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Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

thetimes.co.uk

151–160 of 1001 posts

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#151
post #139
post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Huanan Seafood market paper has been heavily critized. Especially the fact that covid was not found in a single animal sample does make the evidence rather weak. In addition it seems that the lack of sampling from outside the market and the fact that the market is a busy place in the center of the city where the virus would likely be once it's spreading from person to person , does not really lend support to the…

>The Origins of Covid-19 — Why It Matters (and Why It Doesn’t) >More than half of the earliest Covid-19 cases were connected to the Huanan market, and epidemiologic mapping revealed that the concentration of cases was centered there. In January 2020, Chinese officials cleared the market without testing live animals, but positive environmental samples, including those from an animal cage and a hair-and-feather–removal…

[flagged]

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#152
post #145
post #55

After a quick read of the article, it presents no new data, and is replete with innuendo pointing at the Wuhan lab, rather than any direct evidence. Most importantly, the general reader should know that all labs researching viruses do research on dangerous viruses. After all there is no incentive to research benign viruses. So the fact that the Wuhan lab worked on coronaviruses is not in itself an indication of any i…

The map showing the clustering around the lab is not labelled in the article. It looks like the map from the senate report which used internet search history. I recall that their point in the original report was that there was a cluster of internet searches for flu-like symptoms clustered around the institute, rather than the market. There is no new direct evidence in the article, simply the weight of existing indire…

Research applications, in particular to obtain funding.

It is common for researchers to apply to grants/funding for work they are already doing. They tweak the research application to meet whatever the funding criteria is using knowledge they have from existing experiments.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#153

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Daszak/ecohealth alliance and by extension NIH and us govt are also culpable for a Wuhan lab originating virus

You're right that Daszak and the Ecohealth Alliance are culpable, but it must be noted that various USG orgs were not supportive of his actions

> The report he finally did submit stated that scientists planned to create an infectious clone of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), a novel coronavirus found in dromedaries that had emerged in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and killed 35% of the humans it infected. The report also made clear that the NIH grant had already been used to construct two chimeric coronaviruses similar to the one that caused Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which emerged in 2002 and went on to cause at least 774 deaths worldwide. (A chimeric virus is one that combines fragments of different viruses.) These revelations prompted the NIH’s grant specialists to ask a critical question: Should the work be subject to a federal moratorium on what was called gain-of-function research?

> But the [2015 research paper he cited](https://www.nature.com/articles/nm.3985) was not particularly reassuring. In it, Shi Zhengli and a preeminent coronavirus researcher at the University of North Carolina, Ralph Baric, mixed components of SARS-like viruses from different species, and created a novel chimera that was able to directly infect human cells. (Baric did not respond to written questions seeking comment.)

> If anything, the MERS study Daszak proposed was even riskier. So he pitched a compromise to the NIH: that if any of the recombined strains showed 10 times greater growth than a natural virus, “we will immediately: i) stop all experiments with the mutant, ii) inform our NIAID Program Officer and the UNC [Institutional Biosafety Committee] of these results and iii) participate in decision making trees to decide appropriate paths forward.”

> This mention of UNC brought a puzzled response from an NIH program officer, who pointed out that the proposal had said the research would be performed at the WIV. “Can you clarify where the work with the chimeric viruses will actually be performed?” the officer wrote. Ten days later, with still no response from Daszak, the program officer emailed him again. On June 27, Daszak responded, buoyant as ever:

> “You are correct to identify a mistake in our letter. UNC has no oversight of the chimera work, all of which will be conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology…. We will clarify tonight with Prof. Zhengli Shi exactly who will be notified if we see enhanced replication…my understanding is that I will be notified straight away, as [principal investigator], and that I can then notify you at NIAID. Apologies for the error!”

> Allowing such risky research to go forward at the Wuhan Institute of Virology was “simply crazy, in my opinion,” says Jack Nunberg, director of the Montana Biotechnology Center. “Reasons are lack of oversight, lack of regulation, the environment in China,” where scientists who publish in prestigious journals get rewarded by the government, creating dangerous incentives. “So that is what really elevates it to the realm of, ‘No, this shouldn’t happen.’”

In general, his actions make clear he's much more aligned with the Chinese government than the US, so extending Daszak to US govt purely based off of nationality seems unjust.

> On January 30, Daszak went on CGTN America, the U.S. outpost for Chinese state television, and said two things that proved to be spectacularly wrong. “I’m very optimistic…that this outbreak will begin to slow down,” he said. “We’re seeing a small amount of human-to-human transmission in other countries, but it’s not uncontrollable." He went on to conclude that the Chinese government was taking all necessary steps “to be open and transparent, and work with WHO, and talk to scientists from around the world, and where necessary, bring them in to help. They’re doing that. It’s exactly what needs to happen.”

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#154
post #55

After a quick read of the article, it presents no new data, and is replete with innuendo pointing at the Wuhan lab, rather than any direct evidence. Most importantly, the general reader should know that all labs researching viruses do research on dangerous viruses. After all there is no incentive to research benign viruses. So the fact that the Wuhan lab worked on coronaviruses is not in itself an indication of any i…

> indication of any ill-intent

I don’t think ill-intent is the accusation, I think the argument is that the lab has poor safety protocols and made errors. I haven’t studied the “lab leak theory” extensively, but everything I read seems to be about lab failures resulting in a leak, not anything purposeful or ill-intentioned.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are you implying the lab shouldn't have existed at all? And/or future coronavirus labs shouldn't exist either?

I'd like for high risk biological research to be done under the same security arrangements as nuclear weapons research. Covid and influenza have together killed several orders of magnitude more humans in the last 150 years than nuclear weapons/accidents have. Thus GoF research presents a potential human cost much higher than nuclear weapons, and should be treated as such. If that makes it "too expensive and slow" the…

Well, historically, you know, nuclear weapons research involved a lot of cavalier scientists doing dangerous things with limited knowledge, and of course in the early days, there was plenty of above-ground range testing; is that something you want included as well?

If my information is correct, I believe that nearly all nuclear testing these days is 100% simulation on supercomputers, which is as safe as safe can be, as long as you can trust supercomputer simulations to render the correct answer to those trusting researchers.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#156
post #55

After a quick read of the article, it presents no new data, and is replete with innuendo pointing at the Wuhan lab, rather than any direct evidence. Most importantly, the general reader should know that all labs researching viruses do research on dangerous viruses. After all there is no incentive to research benign viruses. So the fact that the Wuhan lab worked on coronaviruses is not in itself an indication of any i…

The problem with Wuhan lab is that the Chinese dictatorship blocks any independent inquiry into it. If they had nothing to hide, they wouldn't be hiding everything. If that was a criminal case, this kind of behavior would be taken as a evidence of guilt.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#157
post #108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> yet the lab itself did nothing to help during the pandemic. Which people in this thread are somehow believing as truth instead of the bald-faced propaganda it is. Do you actually think a virus research lab in the epicentre of an outbreak would not be put to use? From Wikipedia: > As the virus spread worldwide, the institute continued its investigation. In February 2020, a team led by Shi Zhengli at the institute we…

Gene sequencing is table stakes with modern tech, and many countries did that during the pandemic. We don't need a BSL-4 level lab in the middle of a large city to do a gene sequence. It happened that they published early what many other labs would have done (and did do). On the other hand, the vaccines and effective cures had nothing to do with their work. The benefit/risk ratio seems very poor here.

Afaik they weren't even applying BSL4 security to their coronavirus research. On top of that, before the outbreak, the Pasteur institute, who was incidentally supposed to be a research partner but was kept at arms' length, raised an alarm on their apparent general lack of safety compliance.

That and the fact that the Chinese dicatorship blocking any inquiry into the matter are enough to put the blame on that lab until proven otherwise.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#158
post #55

After a quick read of the article, it presents no new data, and is replete with innuendo pointing at the Wuhan lab, rather than any direct evidence. Most importantly, the general reader should know that all labs researching viruses do research on dangerous viruses. After all there is no incentive to research benign viruses. So the fact that the Wuhan lab worked on coronaviruses is not in itself an indication of any i…

Some janitor or whatever sold an infected animal to the market.

It could be as simple as someone got infected in the lab and went to the market.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#159

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd like for high risk biological research to be done under the same security arrangements as nuclear weapons research. Covid and influenza have together killed several orders of magnitude more humans in the last 150 years than nuclear weapons/accidents have. Thus GoF research presents a potential human cost much higher than nuclear weapons, and should be treated as such. If that makes it "too expensive and slow" the…

Well, historically, you know, nuclear weapons research involved a lot of cavalier scientists doing dangerous things with limited knowledge, and of course in the early days, there was plenty of above-ground range testing; is that something you want included as well? If my information is correct, I believe that nearly all nuclear testing these days is 100% simulation on supercomputers, which is as safe as safe can be,…

Not only that, the US is missing 6 nuclear weapons.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/us-military-missing...

To add to your point, regardless of safeguards and protocols, accidents happen.

Re: Inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid

#160
post #138
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And crucially, researchers from the Wuhan lab were studying bat virus samples from Laos, before covid. https://www.business-standard.com/amp/article/current-affair...

Those viruses are slightly more related to SARSCoV2 than RaTG13, however note 1) that they were found even further away from Wuhan than was RaTG13 and 2) that they still remain too different from SARSCoV2 to be its direct ancestor. One of the things we know for sure is that that about 50 years of evolutionary changes separate RaTG13 and BANAL-52 from SARSCoV2, so they are not its direct ancestors.

I don't understand this line of argument. The facts are that 1) the virus outbreak was in Wuhan, 2) that there ws a local lab working on virus samples that come from all over the world and 3) as far as we know, the particular strain that affected Wuhan is not local. Altogether, this should add confidence to the lab leak theory, not detract from it.
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