The men are utterly failing to engage in an important process known as crew resource management, or CRM. They are failing, essentially, to cooperate. It is not clear to either one of them who is responsible for what, and who is doing what. I have read a few other transcripts from crashed planes and this seems to be the most common and significant contributor. I see variations of this problem almost daily in my day to…
This was also one of the points of Malcom Gladwell in one of his book ("the Tipping point"), where he talked about what went wrong in several examples of air crashes: lack of human cooperation at its best.
What really happened aboard Air France 447
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Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
The author did touch on it: "According to Camilleri, not one of US Airway's 17 Airbus 330s has ever been in alternate law. Therefore, Bonin may have assumed that the stall warning was spurious because he didn't realize that the plane could remove its own restrictions against stalling and, indeed, had done so."
So, here's the problem with this whole normal law / alternate law situation: If a pilot believes he is in normal law, and wants to ascend above the storm, he'll probably just pull all the way back on the stick, thinking "this will cause the computer to ascend as quickly as it can without stalling". AAAARGGHH!!!! This maddening concept of normal law is turning the above insanity into the EXPECTED OUTCOME! Having a com…
Most of the later ones (emergency braking, speed control, lane departure) are only on expensvie cars, but within 10 years will be standard equipment on all cars. If not by legislation, probably by insurance companies offering discounts on vehicles so equipped.
It's already an issue with ABS braking in that people run into things even though they could steer around them - simply because they become fixated on pressing the brake harder and harder rather than trying to steer the car away from the impending object.
As people learn to drive with these aids and rely on them, they will become dangerous when one or more become faulty. I can see a point where people start to rely on automatic braking and don't bother putting their foot on the brake. Or take their hands off the wheel on the freeway because the car keeps it in the lane for them.
All this is great until something stops - a camera gets a squashed bug, a wheel sensor breaks from a stone, anything. And the car will be under partial human control and the inputs will be badly exaggerated.
This will become a large issue in the design of vehicle interfaces and driver training in years to come. The solution, of course, is mandatory emergency situation training in an unassisted car. But driver training is routinely ignored worldwide for cost reasons.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#83Co-pilot Robert, after finally getting full control back from Co-pilot Bonin: "Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!" Co-pilot Bonin, who had been pulling back & stalling the plane during the crisis: "But what's happening?" Pretty much sums it up. I am thinking that perhaps Bonin had shellshock & may not have even realized he was holding the stick back. Perhaps the more experienced Robert didn't t…
- Delineate command better, e.g. Captain, Co-pilot #1, Co-pilot #2 so that who is in charge is clear. This antiquated idea has killed many more people than it would have saved in this case. Read about CRM: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management I think a classic example is: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avianca_Flight_52 The plane crashed because it burned all of its fuel in a holding pattern waiting to…
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#84That was a chilling read.
"What the hell is happening? I don't understand what's happening."
"Damn it, I don't have control of the plane, I don't have control of the plane at all!"
It's like a non-fiction horror story. Cockpit data recorders provide some really gripping stories. Same with the air traffic control audio from the bird strike incident that ended with a plane landing in the Hudson river in NYC.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
Our bodies are horrible when it comes to spatial awareness. Pilots are trained to ignore sensory input like the feel of gravity, the feel of being in a dive/climb/bank and use the instruments to make determinations about what the aircraft is doing. Usually those feelings are dead wrong. It's amazing how flying into a cloud bank, even though you've been flying straight and level, suddenly your body screams at you that…
Ah, that bit about being trained to ignore their body is interesting. I was not aware of that, and it answers my question pretty well.
When I experienced it it was in clear skies, so it would be rather obvious that it was happening just by looking out of the window, but apparently this can happen to inexperienced pilots in clouds.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#86I even knew about the two modes of the Airbus - because I once watched an episode of "Air Crash Investigation" where the exact same thing as what is described in this accident happen to an earlier flight.
I don't know if I am jumping to judgement, but it sounds like some of these modern pilots aren't really enthusiasts - they are just people who are trained and do their jobs, and do them by the book and then go home (just like bus or taxi drivers).
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
Airbus' have priority override button which will allow the pilot not flying (PNF) to take command of the aircraft. In hydraulic or "direct" flight controls, both sticks move at the same rate, you need to be stronger than the other pilot. Normally the autopilot and flight control system would have the authority to override the pilot actions (common on A320 etc.) but not all planes have that feature. In addtion, if the…
Should not one pilot say "I Got Her" and tell other pilot that you do nothing, I will take care of it.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#88Such a tragedy... Forgive my ignorance, maybe some pilots can shed some light on this. In the article it mentions that even though the plane was flying in "alternate" mode, my understanding is that it still has limits to what inputs can be given. That said, even if autopilot is off, why wouldn't the computer have emergency functions to negate strange situations like this? When would pulling completely back on the sti…
I don't have a terribly accurate model of airplane control in my mind, but I think this would be the right answer when the nose is pointed down (i.e., the plane is diving). In some cases I think it might also be the right answer if your nose is level but you're losing altitude, e.g. when in a strong downdraft.
Pulling back was the wrong thing in this situation because the plane was in stall, but due to sensor problems and later high angle of attack/low airspeed, the avionics didn't have a complete image and an absolute certainty that the plane was in a stall (hence the stall warnings cutting in and out, too). I'm not sure I'd want the plane overriding me in this specific case.
Re: What really happened aboard Air France 447
#89I've followed the discussion of the AF447 investigation on several flight discussion forums. The PF (Bonin) apparently never became aware of his angle of attack (once the airplane fully stalled, AOA was absurdly high). He did not seem to be aware that his constant inputs had caused the Airbus's THS (trimmable horizontal stabilizer, horizontal flaps on the tail) to deflect to maximum in order to try to keep the nose u…
>at night, over an ocean, in a storm, with no visibility, in possibly significant turbulance Instead of finding out strategies on how to fly under these circumstances, why can't the plane change its course, if they anticipate the flying route to have these conditions. How about running some reconnaissance drones in the popular routes if they suspect a bad weather and want to check out. Or try out better weather monit…
Is there any discussion as to why they didn't seek an alternate plan and if not, is this something that needs to or has been remedied?