Earlier quoted context omitted.
My recommendation for keeping second factor key material would be on a supported smartphone and make backups of that device (I use termux and restic but anything goes here, so long as your desktop can't get at the data). The app isolation makes it a lot harder to get at data compared to when malware makes it onto your desktop. Most people also don't have full control of their phone from their desktop and vice versa,…
But then, once a phone get lost, how do you recover those second factor keys? Or do you mean to have encrypted backup but the "active usage" is on another device? If so I agree and do the same.
The Personal Security Checklist
61–70 of 116 posts
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
> statement about dictionary words being really crackable Every time I see this statement I immediately think: which dictionary? There are more languages than usual suspects (eg English, Spanish, French, Italian, German, Mandarin) and L1/L2 speakers of those make up sizable portion of internet users. Are Welsh/Hungarian/Slovak dictionary words really as easily crackable than English ones? If you have dictionary for t…
So, yes.
But, take 3 long dictionary words chained together...easier to remember and more secure than a shorter randomly generated string.
E.g. postcriptaluminumengagement vs kug45l2wx
Or are there also dictionaries that contain combos of words?! (Would be rather a large dictionary).
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#63> You could store [2fa backup codes] in your password manager Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication: your password from your password manager plus your backup codes from your password manager. I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault. Also the very first item in the guide makes a blanket statement about dictionary words being really crackable. I forgave that one…
Even though a ot of the advice will be sound for pretty much all-time, unless this kind of list is maintained in this way it would grow very stale very quickly.
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
So, yes.
Individual words then are easily crackable. But, take 3 long dictionary words chained together...easier to remember and more secure than a shorter randomly generated string. E.g. postcriptaluminumengagement vs kug45l2wx Or are there also dictionaries that contain combos of words?! (Would be rather a large dictionary).
Iirc 6 words is a good size for most dictionaries or 7 words for diceware, but might be off by one so please look around. I remember posting it on the security stackexchange site (I'm currently on mobile, not logged in or I'd look it up in my user) and I'm not the only one who's done this calculation. It also depends on what security level you need (e.g. should it prevent from offline brute force or only online brute force)
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#65Earlier quoted context omitted.
A typical password manager is two factors: something you have (the password database) and something you know (the master password).
A typical password manager is BitWarden or LastPass which is on the cloud and only requires your master password.
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#66> You could store [2fa backup codes] in your password manager Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication: your password from your password manager plus your backup codes from your password manager. I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault. Also the very first item in the guide makes a blanket statement about dictionary words being really crackable. I forgave that one…
We're not, not really. The only single password that can unlock 2FA is that for the password manager, but most phishing attacks I'm aware of target the specific services, not password managers, since it's usually way easier to fake a banking login. Good password managers will have dedicated apps, so entering that password on some janky website is not something victims will be used to, plus there should be something 2FA-ish as well (biometrics on an iPhone etc.), so that particular password should be considerably harder to get ahold of than most. That doesn't protect against a fully compromised device, but that's not something 2FA is very effective against anyway. I'd say it's good enough for now.
Perfect shouldn't be the enemy of the good; security is always a trade-off between less-than-perfect alternatives, and the obvious alternative for lots of people will be a .txt on their Desktop or in their Dropbox or even an email to themselves, or no 2FA at all. I've been told that no attacker would find one person's password list since they disguised it as an email draft, who'd think to look there? Putting backup codes in one's primay 1Password vault doesn't fare that badly against those.
> I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault.
A separate vault means another password, where do you keep that? It'll be needed very infrequently, so it's easy to forget, especially under stress. Also, you'll want to make sure you have it when you're seven timezones away and just lost your phone, since vacation is prime phone-losing time and also a time when you might have to get at your emails really urgently, e.g. for travel documents; that's also a situation where printing out backup codes on paper might bite you if they stay behind at home. I'm not even sure how I'd set this up, afaik 1Password (Cloud) and LastPass don't support vault-level passwords.
This is a surprisingly little-discussed problem outside of corporate. And when it is discussed, many knowledgeable people view personal security through a corporate security lens, which isn't very practical, making this an IMO pretty underserved niche. I've discussed this with lots of people and I'm still not aware of any silver bullet solution, but the recommendation from TFA seems like a decent compromise for a sizable cohort, especially younger people who aren't comfortable with paper documents and/or are highly mobile.
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
A typical password manager is BitWarden or LastPass which is on the cloud and only requires your master password.
If cloud-based password managers are set up without using a keyfile or something similar, then I agree, they're single factor. I suggest refraining from using such password managers for this reason.
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
A typical password manager is two factors: something you have (the password database) and something you know (the master password).
A typical password manager is BitWarden or LastPass which is on the cloud and only requires your master password.
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#69Earlier quoted context omitted.
But then, once a phone get lost, how do you recover those second factor keys? Or do you mean to have encrypted backup but the "active usage" is on another device? If so I agree and do the same.
I keep my recovery keys encrypted with a different password on my desktop. You could also export the 2FA codes from some apps.
Re: The Personal Security Checklist
#70> You could store [2fa backup codes] in your password manager Aaand we're down to single-factor authentication: your password from your password manager plus your backup codes from your password manager. I do recommend a password manager, but not to keep would-be-two factors in one vault. Also the very first item in the guide makes a blanket statement about dictionary words being really crackable. I forgave that one…
A typical password manager is two factors: something you have (the password database) and something you know (the master password).
A higher security level, which isn't needed for everyone indeed, would be to have these two things (where you have your password database unlocked, usually multiple times a day, and the second factor secret codes) in independent locations. This can also be two VMs if you keep the host encrypted and very secure for example. I assumed people with 2FA wanted to achieve a bit higher security level than all eggs in one basket. (None of these things beat a wrench attack of course.)