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What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

warwick.ac.uk

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Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#71

Post by climb_stealth »

It doesn't quite answer this question but a good resource to learn what bats are like are the Batzilla and Megabattie youtube channels [0]. They are Australian bat rescuers and carers. Lovely ladies, short clips, no clickbait or other stupid youtube shenanigans. Just people who genuinely care for little people and try to spread the word. Educational as well. It feels like I know a whole lot about bats just from watching their videos every now and then.

Also, Flying Foxes are beautiful [1].

[0]

https://www.youtube.com/@BatzillatheBat

https://www.youtube.com/@Megabattie

[1]

https://www.weekendnotes.com/im/004/06/greyheaded-flying-fox...

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#72

Post by fsckboy »

bondarchuk wrote: post #15

I am increasingly of the opinion that the phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat", are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint. Just because these sentences make sense in our everyday language, does not mean they are suitable for technical and rigorous philosophical discussions. For one, the "something" in the 2nd formulation (or simpl…

> phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat",

> are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a

> plain old dualistic standpoint

philosophers have differentiated these into three different questions

"What is it like to be?" has to do with the nature of consciousness.

"word games" has to do with any use of language, nothing to do with consciousness. You could make a word-game critique of any statement.

"dualism" comes in a number of forms, not clearly related to one another (physical body vs soul/spirit, earthly realm vs heaven; mind-body, consciousness vs quantum chemistry) but all having a similar problem. Any place there is posited a dualism, then what is the interaction between the two duals, how could one even perceive the other?

but declaring "there is no dualism", while eliminating that problem, does not eliminate the question as to why it was posited in the first place: why (or how) does it feel like anything to be conscious, feel pain, etc. Saying "that's what evolved" is just hand waving. What's the difference between being alive and dead? Do rocks have a little bit of consciousness?

My personal preference (lifelong atheist-science type) is that the "abstract" world is all that exists, there is no physical world. Everything we study in physics and chemistry we arrive at via abstract mathematical values, relationships and computation. I think that is the nature of the universe, and while it doesn't "solve" the consciousness problem, I feel like it moves the goalposts in the right direction.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#73

Post by hackinthebochs »

naasking wrote: post #68
arolihas wrote: post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are you asserting you don't have any subjective experience? Or that you only feel like you have a subjective experience and it doesn't actually exist?

I am arguing that subjective experience is not what we perceive it to be. The qualities that we perceive of it are deceptive, and not necessarily reflective of anything real.

>The qualities that we perceive of it are deceptive, and not necessarily reflective of anything real.

This claim only makes sense given a particular definition of "real", but if (the qualities of) our subjective experiences are outside of that definition, why should we take (the qualities of) subjective experience to not be real, rather than the definition to be impoverished? What is real should encompass every way in which things are or can be. The qualities of subjective experience included.

The problem isn't with taking subjectivity to be real, but with taking everything that is real to be object based. There are no qualia "things" in the world. But we should not see this as implying there are no qualia.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#74

Post by jancsika »

naasking wrote: post #39
o_nate wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't understand what you mean by sleight of hand. It seems a very straightforward question that makes sense in our everyday use of language, as you admit. Just because it's difficult to rigorously analyze this statement into scientific concepts, it doesn't follow that the question is invalid. In fact the point of the question is to show shortcomings in our current science. Also, I would dispute the assertion that…

> I don't understand what you mean by sleight of hand. He means that it implicitly smuggles in a certain conclusion. For instance, "I think therefore I am" seems logically sound, but actually begs the question in presupposing "I" to then conclude that "I" exists. Or ask an innocent person a question like, "when did you stop beating your wife?" > There are many synonymous ways of phrasing the question: e.g., describe…

> He means that it implicitly smuggles in a certain conclusion. For instance, "I think therefore I am" seems logically sound, but actually begs the question in presupposing "I" to then conclude that "I" exists.

That's not correct.

It means if something-- anything-- is in the act of reflecting about thinking-- that is, reflecting about thinking about anything at all, including questioning existence-- then that thing exists only in that it is an entity capable of reflecting upon its own existence. And only during the act of reflecting on thinking is this true. And, most importantly, this notion is ineluctably cordoned off from any and all evidence-based logic which requires potentially illusory sensory input.

The part in italics came from others who read and critiqued Descartes. In any case, his basic logic is sound. Hume did the clearest job of critiquing it, and even he didn't claim Descartes had made a logical fallacy here.

It's been awhile since I've read it, but Descartes probably implied his notion was more powerful than it turns out to be-- i.e., that he could build an epistemology on it. Nevertheless, the basic notion is certainly not a logical fallacy.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#75

Post by AlbertCory »

uoaei wrote: post #64
AlbertCory wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> while nonetheless projecting an air of competency (Puts nose up in the air and sniffs contemptuously)

There's wading in water, there's treading in water, there's snorkeling, there's diving, there's standing on a boat, there's drifting aimlessly. They are all different ways of interacting with depth. If you have a problem with the extent to which I've represented my knowledge and how my representation of those specific things I discuss differs from how experts deal with them, you are always free to provide something b…

Ooh. "snark and contempt"

Project much?

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#76

Post by UIUC_06 »

uoaei wrote: post #65
AlbertCory wrote: post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

ok, so anything with our "shared history and similar biology" is assumed to have consciousness? How similar is "similar"? Is it just mammals, or just certain orders, or can organisms in the other branches be assumed to have consciousness too?

The question of "where is the line" presumes there even is a line between matter ("objects") that expresses or does not express consciousness, which is also a big and unsubstantiated claim that requires proving. Occam's razor (i.e., our standard scientific apparatus of null vs alternative hypotheses) would seem to indicate it is appropriate to assume there is no difference in kind, only difference in degree, until th…

No need to define it or prove it. Just assume it.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#77

Post by C-x_C-f »

hax0ron3 wrote: post #62
bondarchuk wrote: post #15

I am increasingly of the opinion that the phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat", are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint. Just because these sentences make sense in our everyday language, does not mean they are suitable for technical and rigorous philosophical discussions. For one, the "something" in the 2nd formulation (or simpl…

>are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint Are you assuming that dualism is invalid? If so, why? There is something to the distinction between physical reality and subjective experience that so far no-one has managed to explain. >I can easily imagine a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness which would still not lead to a valid answer of "what is it like to be a bat"…

I think one can salvage the distinction between physical reality and subjective experience without positing an abstract ("Cartesian") dualism. It just so happens that most experiences can be categorized as being either external or internal, so we are led to believe that every experience fits into one and only one bucket. But I think that there are plenty of experiences that are not so easily categorized (e.g. feelings).

Demanding that there must be a perfect partition (i.e. assuming dualism) is an additional requirement, but it's not obvious that it should be a good requirement for a sound philosophical theory. In fact I believe it not to be sound, and I believe many philosophical hard problems come from bending over backwards trying to impose this condition.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#78

Post by peter303 »

I suggest the human-mammal mind readily adapts to new sense modes. Driving a car or riding a bicycle feels like an extension of the body after you mastered it. A grid of bump actuators agains the skin or tongue is perceived as an image after one uses it for a while. So I reject the idea that bat consciousness is special. We'd perceive sound images had we had high frequency ears and emitters.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#79

Post by naasking »

AlbertCory wrote: post #56
naasking wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you have it backwards: we would need a reason to think they don't have it, given our shared history and similar biology.

ok, so anything with our "shared history and similar biology" is assumed to have consciousness? How similar is "similar"? Is it just mammals, or just certain orders, or can organisms in the other branches be assumed to have consciousness too?

The least like us, the less likely, obviously. Animals with very similar neurology almost certainly experience something very similar to ours.

How similar? Good question. Assume nothing and truth will out.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#80

Post by naasking »

hackinthebochs wrote: post #73
naasking wrote: post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am arguing that subjective experience is not what we perceive it to be. The qualities that we perceive of it are deceptive, and not necessarily reflective of anything real.

>The qualities that we perceive of it are deceptive, and not necessarily reflective of anything real. This claim only makes sense given a particular definition of "real", but if (the qualities of) our subjective experiences are outside of that definition, why should we take (the qualities of) subjective experience to not be real, rather than the definition to be impoverished? What is real should encompass every way i…

Would you take a "day job" to be ontologically real? It is a way in which the aggregate of particles that make up your body regularly behave on a semi periodic schedule. That would seem to fit your definition of "encompassing every way in which things are or can be".

If it is real, isn't there still a need to distinguish ontological primitives from aggregate properties like the above? Why shouldn't this be what we mean by "real"?

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