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What really happened aboard Air France 447

popularmechanics.com

331–340 of 374 posts

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#331
post #323

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My thoughts exactly. While reading this I could not think about the same counter-intuitive reaction that people have when they drive and the car slips. Most people steer in the direction of the road when the single action to regain control is to slightly steer in the direction of the slippage.

Except that steering in the direction of the slippage may not be the correct action at all, at least in some vehicles. http://www.oregon.gov/OSP/PATROL/safety_tip_slide_control.sh...

It indeed depends on how the car slips. What is different is the amount you do throttle, braking and steering but the response is so counter-intuitive that you need proper training to do it correctly.

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#332
post #328

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My thoughts exactly. While reading this I could not think about the same counter-intuitive reaction that people have when they drive and the car slips. Most people steer in the direction of the road when the single action to regain control is to slightly steer in the direction of the slippage.

The correct course of action is to declutch so that the wheels get back in sync with the road. Of course, you cannot do that on an automatic car.

Whatever actions you take they should aim to regain traction. My point is - the car's response is non-linear in such circumstances and linear responses don't help. You can find on youtube videos of drifting cars. You can see there how complex your response (steering + throttle + braking) should be with respect to the car's state on the road.

If the plane stalls it goes down. Ponting it upwards to not go down will make it stalling even worse. You didn't have any speed to begin with and now the angle of attack is reducing its speed even more.

(Don't assume de-clutching works if you did not test it in a safe env)

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#333
post #30

Co-pilot Robert, after finally getting full control back from Co-pilot Bonin: "Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!" Co-pilot Bonin, who had been pulling back & stalling the plane during the crisis: "But what's happening?" Pretty much sums it up. I am thinking that perhaps Bonin had shellshock & may not have even realized he was holding the stick back. Perhaps the more experienced Robert didn't t…

> "This can't be happening!"

I want a device that gives me an electric shock every time I think or say this. If one can restructure one's cognitive habits in a way that replaces thoughts like this with thoughts like "What would explain this? Is this reasonable? What are the alternaives? How can I check this?", many errors will be avoided.

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#334
post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bonin would have had to realize that the plane is in alternate mode in the first place in order to react correctly. It probably never crossed his mind since he never trained in it, and conversely if he had trained in it, he may have been more likely to at least check. But to me the bigger problem seems to be that such an important change in the plane's behaviour could happen without anyone noticing. I'd consider the…

A mode switch as important as this should be very visible. An idea: put a two-color led under every indicator light and switch to the other color when the plane falls into alternate law. This should make it sufficiently clear that something very notable has just happened.

Something like that was my initial thought. However, you have to remember that there is massive amount of very notable things going on and data shown. As brazzy pointed out, the stall warning was as prominent as possible and still was pretty much completely ignored. I don't think they would've noticed any amount of leds in that point.

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#335

I've followed the discussion of the AF447 investigation on several flight discussion forums. The PF (Bonin) apparently never became aware of his angle of attack (once the airplane fully stalled, AOA was absurdly high). He did not seem to be aware that his constant inputs had caused the Airbus's THS (trimmable horizontal stabilizer, horizontal flaps on the tail) to deflect to maximum in order to try to keep the nose u…

I can't find any reference of Bonin having glider ("vol à voile" in French) experience, do you have a source? I see many blog entries asserting that if he did it would never have happened...

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#336
post #168

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Make it a loud, repeated aural indication. Oh wait, the stall warning was just that and got completely ignored... I think we've discovered the most difficult UX design task on earth.

I am no aviation expert, but according to other posts here the stall warning may have been ignored because Bonin didn't register that they were in alternate law. If they weren't in alternate law, the plane would have automatically limited the amount to which he could pull back. The most obvious solution to me, if all of that information is accurate, is that there should be a distinct audio stall warning for alternate…

It seems like that when analyzing this accident. If you analyze another, there may be 2 or 3 other things that would seem "pertinent enough information to push it front and center". And yet more for a 3rd accident.

The problem is that making something more noticeable automatically makes everything else less noticeable...

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#337
I hope to give some light from the point of view of an airbus pilot( a320) also with B737 and MD80 experience.

First of all I must say that is very difficult to judge what happened from outside, there is a rush of adrenalin if some important alarm starts at the cockpit, it becomes worst if you are flying in the middle of the night and turbulence. Problems that would be solved or the solution evident seating at home in front of a computer, become suddenly a mistery or insolvable because you lost an stabilicer or any other physical problem to the plane( it has happened before).

The first obvious mistake is going through the thunderstorm in that lattitudes, I personally know the pilots who where flying in front of them and they took a 200miles reruting to avoid that particular thunderstorm ( as other trafics did).

Then the reaction to the lost of information : as has been said the proper way to react is using thrust power % and pitch positions, there are tables for different flight phases , they are located at the quick reference handbook, but they should be located at an sticker close to the instruments( for inmediate use as speed limits for flaps or landing gear). An automatic help for recovering such a problem would be greate but computers do fail regularly in comercial planes( if web servers that are seating in a room fail imagine something that is suffering high doses of vibration, dirt, humidity changes, temperature changes, you name it) and you there MUST be other options.

When flying that high you are at whats called coffin corner, that is you are so high that the wings will easily enter both high speed buffeting and low speed stall( both will produce a lost of altitude control, you fall but can do nothing to avoid it). Also the engines don't have enougth thrust( as fighters do) to support the weight of the plane. So the maneuver they performed seemed to don't make sense at all, why would a pilot pull the stick to put the plane deeper in the cofin corner inside a thunderstorm?.

I think the cause is precisely training( and possibly other interface choices made by airbus helped too ), let me explain: there IS a maneuver inside thunderstorms wich is trained a lot AND will make the pilot PULL the sidestick and apply TOGA power, is called windshear( avoidment). Usually windshear is the wind state that you could find near a thunderstorm close to the airport. Is caused by the first descending burst( thunderstorm madurity) hitting the ground (please google it as it is easier to see a picture than explain it). The result is that the big wind speed changes( in seconds) may put the plane suddenly in a stall situation. Because it happens when you have no altitude left to recover from a stall ( maybe less than 3000 feet or closer than ten miles to the airport), your only possibility is to apply TOGA power and sidestick FULL back( the protections are NOT lost and then the plane takes care of the stall, the pilot takes care of the ground). This maneuver is practiced yearly ( or almost) as one of the most important ones ( with engine fail, traffic avoiding, depresurization), so it is my opinion ( I must say is not shared by many other pilots, many of them say it was the plane or simply don't know) and the simplest cause, that they simply were trying to fight a windshear, after all they were inside a thunderstorm and had to recover the control. That is way they simply couldn't understand ( or even hear the anouncement) why the plane was in stall, because they were folloing the procedure to the point. And procedures are to be followed if you do 't want problems with the plane and the judge( in a posterior investigation)

Also there are problems with the flight controls interface of airbus that have been known from the first a320 accident, and are highly polemic between pilots. Mainly airbus tried to reinvent the wheel at the cockpits,( and the rest of plane systems)in order to save weight. So they removed the link between the pilots controls ( except the rudder-fronwheel ones) and removed the possibility of the throttle levers to move acording to the power possition while in autopilot mode ( as boeing does ), after all only one pilot is taking the controls at a given time right?. But it is wrong, control feedback is fundamental in critical situations and has saved souls in the past. Also knowing the throttle possition at every moment just resting your hand at the levers while they move, gives you an amazing information of how the plane is behaving without having to look at the engine instruments ( there are one mm dots at the indicator showing the virtual "possition" of the levers, or where the thrust is going to move next), or simply overriding the autothrottle with out having to dissengage it. This throttle problem in particular has not caused a serious problem( that I am aware) yet, but give it time... Just imaging an autothrust setting the engines to iddle at 500' and the crew worried about having the runway insight in bad weather. The " don't make me think" principles still apply with airplanes ( and save lives, not only fuel) but airbus doesn't seem to bother too much.

I hope to have clarified a bit the problem from the Point of view of an airline pilot.

Pd. Sorry for all the misspellings, I am writting from my iphone. I'll edit at home.

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#338

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Precisely.. I'd also like to know under what circumstances this would actually be used, and be a useful safety feature to have implemented. At the very least, there should be a significant warning in the cockpit when "dual input" mode is active. That is an incredibly dangerous "feature."

completely agree about this 'dual input' mode - crazy. But also these modern planes seem to jump in and out of 'modes' without any warning or confirmation. I believe the 2008 plane crash at Madrid (largely pilot error again) also suffered from some confusion about the plane 'mode'. It was set to 'normal flight mode' whilst attempting to take off (or something). Again, both crashes largely due to 'usability' issues an…

Madrid crash was due to a improper disconection of the flight-ground sensor by maintenance( following unclear documentation)That led to a take off without flaps ( the configuration alarm didn't sound as it should when the crew forgot to extend them). It didn't take off it only jumped out of the runway and then crashed. It was not an usability matter just lots of small factors aligning, neither one on itself could have caused the accident.

Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447

#340

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm actually mildly surprised that it waited until you were in the air. I always brief that before takeoff whenever I take another pilot along. But yes, very basic stuff in any case, and amazing that they were not following this standard procedure.

Same experience. Pre-flight briefing with instructor: "When I say 'I have the plane', do NOT fly the plane". But then again, that's a VFR flight in decent weather. I'd imagine it's a bit easier to get stressed in the middle of the night in a storm over the Atlantic with electrical failures.

I think another major difference is that in most planes, you can feel when the other guy is screwing around with the controls because they're connected, so you can yell at him to stop doing whatever he's doing.

It seems to me that it would be worthwhile to fake this in a pure fly-by-wire environment. The added cost and weight of a force-feedback system on the control sticks should be minimal compared to the aircraft as a whole.

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