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What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

warwick.ac.uk

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Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#61

Post by visarga »

goatlover wrote: post #28
visarga wrote: post #6

I think the closest we might get to actually learning what it is like to be a bat is by unsupervised learning + a bit of manual labelling on top. A neural net could learn their states and dynamics, by training on a million hours of bat recordings. These representations will already encode bat states and values, so we just need the bridge to human language, which is easy to build with a pretrained language model. This…

We still won't know what the sonar experience is.

But we know how it relates to everything. Neural nets are good at that. And then we can cluster the data and interpret it, or correlate it with a visual signal.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#62

Post by hax0ron3 »

bondarchuk wrote: post #15

I am increasingly of the opinion that the phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat", are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint. Just because these sentences make sense in our everyday language, does not mean they are suitable for technical and rigorous philosophical discussions. For one, the "something" in the 2nd formulation (or simpl…

>are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint

Are you assuming that dualism is invalid? If so, why? There is something to the distinction between physical reality and subjective experience that so far no-one has managed to explain.

>I can easily imagine a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness which would still not lead to a valid answer of "what is it like to be a bat"

Then it would not be a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness. A complete physicalist explanation of consciousness, by definition, would have to account for subjective experience/qualia/whatever you want to call it.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#63

Post by tasty_freeze »

mkehrt wrote: post #20
visarga wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> how on earth does consciousness arise from material "meat" Let me try. It is a way to perceive with goals in mind. Nothing special, just perception, future reward prediction conditioned on current state, and learning from outcomes. The whole specialness of consciousness is that it carries inside not just our external world, but also our plans and goals. So in this place where they meet, and where there are conseque…

[flagged]

Your response it needlessly insulting. The person you are talking about has taken a complex topic and expressed their model for consciousness in a short, clinical way. Then you insult them as not being a real human for describing their model clinically.

A more charitable response might be: I don't understand how your model addresses the origin of consciousness. Could you elaborate on that?

Personally, I understood their point and didn't question whether a human wrote it.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#64

Post by uoaei »

AlbertCory wrote: post #54
uoaei wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Consciousness is only defined in the philosophy of mind as "phenomenological experience", full stop, i.e., "experiencing the color yellow" as something beyond just a certain wavelength incident upon and mechanistic reaction within the organism. "Consciousness" as defined in colloquial settings, such as the one we inhabit now, is usually substantially more elaborate than thae one used by philosophers and includes thin…

> while nonetheless projecting an air of competency (Puts nose up in the air and sniffs contemptuously)

There's wading in water, there's treading in water, there's snorkeling, there's diving, there's standing on a boat, there's drifting aimlessly. They are all different ways of interacting with depth.

If you have a problem with the extent to which I've represented my knowledge and how my representation of those specific things I discuss differs from how experts deal with them, you are always free to provide something beyond snark and contempt.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#65

Post by uoaei »

AlbertCory wrote: post #56
naasking wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you have it backwards: we would need a reason to think they don't have it, given our shared history and similar biology.

ok, so anything with our "shared history and similar biology" is assumed to have consciousness? How similar is "similar"? Is it just mammals, or just certain orders, or can organisms in the other branches be assumed to have consciousness too?

The question of "where is the line" presumes there even is a line between matter ("objects") that expresses or does not express consciousness, which is also a big and unsubstantiated claim that requires proving. Occam's razor (i.e., our standard scientific apparatus of null vs alternative hypotheses) would seem to indicate it is appropriate to assume there is no difference in kind, only difference in degree, until there is evidence to prove otherwise.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#66

Post by arolihas »

naasking wrote: post #52
o_nate wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm afraid this is far too clever for me to understand. I know what I mean by subjective experience, and no amount of linguistic hair-splitting will convince me it doesn't exist.

You mean you think you know. If I put an object in your blind spot, you'll also swear up and down there's nothing in front of you.

Are you asserting you don't have any subjective experience? Or that you only feel like you have a subjective experience and it doesn't actually exist?

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#67

Post by arolihas »

visarga wrote: post #61
goatlover wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We still won't know what the sonar experience is.

But we know how it relates to everything. Neural nets are good at that. And then we can cluster the data and interpret it, or correlate it with a visual signal.

If you did that with all the colors of the rainbow, do you think that is anywhere near the experience of seeing the color red? It seems pretty clear to me that it doesn't even come close and isn't remotely relevant.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#68

Post by naasking »

arolihas wrote: post #66
naasking wrote: post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You mean you think you know. If I put an object in your blind spot, you'll also swear up and down there's nothing in front of you.

Are you asserting you don't have any subjective experience? Or that you only feel like you have a subjective experience and it doesn't actually exist?

I am arguing that subjective experience is not what we perceive it to be. The qualities that we perceive of it are deceptive, and not necessarily reflective of anything real.

Re: What is it like to be a bat? (1974) [pdf]

#70

Post by [deleted] »

hax0ron3 wrote: post #62
bondarchuk wrote: post #15

I am increasingly of the opinion that the phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat", are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint. Just because these sentences make sense in our everyday language, does not mean they are suitable for technical and rigorous philosophical discussions. For one, the "something" in the 2nd formulation (or simpl…

>are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint Are you assuming that dualism is invalid? If so, why? There is something to the distinction between physical reality and subjective experience that so far no-one has managed to explain. >I can easily imagine a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness which would still not lead to a valid answer of "what is it like to be a bat"…

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