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Consciousness is not computation

joe-antognini.github.io

231–240 of 767 posts

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#231

We don't know of anything that is provably not computation. There's not a single proof that "process X is not reproducible computationally, yet it is implemented in the universe". All the statements like the one in the subject line are desires (conscious or unconscious) for special privilege for humans.

Proving a negative is not always possible, but the irreducible randomness in quantum measurement or "wave function collapse" is essentially defined as uncomputable.

You can of course simulate quantum randomness using an RNG or some such but the essential inherent unpredictability can't be simulated like that.

To be clear, I'm not trying to argue that quantum randomness is a component of consciousness!

Regards consciousness and computation, though, it's always seemed suspicious to me that we can't reliably specify 'qualia' like "what it's like to feel wet" or "what it's like to hear a trumpet" except either in terms of a physical description (e.g. the waveform of the trumpet note) that misses out the experiential component or in terms of "samples" - i.e. references to other 'qualia': "sounds like a french horn but less round" or whatever.

I'd have thought being able to adequately specify something was a necessary step in reducing it to computation. We've been using language for thousands of years though, and as far as I'm aware precisely specifying experiences in this way is still an unsolved problem.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#232
post #205

I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…

The iron bar argument is terrible for exactly the reason you say. The atoms in the iron bar would have to evolve following the rules of a Turing machine and they won't. So you'd have to define a mapping which varies over time. There's nothing stopping us doing that but I can do the same with a pumpkin and my brain. Therefore I'm not conscious. Sad!

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#233
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> This is exactly what it is... I'm literally taking the narrow conclusion from the second paragraph: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ > This is exactly what it is ... albeit not "consciousness" proper Which is it? You conceded the first point in the second. > The Turing test is much weaker than the Chinese room experiment. Yes agreed, this comment on the Turing test was a reference to the linked arti…

> I'm literally taking the narrow conclusion from the second paragraph: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ You should really the entire article, but at least finish the paragraph you're citing: "The broader conclusion of the argument is that the theory that human minds are computer-like computational or information processing systems is refuted."

I have read the whole thing. My point is I’m taking the narrow conclusion and not the broader conclusion, if I have to spell it out to you.

Please continue not responding to the rest of my points.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#234
post #205

I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…

Computation does not have anything essential to it that makes it different from other "atoms jumping around" other than it produces outputs that we find interesting.

There's no reason to expect an adder circuit to be aware that it's adding numbers. There's no reason to expect an implementation of AlphaGo to know that it's playing Go. This should be extendable without limitation.

There's no reason to expect that a certain type of circuit produces consciousness unless of you have a model of consciousness that allows for certain properties to cause it. But there's no such model.

The only thing there is is our brains. You just think that since the brain is doing computations and the brain is conscious, therefore consciousness is a computation.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#235
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> My personal experience is that consciousness, like free will, is a useful illusion It is probably just a difference in semantics but for me, it seems like consciousness is the only thing that is assuredly not an illusion. That I am having a subjective experience is undeniable. The objects of my consciousness all might be (and probably are) something else than they appear to be (as is often the experience with diffe…

It seems to go even deeper. Not even that "I" am having a subjective experience is undeniable, but only that there is a subjective experience at all. When deconstructing sensory and thought phenomena, it can be found that any particular trait that points to "I" is actually ephemeral, and not a permanent fixture of the experiencer. For instance, the sense that there is a face and eyes that is being looked out through…

Bertrand Russell made this point about Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum”, stating it would more correctly be something like “there are thoughts”.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#236
> Now, if consciousness were a consequence of pure computation, it would be possible to write a clever computer program (let’s call it consciousness.exe) that, when executed on a big enough computer, produces a conscious being.

> ...

This is pretty much the premise of the treatise by the great Australian philosopher Greg Egan, called "Permutation city". It really blew my mind back in the 90's when i first read it. Actually I think I read the short story "Dust" first. High a.f. after reading that.

> But perhaps new biology is not enough. Roger Penrose has argued that an explanation of consciousness does not simply require new biology, but new physics as well. I have to confess that as far-fetched an idea as it is, I am somewhat partial to the idea.

Cool. Me too.

> ... resorting to quantum mechanics or new physics is the last refuge of scoundrels.

Well that escalated fast!

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>My personal experience is that consciousness, like free will, is a useful illusion An illusion to whom? It isn't meaningful to say that an unconscious thing experiences illusions.

To no one. "It is an illusion" is transcribed and recalled as an explanation for feelings that drive actions in the person who said it, because we evolved to be able to explain our actions with sophisticated language, and to judge the arguments of others so that we can act together to overcome challenges and to kill the out group. In this case, OP is, without knowing it, signaling which group is his, and which is not…

>"It is an illusion" is transcribed and recalled as an explanation for feelings that drive actions in the person who said it, because we evolved to be able to explain our actions with sophisticated language, and to judge the arguments of others so that we can act together to overcome challenges and to kill the out group.

A p-zombie could do all of those things just fine.

>we do not understand consciousness, because it cannot be understood, because it is not a thing.

Maybe if it's not a thing, you should stop predicating things of it. You should figure out how to use language consistently before engaging in philosophically fraught discussions like this one.

>It is a construct we share and use to separate ourselves from the animals so that we can kill them and eat them as a group.

It is unclear to me why unconscious beings should need to separate themselves from other animals (with a wholly illusory meaningless concept that cannot be understood, btw) in order to kill them and eat them.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#238

The problem with all these arguments is that if consciousness is not an inherent side effect of computation, then it must have evolved, which means it have once given a very simple animal a competitive advantage. But we have no theory, evidence, or even well-thought-out stoner postulations of consciousness having any effect on the material universe, other than fancies of wish fulfilment. It appears to be a one-way pr…

The act of saying “consciousness doesn’t have any effect on the material universe” denies the premise of what’s being said. Behold, your consciousness has just had direct effect on material universe (just as deciding to obtain the device on which it was typed, and before that someone’s idea to make that device, had).

I remember myself being unshakeably of the same opinion: consciousness is obviously something of no relation to reality, so it might as well not exist or be an illusion. It’s one of those things that are tricky to explain but can just dawn on you, how it’s inevitably the thought that manipulates reality.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#239
post #220
post #189

> So if we accept that qualia exists (which, after all, seems intuitively sensible), we are burdened with the apparently impossible task of explaining how consciousness can be generated by physical processes. No, you don't get to just gloss over that. I don't think it's "intuitively sensible" that "qualia" exist. I don't think think it's intuitively sensible that they don't exist either: the question is ill-defined u…

What word would you use to describe the subjective experiences of people? What word do you describe something like the taste of an apple, or the appearance of the color red? That is what Qualia refer to. I would say that it is intuitively sensible that these subjective experience exist, at least for any reasonable definition of existence.

When I taste an apple that corresponds to some physical pattern in my brain: electrical impulses; neurotransmitters; neural connections being created or destroyed or changing in strength, etc. I see no reason that needs a special word to describe it, nor why that same pattern couldn't be represented abstractly in a formal language or translated to some other computational architecture.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#240
post #31
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a little bit of an emotional take I think. The burden of proof is on the claim that you can get there through computation, not otherwise. We do not understand the fundamental reality of consciousness, this does not mean that consciousness is magic. The assertion that you cannot get there from computation implies there is a currently non understood yet essential piece of physics(I assume, but I do not know) wh…

Considering that everything in the universe is the product of some computation, I would consider it a reasonable default assumption that whatever we mean by “consciousness” emerges from computation. That this idea “intuitively feels weird” or “intuitively feels wrong”, and that we love to think we are special and have a unique place in the universe, is probably a more serious bias.

>Considering that everything in the universe is the product of some computation

This is not necessarily true. If you drop a ball it's impossible to calculate how long it takes before it hits need ground. We can calculate an approximation by creating a model, but there is no way to know if that model matches reality.

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