Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
61–70 of 198 posts
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#62Quoted post unavailable.
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#63When similar events unfolded in Syria, people created redundant social networks of fake Facebook accounts. This seemed to work well. When captured and tortured, people would hand over credentials for one account. People would detect that network was "burned" and move to the next one.
This gave the officials very little information, since the accounts did not reference real names, and locations were obfuscated. High risk private messages were deleted, etc.
The key to this working was that Facebook was not sympathetic to or cooperating with the Syrian government, and accessing Facebook was a common (not worth prosecuting) infraction.
I'd be worried that they will fingerprint / honeypot tor infrastructure, then round people up. The existence of the tor client or connection logs basically proves guilt.
Friending facebook accounts with cutsey names is much less incriminating. Edit: Also, any honeypot proxy connection logs just show that you used https to access facebook.
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#64Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#65Right now, it seems like those who use the internet and phones are at a disadvantage. Phones are always tracked, and the internet is a giant surveillance tool. If the government controls the network, then it is always at a great advantage, no matter if VPN or Tor is used.
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#66Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#67Funny how the women's rights situation in Iran became bad enough to prompt large scale protests within two weeks of Iran joining SCO. Not two months earlier. Not two months later. Just within weeks.
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#68Funny how the women's rights situation in Iran became bad enough to prompt large scale protests within two weeks of Iran joining SCO. Not two months earlier. Not two months later. Just within weeks.
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#69Funny how the women's rights situation in Iran became bad enough to prompt large scale protests within two weeks of Iran joining SCO. Not two months earlier. Not two months later. Just within weeks.
SCO? The country code for Scotland? The Santa Cruz Operation? What's SCO in this context? My (30 seconds of) searching turned up nothing plausible.
(Though I'm fairly sure the protests are unrelated)
Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran
#70Earlier quoted context omitted.
The first hop, "SSH Client -> Iranian Datacenter" seems extremely vulnerable to surveillance, and would create an incriminating list of people involved. With this discussion in the open, you can bet Iranian authorities are going to specifically look for anything discussed here, so the only viable solutions should have no measurable deviation from normal behavior that would allow them to detect which datacenter was do…
maybe lorawan can be used to launder the traffic? IoT traffic obfuscators running on battery power