> 1. No telegram employee can read any messages. They use distributed key generation to encrypt data on servers which means no single server has access to decryption keys and all the servers are in different jurisdictions.
This is wrong. First, reported messages (via id) are read by employees. Second, regardless of your claims, Telegram can easily write a service which has access to plain text messages.
> 2. They do not sell message content data. If you can prove it, you can go ahead with a lawsuit and win a hefty sum.
How about you prove your claims? I hardly can bring them to justice when even the police doesn't have immediate access to them.
> 3. They do not compromise security. They do not use E2EE by default. Their threat model and vision for a messaging platform is different than yours.
Actually, they do by not using E2EE by default and providing bad encryption possiblities.
> 4. Telegram has never given message content for a court order. As mentioned in the privacy policy, they give out only the phone number and IP Address only in case of terrorism or child abuse and only when there's a court order from a country of a higher democratic index.
no idea about that
> 5. If you truly believe Telegram is bad for privacy even after all the evidence from FBI itself and PrivacySpy giving it a higher score than Signal, then please go ahead and sue them because surely they can't have a good privacy policy and bad privacy at the same time.
Since when is "bad for privacy" a reason for suing? The quality of a privacy policy doesn't have anything to do with privacy itself btw.
> and yet I just did. Can we please stop confusing privacy and anonymity?
I didn't, did I? please explain