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One Year into the War in Ukraine

acoup.blog

101–110 of 190 posts

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#101

"Urban warfare is brutally difficult and has in the past not been a particular strength of the Russian Federation.” Ahem, Stalingrad Cough, splutter, gurgling blood..

> "Urban warfare is brutally difficult and has in the past not been a particular strength of the Russian Federation.” > Ahem, > Stalingrad Ahem, “Russian Federation”. Not the same thing as the USSR.

Pretty close though, realistically. Continuity of doctrine and a fair number of people AFAIK. I'm not an expert but I still think I would have heard about it if Russia reconstituted its entire military from scratch after the USSR's collapse.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#102
post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> “They are only focused on attrition and minimizing their own casualties.” ??? That’s errr... going poorly.

https://meduza.io/amp/en/news/2023/02/17/close-to-15k-russia... An investigation via open sources by the BBC and Meduza (an anti-Putin media outlet based in Latvia) has confirmed the deaths of about 15k Russian soldiers since the start of the war, and estimates the true number to be up to 60% higher. What sources do you have that the widely reported media number of 200k+ is actually true that doesn’t ultimately come…

> An investigation via open sources by the BBC and Meduza (an anti-Putin media outlet based in Latvia) has confirmed the deaths of about 15k Russian soldiers since the start of the war, and estimates the true number to be up to 60% higher.

Where do you get the estimate of the true number? Your cited source only has the count of the named individuals identified, not anything corresponding to your claimed total KIA estimate. (Also, the investigation was published, as you linked, by Meduza, but conducted by the BBC and Mediazona, not the BBC and Meduza.)

> What sources do you have that the widely reported media number of 200k+ is actually true that doesn’t ultimately come from the government of Ukraine (who would have an interest in over-inflating their victories) or by a western government that is militarily supporting Ukraine?

Who else (besides sources with opposite biases, like official Russian sources – who haven’t provided casualty estimates since September) would have the kind of information necessary to make a meaningful estimate? (Also, the most commonly cited figure, which is sourced to the UK Ministry of Defense, is “up to” 200,000 casualties, with 40,000-60,000 KIA, not 200K+ KIA.)

But even if we go by that confirmed-by-name count as the full count of KIA, it roughly matches the Soviet KIA in Afghanistan, which was instrumental in the collapse of the USSR, so, going quite badly.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#103
post #11
post #6

Business Insider says 97% of the Russian army is now committed to Ukraine.[1] That leaves the central Russian government very vulnerable to its own internal separatist movements, of which there are rather a lot.[2]. Some of those movements are in areas landlocked or not economically viable, but the Free Ingria movement (Leningrad oblast, including St. Petersburg) has potential. That area is bordered by Finland, Eston…

> Free Ingria […] has potential No, it's a toy movement. > There's no part of Russia bordering Ukraine that Ukraine could take as a bargaining chip Transnistria could play precisely that role.

> Transnistria could play precisely that role.

Transnistria isn’t part of Russia and Ukraine isn’t going to take it from Moldova.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#104
post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They also thought they could take Ukraine in about the time it took Hitler to blitz into Poland.

That is an assumption.

It's the hypothesis that ascribes the least idiocy to Russian military command, compared to, say, deliberately wading into a multi-year attritional struggle. As much we may think they're fools, they're probably not that stupid.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#105
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They don't have russian passorts. You clearly are not familiar with how things work in Transnistria.

I'm from around that region so I'm quite familiar. Just because Putin says those people are Russians so he can claim some clay, doesn't make it a fact. Sure some are ethnically Russian, but that doesn't make them Russian citizens of the Federal Russian Republic. They are Moldovan citizens. Transnistria is a rouge separatist nation that's not internationally recognized and only exists on paper because Russia is a nucl…

> I'm from around that region so I'm quite familiar.

Not sufficiently familiar then.

"It is estimated that about 250,000 out of 500,000 people living in Transnistria hold Russian citizenship."

That's as of 2020, "passportization" has continued since then.

https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-hands-passports-diaspora/

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#106
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Free Ingria […] has potential No, it's a toy movement. > There's no part of Russia bordering Ukraine that Ukraine could take as a bargaining chip Transnistria could play precisely that role.

> Transnistria could play precisely that role. Transnistria isn’t part of Russia and Ukraine isn’t going to take it from Moldova.

> Transnistria isn’t part of Russia

It is controlled by Russia.

> Ukraine isn’t going to take it from Moldova.

What is that based on?

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#107
post #14
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Free Ingria […] has potential No, it's a toy movement. > There's no part of Russia bordering Ukraine that Ukraine could take as a bargaining chip Transnistria could play precisely that role.

The Russians have shown that they don't care about holding territory in the short term, see Kherson withdrawal, etc. They are only focused on attrition and minimizing their own casualties. If Ukraine goes into Transnistria it will not force Russia to capitulate.

> If Ukraine goes into Transnistria it will not force Russia to capitulate.

A Ukraine invasion of Moldova would result in Ukraine being forced to capitulate by the sudden collapse of all outside support.

I suppose Ukraine supporting a Moldovan effort to push Russia out of Transnistria might be a thing that could happen without that consequence, but it doesn’t seem like something likely to happen while Ukraine is busy fighting Russia over Ukraine.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Transnistria could play precisely that role. Transnistria isn’t part of Russia and Ukraine isn’t going to take it from Moldova.

> Transnistria isn’t part of Russia It is controlled by Russia. > Ukraine isn’t going to take it from Moldova. What is that based on?

> It is controlled by Russia.

And Ukraine obviously supports the Moldovan government’s opposition to that condition, but Ukraine isn’t going to unilaterally invade Moldova to fight Russians while its got plenty of Russians in Ukraine to deal with.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#109
post #65
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The column that was rushing towards Kyiv consisted in large part of the Russian National Guard units - those are the guys whose primary purpose is to beat up people in opposition protests. And they had the anti-riot gear packed, as Ukrainians have found out when going through the wrecks. So, yes, they were absolutely planning to suppress civilian opposition to the occupation.

[flagged]

I don't find it particularly convincing that you dismiss int_19h's evidence as mere propaganda, without further elaboration. I think it is easy to say now, after a year of war, that Russia could not have occupied Ukraine, but I think it is important to understand the prelude to war, 200.000 troops is not enough to occupy a country the size of Ukraine that will fight back, but it is more than enough for a country that would not, Ukraine had almost no army in 2014, and it still seems like yesterday, Russia under Putin has always won military conflicts: Chechnya, Georgia, and the fact that it took Crimea without hardly firing a shot, also the attitude that Russians have toward Ukrainians as sort of stupid cousins who need to be brought home, and after that the fact that Russia has a high level of corruption and Putin chooses his men well, the people he surrounds himself with have survived endless purges and power plays, so I would hardly see them responding (one of the reasons why I think democracies are stronger than public opinion seems to think). These are the reasons why it is clear to me that Russia tried to occupy Kiev and overthrow the government, the plan was not to get to the suburbs and then simply withdraw forces from the area, this is not how you "demilitarize and denazify" a country, the capital also is not far from the Belarusian border, then there is the evidence of int_19h.

Re: One Year into the War in Ukraine

#110
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They don't have russian passorts. You clearly are not familiar with how things work in Transnistria.

I'm from around that region so I'm quite familiar. Just because Putin says those people are Russians so he can claim some clay, doesn't make it a fact. Sure some are ethnically Russian, but that doesn't make them Russian citizens of the Federal Russian Republic. They are Moldovan citizens. Transnistria is a rouge separatist nation that's not internationally recognized and only exists on paper because Russia is a nucl…

All I'm saying is Transnistria is de facto a Russian asset.
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