Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sun Tzu's work was aimed at nobled who had zero experience and knowledge in warfare; a lot of it is low-hanging fruit, but you have to build up the basis for these things like "make sure your soldiers have food" and "don't tell your opponent what you're up to" in these people. It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander. I'm sure they have good advisors and the good one…
> the president is also the top military commander It's also true in quite some other countries, and it is to ensure that the military remains subordinated to the civil government, after the many examples of military coups in History.
Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
91–100 of 211 posts
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#92As both a former army officer as well as someone who appreciates historical Chinese, it pains me to say that I found it underwhelming. I’m not saying that any one on here is like this, but in my experience it def attracts a certain type who, among other things, have a zero sum, “business is war” mindset that’s a tad creepy. Unlike everyone I know who has actually served .
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#93Finally. I remember reading Sun Tzu and thinking "hmm all this stuff is either very specific to ancient China, or unsubstantiated". As in, everyone sounded like distilled wisdom, but it smelled. The thing that was missing I think was that normally when you read a text about something that's trying to make a general point, it cites a whole bunch of historical precedents. "Always drive deep into enemy territory, like X…
Well, it's a fairly brief text. I've got a copy of Art of War here, but most of it is commentary by others. Sun Tzu's own text is not a lot. He throws out some principles without explanation or examples, and that's limiting it's practical applicability quite a bit. I suspect much of his more questionable advice is stuff that happened to work once for him in specific circumstances, and it'd be great if he told a bit m…
It's not "good advice in many cases", it was (prior to the availability of first railroads and then trucks, and with the very notable exception of all-cavalry armies operating on grass steppe) an extremely basic fact on how an army works. Bringing your own supplies was, over long distances, not just bad advice, nor just hard to do, it was logistically impossible. Napoleon did not (yet) have the choice to do it any other way, the alternative was not to invade Russia, or to do it piecemeal while consolidating and developing conquered parts before moving on, which would have taken decades.
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#94Earlier quoted context omitted.
In Germany the (civilian) defense minister is the head of the armed forces. (Though I think that role might go to the chancellor in times of war. Not sure.)
According to the wiki, it's the chancellor in wartime ( https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundeswehr ). Either way, it's a civilian position that's temporarily filled by the ruling government which was democratically elected.
Yes, just like in the US.
My main point was that the chancellor is not the commander in chief by default. Only under exceptional circumstances.
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#95Earlier quoted context omitted.
In Spain it’s the King… anachronic af, I know.
It's traditionally the head of state, so King makes sense. In Bulgaria the president is mostly a figurehead with very limited power (basically easily repeatable veto, appoint ambassadors and temporary cabinets when there's no active government pending elections), but is still the commander in chief of the armed forces.
That might have something to do with a leftover from the English Civil War. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Model_Army
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#96Finally. I remember reading Sun Tzu and thinking "hmm all this stuff is either very specific to ancient China, or unsubstantiated". As in, everyone sounded like distilled wisdom, but it smelled. The thing that was missing I think was that normally when you read a text about something that's trying to make a general point, it cites a whole bunch of historical precedents. "Always drive deep into enemy territory, like X…
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#97Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#98As both a former army officer as well as someone who appreciates historical Chinese, it pains me to say that I found it underwhelming. I’m not saying that any one on here is like this, but in my experience it def attracts a certain type who, among other things, have a zero sum, “business is war” mindset that’s a tad creepy. Unlike everyone I know who has actually served .
Sun Tzu's work was aimed at nobled who had zero experience and knowledge in warfare; a lot of it is low-hanging fruit, but you have to build up the basis for these things like "make sure your soldiers have food" and "don't tell your opponent what you're up to" in these people. It's why I don't understand why in the US, the president is also the top military commander. I'm sure they have good advisors and the good one…
So, yes, he does have final command (subject to "legal orders" and similar restrictions). But he's not commanding in the normal sense of a military commander.
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#99Earlier quoted context omitted.
Modern militaries don't seem to enjoy the freedom to act and maneuver that a classic general enjoyed in the field (for good reasons). Modern requirements for transparency and democracy, and the interest of the military industrial complex don't help when you try to "appear weak when you are strong" or to "disguise a plan". For a mid-level army officer these things are probably even less applicable. I still think there…
> Modern militaries don't seem to enjoy the freedom to act and maneuver that a classic general enjoyed in the field (for good reasons). Modern requirements for transparency and democracy I think modern democracies do a much better job of separating military and civilian leadership than dictatorships do. Putin seems to be too personally involved in micromanaging his war, insisting on conquests that are simply not poss…
That makes it sound as if Putin attacked because an opportunity presented itself.
I don't think that's why he attacked. I think he attacked because he felt he had no choice. Not because NATO was crowding into his borderlands, which is Putin's story; but because following the collapse of Soviet communism and the USSR, the rump Russia was clearly a state dependent mainly on resource-extraction, which desn't promise a great independent future. Especially with Europe's increasing development of non-fossil energy, earnings from fossil fuel exports could be expected to diminish rapidly.
But why Ukraine? Well, setting aside his deranged opinions about the historic unity of Ukraine and Russia, and the historic destiny of the "Rus", Ukraine was rapidly becoming closer to Europe, and Ukrainians were clearly happy with that prospect. Having a successful, happy fragment of the USSR on his border threatened his control over his own population.
> Turns out he incorrectly believed the strong appearance of his own army.
Agreed! In fact everyone overestimated the strength of his army.
Re: Notes from a Sun Tzu Skeptic (2019)
#100Earlier quoted context omitted.
> the president is also the top military commander It's also true in quite some other countries, and it is to ensure that the military remains subordinated to the civil government, after the many examples of military coups in History.
As if they can't just ignore the civilian commander if they really wanted to?