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Consciousness is not computation

joe-antognini.github.io

241–250 of 767 posts

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#241
This is a really good write-up though there's lots of connective tissue missing.

The idea that computation is a whole-mind or whole-consciousness experience that describes everything the brain and mind does, is a little flawed. The mind is capable of mathematical calculation, as a certain function, but it is also capable of metaphor, visions, musical enjoyment and connection to an uncertain, true "whole" that is separate from mathematical certainty.

The idea that computation is substrate independent is missing a layer. The idea that you can run computation on any given mathematical computing device and produce the same 'level' of consciousness as a parallel for consciousness is a little flawed.

ADHD study on the brain has 'room for improvement' because the Executive Function theory relies on parts of the brain which does not exist inside mice and some people argue we should study monkey brains who have a similar biological componentry to humans. The consciousness monkeys and apes have, is commonly seen to be a higher level than mice, and the biological componentry supports that idea.

Different kinds of computing devices would support different levels of consciousness. A toaster could run DOOM levels of consciousness and a supercomputer could "host" the consciousness of a much higher being. The religious faiths differ on this view across denominations. Catholics argue that dogs do not go to heaven because they have a 'worldly consciousness' and man has a heavenly consciousness. Some other faiths argue that we differ from animals in degree, not by kind, and that dogs are saved for heaven. These ideas have parallel with the concept of differing levels of consciousness.

The article makes the idea that differing relative observers (Alice, Bob, ect) of the computing substrate (hot iron magnetic poles) could generate different consciousness simulations. This elevates the idea of second-order thinking, thoughts about thoughts to be the mediating factor in deciding where consciousness is observed, and that's not really clear consciousness functions like that. It also supposes that the differing subjectivity of consciousness is linked to relating differently to an identical computational underbelly, like a tribe accessing the same or instanced resource, which is not really clear for the nature of mind or consciousness.

Hot Iron magnetic poles and computation as an example of consciousness, works for a subset of certain mathematical conscious functions, but functions like language are yet to be seen as computationally generated. DNA works better as a natural examination of the language. Mathematics has strict rigid certainties that often mirror randomness, or repetitive natural processes, like simulated annealing and physical forces. DNA's genetic code is possibly the first place in nature where we have seen non-repetitive, mutating code that is as complex as a human language, mediated by natural forces. The concept of "intelligent design" stephen meyer, et al and the question as to how life came to be, has become a thrust of biological research alongside evolutionary theory. It has some great discussions and speculation about language that didn't come from humans or animals.

There is a lot of elegant connections to be made when the author opens the idea of a split-brain "two consciousness" in epileptic patients. The left-right brain split has existed forever in pop psychology and it has lacked a lot of detail. The effects of left and right hemisphere splits have been studied for a while now by people with lesions and psychological disorders and a lot of the literature and implications have been compiled by a GP (PCP in US English) into a book.

The left brain excels at mathematical certainty and computation and pulling apart ideas into abstract pieces and trying to assemble them together into more than the sum of the parts. The right brain is eternally uncertain, connected to a whole and can interpret metaphor, people's faces, the shape of objects and much more. The implications go deep and don't lend to easy summarizing yet, the book the Matter with Things by McGilchrist spends multiple chapters just going through scientific example after example from brain-damaged and psychologically ill people to show the ideas that apply to the respective hemispheres.

Defending the idea from McGilchrist that a mathematical computation, worldview or functionality, is mostly executed in the left-hemisphere and not the whole brain, we can maybe illuminate why philosophers take differing stances on the nature of consciousness.

The author's conclusion that we are left in apophatic or negative theology attempts at describing what God is or what consciousness is, by excluding what he is not, rules out the inherent ability we have to build a view or metaphor in our mind that internally coheres with our own thoughts, and then apply it in the world.

There are likely a lot more internally coherent arguments, visions, ideas, maps of God or consciousness that we can make in our a mind and some of them will correspond to the natural reality we live in. Scientific discovery by the greats has used this method for a very long time. We still have hunches and sudden inspiration from an uncertain source and generally process some ideas in non-logical, non-rational ways. These ideas are only, but often, proved true when applied in the world. The ancient Greeks frequently only really pursued or argued about ideas they had guessed at first, instead of ruling out everything it couldn't be and working within that tiny area. Apophatic thinking can be overly limiting in some cases.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#242
post #33
post #3

I think people start with the premise that consciousness is a specific “thing”, that it is unique and special to humans (and maybe dogs because we like them but definitely not spiders and flies because we don’t) and then try to work backwards to define it in some ways that keeps it special. I don’t think consciousness is so specific, and I think people aren’t clear about how they think about it as something separate…

> My personal experience is that consciousness, like free will, is a useful illusion It is probably just a difference in semantics but for me, it seems like consciousness is the only thing that is assuredly not an illusion. That I am having a subjective experience is undeniable. The objects of my consciousness all might be (and probably are) something else than they appear to be (as is often the experience with diffe…

This is correct.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#243

> But! If a single observer can correctly determine that the bar of iron is conscious, we must conclude that the bar of iron is conscious for everybody, because consciousness is observer independent. If true, honest-to-God consciousness is just a matter of running consciousness.exe, we have indeed found someone who has correctly observed that the bar of iron is running consciousness.exe and we must conclude that the…

You don't need to know all that much in order to achieve consciousness. Lets say that you have a program that you assume to be conscious. You run it for 1 second, and exactly record all its internal states and outputs. Now, you can find an interpretation of the iron bar that shows that the iron bar casually and deterministically went through those exact same states for a full 1 second. What is the difference between those two situations? Why would the program be conscious but the iron bar would not be?

I believe the argument is more about how loose our definition of computation is rather than trying to disprove any form of consciousness. If we can find a proper iron bar and an interpretation of internal state that exactly mimics a computer, why do we consider one a computer and one completely random? What is missing from our definition of computation?

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#244
post #234
post #205

I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…

Computation does not have anything essential to it that makes it different from other "atoms jumping around" other than it produces outputs that we find interesting. There's no reason to expect an adder circuit to be aware that it's adding numbers. There's no reason to expect an implementation of AlphaGo to know that it's playing Go. This should be extendable without limitation. There's no reason to expect that a cer…

How do you know that? Lamda AI claims itself as conscious being. How can you distinguish between two entities which can communicate? Do you discriminate on meat factor?

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#245
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Considering that everything in the universe is the product of some computation, I would consider it a reasonable default assumption that whatever we mean by “consciousness” emerges from computation. That this idea “intuitively feels weird” or “intuitively feels wrong”, and that we love to think we are special and have a unique place in the universe, is probably a more serious bias.

>Considering that everything in the universe is the product of some computation This is not necessarily true. If you drop a ball it's impossible to calculate how long it takes before it hits need ground. We can calculate an approximation by creating a model, but there is no way to know if that model matches reality.

What I am saying is that the universe is literally performing the computation.

What you're describing is humans' attempt at modelling this computation using simple formulas.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#246
post #3

I think people start with the premise that consciousness is a specific “thing”, that it is unique and special to humans (and maybe dogs because we like them but definitely not spiders and flies because we don’t) and then try to work backwards to define it in some ways that keeps it special. I don’t think consciousness is so specific, and I think people aren’t clear about how they think about it as something separate…

> My personal experience is that consciousness, like free will, is a useful illusion.

Do you mean in the sense that we don't really have it, or in the sense of the word is devoid of meaning because we can't directly compare what's in our own heads to what's in the head of even another human?

I'm currently leaning towards the latter. Even if consciousness, whatever it is, is a lie or an act by one part of my brain to itself or to another part of my brain, it still is something.

On the other hand, the more I learn about other humans, the more varied I realise our inner worlds to be — aphantasia (and equivalents for other senses), religious experiences and their absence, having or not having purity as a moral foundation, the range of conditions in the DSM, and so on.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#247
post #234
post #205

I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…

Computation does not have anything essential to it that makes it different from other "atoms jumping around" other than it produces outputs that we find interesting. There's no reason to expect an adder circuit to be aware that it's adding numbers. There's no reason to expect an implementation of AlphaGo to know that it's playing Go. This should be extendable without limitation. There's no reason to expect that a cer…

> Computation does not have anything essential to it that makes it different from other "atoms jumping around" other than it produces outputs that we find interesting.

This is not true. Computing is a system where the physical hardware (the computer) is following rules that are explicitly encoded in itself - you can analyze the system and discover where and how the program it is following is encoded (as we did with DNA).

In contrast, non-computational physical processes are following the laws of physics which are not encoded anywhere.

A simple way to test this difference is to check whether there is some way, at least in principle, to get the computer to perform a different computation. For a cell, we have successfully done this: change the DNA, and the output changes, without affecting the computer itself. With a system simply evolving according to physical laws there is no way to change its behavior.

At best, you can claim that the universe itself is a computer, and all fields/particles are the symbols that it is manipulating (the laws of physics being then part of the internal implementation, akin to microcode in a CPU).

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#248

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sorry but you always forgot that when you sleep your consciousness disappeared. Please take account for this fact. When all sensory shut down, really you feel nothing and of cos think nothing.

Consciousness can end temporarily, perhaps permanently. This in no way suggests that it’s an illusion. The claim that consciousness is an illusion has always seemed like nonsense to me; for, if consciousness is an illusion, who experiences that illusion? Answer: the conscious mind.

Consciousness is a trick for human neural network to simplify some calculations about the world. It was developed as an evolutionary trait and proved useful to survive. That's my opinion. It's not an illusion, it definitely exists as an particular configuration of neurons.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#249
post #18

The idea that you cannot get to consciousness from computation requires accepting on faith alone that consciousness is magic. It’s fundamentally a religious-like bias. It’s not magic, I’m afraid.

(Author here.) This is a false dichotomy. Saying that consciousness is not fundamentally a computational process does not mean that it then has to be magic. We could say the same thing about life. Life is not a computational phenomenon. But it is also not magic. It is, fundamentally, a particular kind of chemical process. Perhaps the same is true of consciousness, or maybe it is some other kind of physical process. I…

Biological life is not a computational phenomenon. There's no reason very advanced computers couldn't make simulated life. OpenWorm is an example.

By the way I find it hilarious how confident you (and other philosophers) are about your conclusions despite them basically being thought experiments with zero evidence. Imagine if scientists did that!

Actually I guess string theory is an example of that.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#250
post #205

I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…

The question is whether there was ever a good reason to suggest that mind is computational, and I think philosophy (i.e. Searle) have shown that there wasn’t. A brain CAN compute (albeit very slowly), but that’s the end of the similarities.

The reason it’s not morally wrong, say, to recycle an old computer is that computers are not at all like human minds.

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