My question is why black box data is not uploaded to a central server while flying? Is it because of its huge size?
What really happened aboard Air France 447
271–280 of 374 posts
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#272That was one of the tensest things I've read in a while. My heart was pumping up until the end. The level of stress, confusion, and terror those pilots, not to mention the passengers, must have experienced must have been truly terrible.
I do wonder if passengers knew what was happening. Many might have been asleep. It sounds like there was a fair bit of turbulence on. It looks like from the report that none of the cabin crew raised any concerns, so I'm wondering if people were pretty much oblivious and they went quickly.
I've been in flights that have experienced very mild turbulance and let me tell you, it's enough to wakup any sleepy passenger. With the amount of turbulance this plane experienced, there is no way anyone could have been oblivious to what was going on.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#273Earlier quoted context omitted.
This one feature may have prevented the crash. A indicator light, saying the plan is in "alternate law" mode, and SHIT can go wrong, very quickly. Also an alarm in the pilot resting area that would relay when warnings are detected like stall or switching to alternate law.
Okay. This is how the cockpit apparently looks: http://www.pbase.com/image/47231836 Where are you going to stick the indicator light so that it's impossible to ignore it or mistake it for something else.
Some ideas:
Illuminate the pilot's footwells with a bright red light. There is normally no illumination there at all, plus it takes up a fairly large percentage of their viewable area when looking at their screens.
Or, change the background colors of all the screens from black to red. That might harm usability too much though. Maybe change all the other switch backlighting over to red. Or change the cabin overhead lighting over to red.
To the greatest extent possible, the entire environment and interface needs to communicate the modal shift. And pilots would need to train on this shift constantly so that recognition, and the appropriate shift in thinking, would happen habitually.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#274Earlier quoted context omitted.
So, here's the problem with this whole normal law / alternate law situation: If a pilot believes he is in normal law, and wants to ascend above the storm, he'll probably just pull all the way back on the stick, thinking "this will cause the computer to ascend as quickly as it can without stalling". AAAARGGHH!!!! This maddening concept of normal law is turning the above insanity into the EXPECTED OUTCOME! Having a com…
This is an important point as cars nowadays have more and more electronic overrides - everything from traction control to stability control to anti-lock brakes to lane departure warnings (and recovery) to emergency braking and speed control. Most of the later ones (emergency braking, speed control, lane departure) are only on expensvie cars, but within 10 years will be standard equipment on all cars. If not by legisl…
In motorcycle racing nowadays the vehicle is governed by the computer to a surprisingly large degree. Yet this has allowed levels of performance thought unachievable not too long ago.
The same technology is now trickling down to street legal sportbikes. It's interesting to watch the public's reaction to it. Some disagree vociferously, saying that it will take the fun out of the hobby. Others acknowledge the life-saving intervention of throttle control when you're leaning in a turn on wet asphalt and mistakenly give it too much gas.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#275Earlier quoted context omitted.
BTW, who is commanding the plane (by inputs) and who is commanding the crew are entirely separate questions. I think one of the serious issues that MUST be addressed here is the issue of conflicting commands to the plane. Two options.... 1) Place all controls between the pilots so they can easily see what eachother is doing or 2) Place a selection switch and indicator that allows a pilot to unambiguously take control…
What happens if they're fighting each other?
At least there's feedback, and you can immediately see what's happening! In the current configuration, Bonin's stick inputs were nearly unknowable to the other officer.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#276Co-pilot Robert, after finally getting full control back from Co-pilot Bonin: "Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!" Co-pilot Bonin, who had been pulling back & stalling the plane during the crisis: "But what's happening?" Pretty much sums it up. I am thinking that perhaps Bonin had shellshock & may not have even realized he was holding the stick back. Perhaps the more experienced Robert didn't t…
> - Add a display that shows the current positions of both control sticks. Add an alarm when the two sticks are not within a certain margin of the each other, if both are engaged. Such as if one is full forward & the other is full back.
Even better: when you have two mechanical inputs to a single output channel, mechanically _link_ the two. If Pilot #1 moves the stick, pilot #2's stick should move. So that if there is a disagreement, they can physically observe it in their hands. Any fight over where to put the stick shouldn't be "averaged". It should be physically felt by both pilots so that they realize that there is a conflict and resolve it face to face.
It's similar to why SVN commit conflicts are so damn annoying. But they're designed to be: the only way to resolve a commit conflict is to walk over and meet your conflicter face to face and resolve. Can you imagine if SVN decided to "average the inputs"? What the fuck does that even mean? This entire plane sounds like a UI disaster (modal inputs, etc.)
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#277From the article, it seems like the plane had a downward velocity of 10,000 fpm (~110mph) upon crashing. Would passengers have died instantly upon impact with the water? (It appears not)
At that speed, water is a brick wall.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#278Earlier quoted context omitted.
A commenter below (cellularmitosis) makes a very interesting point: Bonin may not have realized he was in "alternate law" (let's call it "mode" instead of "law"). In "normal mode" the computer will not let pilots stall the plane, whatever they do; it will accept the commands up to what it considers dangerous. There's an "envelope" of acceptable plane movements; pilots can move inside this envelope but not outside of…
Bonin would have had to realize that the plane is in alternate mode in the first place in order to react correctly. It probably never crossed his mind since he never trained in it, and conversely if he had trained in it, he may have been more likely to at least check. But to me the bigger problem seems to be that such an important change in the plane's behaviour could happen without anyone noticing. I'd consider the…
Bonin had to have known that the plane was in alternate law.
In the flight recorder log, at 2h10m05s, there was an audible "cavalry charge" alarm that indicated to everybody in the cockpit that the autopilot was disconnecting (plus message at the same time on the ECAM).
Then, on the ECAM message console 1 second later, the message "F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)" was displayed: alternate law, protection lost. At the same time, Bonin said "I have the controls", which to me indicates that he knew that the autopilot was off and that alternate law was engaged.
References: [1] Page 45, http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp0906... [2] Page 88, Ibid.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#279Where does the captain go to take a nap? I was wondering how he didn't hear the stall sounds in order to immediately return.
Not sure about the AF configuration, but he would be resting either in a crew rest compartment fitted in the cargo hold [1], or alternatively in a reserved seat in business class. Either way, no alarms are audible outside the cockpit. [1] - http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/re...
> Either way, no alarms are audible outside the cockpit.
They should wear a Bluetooth at all times.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#280We need AI to control our planes.