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Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

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61–70 of 198 posts

Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

#63
I wish you the best of luck.

When similar events unfolded in Syria, people created redundant social networks of fake Facebook accounts. This seemed to work well. When captured and tortured, people would hand over credentials for one account. People would detect that network was "burned" and move to the next one.

This gave the officials very little information, since the accounts did not reference real names, and locations were obfuscated. High risk private messages were deleted, etc.

The key to this working was that Facebook was not sympathetic to or cooperating with the Syrian government, and accessing Facebook was a common (not worth prosecuting) infraction.

I'd be worried that they will fingerprint / honeypot tor infrastructure, then round people up. The existence of the tor client or connection logs basically proves guilt.

Friending facebook accounts with cutsey names is much less incriminating. Edit: Also, any honeypot proxy connection logs just show that you used https to access facebook.

Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

#65
Back in the 80's, I remember that people were protesting without internet and mobile phones, with very successful results. They bought down the iron curtain after all. The most sophisticated technology they used was the printing press, for printing and distributing fliers, newspapers and censored books. Underground groups were organized in cells too, without phones, email or apps.

Right now, it seems like those who use the internet and phones are at a disadvantage. Phones are always tracked, and the internet is a giant surveillance tool. If the government controls the network, then it is always at a great advantage, no matter if VPN or Tor is used.

Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

#67

Funny how the women's rights situation in Iran became bad enough to prompt large scale protests within two weeks of Iran joining SCO. Not two months earlier. Not two months later. Just within weeks.

SCO? The country code for Scotland? The Santa Cruz Operation? What's SCO in this context? My (30 seconds of) searching turned up nothing plausible.

Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

#68

Funny how the women's rights situation in Iran became bad enough to prompt large scale protests within two weeks of Iran joining SCO. Not two months earlier. Not two months later. Just within weeks.

This is the sixth occurrence of major protests in Iran in in five years.

Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

#69

Funny how the women's rights situation in Iran became bad enough to prompt large scale protests within two weeks of Iran joining SCO. Not two months earlier. Not two months later. Just within weeks.

SCO? The country code for Scotland? The Santa Cruz Operation? What's SCO in this context? My (30 seconds of) searching turned up nothing plausible.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisat...

(Though I'm fairly sure the protests are unrelated)

Re: Tell HN: The Internet situation inside Iran

#70
post #42
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The first hop, "SSH Client -> Iranian Datacenter" seems extremely vulnerable to surveillance, and would create an incriminating list of people involved. With this discussion in the open, you can bet Iranian authorities are going to specifically look for anything discussed here, so the only viable solutions should have no measurable deviation from normal behavior that would allow them to detect which datacenter was do…

maybe lorawan can be used to launder the traffic? IoT traffic obfuscators running on battery power

You'll fill the airwaves very quickly with Lora devices. They're quite terrible at anything more than very simple text data. Time in air is high, bandwidth is very low, and signal clashes in crowded areas are a big issue.
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