thus far seen no statements from Apple that they actually intended to stop the deployment of clientside scanning. Serverside scanning h…
Where do you get this number?
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#15I haven't forgot about the guy that sent photos of his child to his doctor and was investigated for child pornography. With these systems, in my humble opinion, you are just one innocent photo at the beach away from your life turned upside down.
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#16I’m not sure I understand Apple’s logic here. Are iCloud Photos in their data centers not scanned? Isn’t everything by default for iCloud users sent there automatically to begin with? Doesn’t the same logic around slippery slope also apply to cloud scans?
This is not to say they should scan locally, but my understanding of CSAM was that it would only be scanned on its way to the cloud anyways, so users who didn’t use iCloud would’ve never been scanned to begin with.
Their new proposed set of tools seems like a good enough compromise from the original proposal in any case.
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#17> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
It's an incredibly bad thing. It's also an incredibly poor excuse to justify backdooring phones. Cops need to investigate the same way they always have, look for clues, go undercover, infiltrate, find where this stuff is actually being made, etc. Scanning everyone's phones would make their jobs significantly easier, no doubt, but it simply isn't worth the cost to us as a society and there is simply no good counter-ar…
[deleted]
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#18The who is often interesting with these stories. > a new child safety group known as Heat Initiative Doesn't even have a website or any kind of social media presence; it literally doesn't appear to exist apart from the reporting on Apple's response to them, which is entirely based on Apple sharing their response with media, not the group interacting with media. > Sarah Gardner on the other hand previously appeared as…
> So despite looking a bit fishy at first, this doesn't seem to come from a christofascist group. Why would you assume this in the first place?
They use hysteria to generate power in society.
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#19The vast majority (99%+) of iCloud Photos are not e2ee and are readable to Apple. You can rest assured that they are scanning all of it serverside for illegal images presently. The kerfuffle was around clientside scanning, something that it has been reported that they dropped. I have thus far seen no statements from Apple that they actually intended to stop the deployment of clientside scanning. Serverside scanning h…
Where do you get this number?
e2ee for iCloud is currently opt-in, without prompts/nudging. Most power users don't even have it turned on or are aware of its existence. The setting is buried/hidden in submenus.
Approximately no one uses it.
Hopefully Apple will begin promoting users to migrate in future updates.
Re: Apple clarifies why it abandoned plan to detect CSAM in iCloud photos
#20> “Scanning every user’s privately stored iCloud data would create new threat vectors for data thieves to find and exploit," Neuenschwander wrote. "It would also inject the potential for a slippery slope of unintended consequences. Scanning for one type of content, for instance, opens the door for bulk surveillance and could create a desire to search other encrypted messaging systems across content types.” Both of th…
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