Taiwan is a vital island that is under serious threat

>disallow foreign military aid

Current hardware delivery aren't coming through during active hostilities. Unlike RU who doesn't have capabilities to deny vast UKR + EU land logistics, PRC can proactively deny air+maritime around TW. Optics of PRC allowing foreign powers to actively support seperatist gov on Chinese territory during active Chinese civil war which includes TW soil and 12nm territorial waters is not something tolerable for domestic PRC politics. Or that TW cannot be supplied during war time without invading legal Chinese soil something PRC sovereignty politics won't allow due to history. That's the significant political consideration, UKR supporters moving supplies through soverign UKR territory aren't legal belligerants, supplyiers of TW that necessarily involves what PRC percieves to be invading Chinese territory are.

>imply a global conflict

Yes as does blockading PRC, that's where the entire US can choke PRC strategy falls apart, it now feasibly escalates to CONUS war. If US blockades PRC (i.e. US initiates legal war), then PRC reciprocating attack on CONUS no longer falls under art5. Of course NATO could still join, but with what hardware, based where? Even G7 boycott weatherable, this isn't 2010s when PRC was relatively export dependent, export GDP to west is now barely 10%, with mutual knock on supply chains. Most of G7+ are MUCH more trade dependant than PRC as well and will hurt more, i.e. even least trade dependant US is going to have to contest with trillions lost in advanced industries because TW leading edge semi gone, and likely crippled domestic US semi because they will still be dependant on east asian semi supply chains that's not going to survive a broad war. Meanwhile most of that hardware is already sanctioned / denied to PRC. This doesn't suggest PRC wants a broader war, but broader war does open up host of strategic reach goals and opportunities that asymmetrically devastates PRC containers.

>before they had indigenous weapons and while they had a nuclear protector

Yes, PRC had no issue tussling with nuclear powers while not being nuclear power herself. And she tussled with her alleged nuclear protector USSR as well. Multiple times + other geopolitical drama, all less important than TW.

> civilian targets are targeted

This excludes TW civilian targets (and likely strategic targets on JP, SKR, PH, AU etc), as old addage goes, is US willing to trade nukes for Los Angeles over Taipei. Proxies can fight to the last man / brick. If US doesn't want to escalate to nuclear with PRC then the point of CONUS retaliatory strikes is to deter US from dirupting PRC civilian homefront, which includes PRC shipping. But really I'd say esclation ladder jumps near nuclear once homeland attacks, even if just military are happening, which many US war planners still think is allowable - plenty of entrenched hubris thinking unilaterally attacking PRC mainland targets would not invite proportional retaliation on CONUS or other belligerants against PRC. Chance of US blockading PRC or hitting mainland PRC increasingly unlikely as PRC fills out conventional CONUS escalation rungs. Intervention calculus changes when there's homeland vunerability, this includes US allies whose critical infra is vunerable to PRC global strike as well. If anything home land vunerability limit nuclear escalation by stopping escalation at critical conventional rungs and limit broadness of response. Alternatively this is also a world where conventional escalation can reach near existential levels of mutually assured destruction. Imagine escalation ladder with rung where US+co refinery goes boom and first world economies simply ceases to be viable. That's what's skewing escalation dominance towards PRC over core PRC concerns over TW, which starts at preventing foreign aid to speed up TW collapse/capitulation.

No, private ferries are duo use hulls EXPLICITYLY built to military standards "disguised" as / duo used for civilian purpose. As I've said, these RO/ROs will likely do brunt of the hulling because mil amphib including 075s are NOT being massively procured. Proponents of PRC not having enough dedicated amphib is not accepting the fact that massive dedicated amphib is NOT part of sealift strategy. Hasn't been for 10+ years for those that study PLA acquistion. Duo use civil/military sealift IS the strategy, and currently what has been built, trained, crewed is able to move massive amount of troops already. Yes they'll build, train, crew more, but that only extends the already gargantuan sealift capability that is more than enough for TW scenarios that most credible western analysts previously thought PRC needed. 7 group armies is an ABSURD amount of sealift.

>Europe

Europe already showed a lot of their acquisition hand, nothing meaningful for IndoPac and like AUKUS, big pieces like naval combatants are decades away while PRC dropping them like dumplings. RU, going through an active war is actually/literally has relevant industrial base to rearm, while also burning through legacy hardware just like EU, but with more and cheaper resource autarky and motivation to acquire at industrial scale for active war. Meanwhile Europe is TALKING about rearming, which is acquiring token SRK/US hardware as stop gab before figuring out indigenous efforts that will take decades. DE promises to raise spending already stalling, and they're key supplier in EU defense whose entire industrial base in general will have to deal with more expensive inputs. This is nothing like PRC who has massive industrial base and now cheap RU resources, hence EU prognosis being overall reduced. Like don't get me wrong, EU will likely increase defense capabilities relative to RU, but will be long and not smooth process, and questionable if their acquistions will be effective in the first place, especially for IndoPac. Two things can be true, EU can become a stronger bloc against RU, but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour because while it prefers independant EU vs US+EU, writing off a weak EU that can't substantively boost US even if they wanted to is more reliable for planning because less need to transatlantic consider political shifts.

So you have no qualification to say in Taiwan.

This kind of tussle is sadly part and parcel of being a superpower. China does it, Russia does it, US does it. Like with nuclear deterrence, it sucks but if you don't do it, you lose to those who do.

> RU, going through an active war is actually/literally has relevant industrial base to rearm

Russia doesn't have any money to rearm. Their economy is smaller than Canada, is about the same size as Italy, and ~9X smaller than the EU+UK. Russia will not be able to help China in any significant way. China is on its own if it attacks Taiwan, without a large power to support it.

> but also relatively weaker bloc against PRC relative to pre UKR war EU conditions. Reality at this time is both RU/EU are reduced powers, likely for decades and that works in PRC favour

The Europeans need to scale up their existing industrial base, not completely reimagine their forces from the ground up. That will take years, not decades. They can rearm rather quickly, considering the EU+UK's economy is larger than China's. Also, you misunderstand part of the real value of a more muscular EU; it frees up even more US resources in the Pacific.