Two-party iterated prisoner's dilemma is hard enough. Sensible players will coordinate with something like tit-for-tat, but that only works when both parties start off on the right foot. Regardless of initial strategy, the chances of degenerating towards the mutual-defection Nash equilibrium increase with the number of parties. The only prior example of world coordination at this level would be nuclear disarmament ac…
> Climate change mitigation, which more closely resembles AI safety in both complexity and (lack of) barriers to entry, has been sporadic, inconsistent, and only enacted to the extent... Climate change mitigation is the perfect example. Nobody is doing anything, nobody seems to care, everyone cheats with ridiculous carbon credits or carbon offset vouchers made out of thin air, etc. It's likely the planet will become…
Sure, because the planet is already hostile. However, AI could potentially do much more harm much more quickly if we're not careful. In the pessimistic scenario we could all be dead in 10 years from now due to AI or experience a modern society ending event literally tomorrow. Climate change never posed such an immediate and complete risk