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The Personal Security Checklist

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61–70 of 116 posts

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#61
post #60
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My recommendation for keeping second factor key material would be on a supported smartphone and make backups of that device (I use termux and restic but anything goes here, so long as your desktop can't get at the data). The app isolation makes it a lot harder to get at data compared to when malware makes it onto your desktop. Most people also don't have full control of their phone from their desktop and vice versa,…

But then, once a phone get lost, how do you recover those second factor keys? Or do you mean to have encrypted backup but the "active usage" is on another device? If so I agree and do the same.

I keep my recovery keys encrypted with a different password on my desktop. You could also export the 2FA codes from some apps.

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#62
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> statement about dictionary words being really crackable Every time I see this statement I immediately think: which dictionary? There are more languages than usual suspects (eg English, Spanish, French, Italian, German, Mandarin) and L1/L2 speakers of those make up sizable portion of internet users. Are Welsh/Hungarian/Slovak dictionary words really as easily crackable than English ones? If you have dictionary for t…

So, yes.

Individual words then are easily crackable.

But, take 3 long dictionary words chained together...easier to remember and more secure than a shorter randomly generated string.

E.g. postcriptaluminumengagement vs kug45l2wx

Or are there also dictionaries that contain combos of words?! (Would be rather a large dictionary).

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#63
post #33

> You could store [2fa backup codes] in your password manager Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication: your password from your password manager plus your backup codes from your password manager. I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault. Also the very first item in the guide makes a blanket statement about dictionary words being really crackable. I forgave that one…

Despite its shortcomings, I value the attempt to generate this list and thank the author for it. Moreover, it's on Github so issues and pull-requests can be created, and the list can be improved.

Even though a ot of the advice will be sound for pretty much all-time, unless this kind of list is maintained in this way it would grow very stale very quickly.

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#64
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So, yes.

Individual words then are easily crackable. But, take 3 long dictionary words chained together...easier to remember and more secure than a shorter randomly generated string. E.g. postcriptaluminumengagement vs kug45l2wx Or are there also dictionaries that contain combos of words?! (Would be rather a large dictionary).

3 words is not enough usually, but it technically depends on the dictionary size. Since the formula is dictsize^numwords, adding a word to your phrases is a lot better than adding a thousand words to your dictionary (also because of diminishing returns above ~5 thousand words).

Iirc 6 words is a good size for most dictionaries or 7 words for diceware, but might be off by one so please look around. I remember posting it on the security stackexchange site (I'm currently on mobile, not logged in or I'd look it up in my user) and I'm not the only one who's done this calculation. It also depends on what security level you need (e.g. should it prevent from offline brute force or only online brute force)

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#65
post #57
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A typical password manager is two factors: something you have (the password database) and something you know (the master password).

A typical password manager is BitWarden or LastPass which is on the cloud and only requires your master password.

If cloud-based password managers are set up without using a keyfile or something similar, then I agree, they're single factor. I suggest refraining from using such password managers for this reason.

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#66
post #33

> You could store [2fa backup codes] in your password manager Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication: your password from your password manager plus your backup codes from your password manager. I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault. Also the very first item in the guide makes a blanket statement about dictionary words being really crackable. I forgave that one…

> Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication

We're not, not really. The only single password that can unlock 2FA is that for the password manager, but most phishing attacks I'm aware of target the specific services, not password managers, since it's usually way easier to fake a banking login. Good password managers will have dedicated apps, so entering that password on some janky website is not something victims will be used to, plus there should be something 2FA-ish as well (biometrics on an iPhone etc.), so that particular password should be considerably harder to get ahold of than most. That doesn't protect against a fully compromised device, but that's not something 2FA is very effective against anyway. I'd say it's good enough for now.

Perfect shouldn't be the enemy of the good; security is always a trade-off between less-than-perfect alternatives, and the obvious alternative for lots of people will be a .txt on their Desktop or in their Dropbox or even an email to themselves, or no 2FA at all. I've been told that no attacker would find one person's password list since they disguised it as an email draft, who'd think to look there? Putting backup codes in one's primay 1Password vault doesn't fare that badly against those.

> I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault.

A separate vault means another password, where do you keep that? It'll be needed very infrequently, so it's easy to forget, especially under stress. Also, you'll want to make sure you have it when you're seven timezones away and just lost your phone, since vacation is prime phone-losing time and also a time when you might have to get at your emails really urgently, e.g. for travel documents; that's also a situation where printing out backup codes on paper might bite you if they stay behind at home. I'm not even sure how I'd set this up, afaik 1Password (Cloud) and LastPass don't support vault-level passwords.

This is a surprisingly little-discussed problem outside of corporate. And when it is discussed, many knowledgeable people view personal security through a corporate security lens, which isn't very practical, making this an IMO pretty underserved niche. I've discussed this with lots of people and I'm still not aware of any silver bullet solution, but the recommendation from TFA seems like a decent compromise for a sizable cohort, especially younger people who aren't comfortable with paper documents and/or are highly mobile.

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#67
post #65
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A typical password manager is BitWarden or LastPass which is on the cloud and only requires your master password.

If cloud-based password managers are set up without using a keyfile or something similar, then I agree, they're single factor. I suggest refraining from using such password managers for this reason.

You can set up LastPass and 1Password Cloud with second factors like USB security keys

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#68
post #57
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A typical password manager is two factors: something you have (the password database) and something you know (the master password).

A typical password manager is BitWarden or LastPass which is on the cloud and only requires your master password.

Thats just no true, most pw managers allow setting up MFA.

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#69
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But then, once a phone get lost, how do you recover those second factor keys? Or do you mean to have encrypted backup but the "active usage" is on another device? If so I agree and do the same.

I keep my recovery keys encrypted with a different password on my desktop. You could also export the 2FA codes from some apps.

Where do you keep that password? Rarely-used ones are easy to forget after all.

Re: The Personal Security Checklist

#70
post #48
post #33

> You could store [2fa backup codes] in your password manager Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication: your password from your password manager plus your backup codes from your password manager. I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault. Also the very first item in the guide makes a blanket statement about dictionary words being really crackable. I forgave that one…

A typical password manager is two factors: something you have (the password database) and something you know (the master password).

By that logic the password itself is two-factor, because you need the database password as well as the database file to obtain the target password. I definitely see where you're coming from, but I'm not sure why you'd still bother setting up 2FA with backup codes then if you already consider the password itself 2FA?

A higher security level, which isn't needed for everyone indeed, would be to have these two things (where you have your password database unlocked, usually multiple times a day, and the second factor secret codes) in independent locations. This can also be two VMs if you keep the host encrypted and very secure for example. I assumed people with 2FA wanted to achieve a bit higher security level than all eggs in one basket. (None of these things beat a wrench attack of course.)

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