Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is ignorant. There is lots of information about the safety of human driven cars, it is not a high bar to improve upon, and can be verified. The technology in question is introducing a new form of potentially ruinous statistical surveillance that didn't exist before.
>There is lots of information about the safety of human driven cars, it is not a high bar to improve upon, and can be verified. That doesn't make sense. The 'average' driver gets into millions of accidents. I don't want a slight above average driver driving my family around, and I don't want slightly above average drivers around me - especially those who I can't communicate with - by honking, by shouting to get their…
Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
71–80 of 143 posts
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#72Earlier quoted context omitted.
You mean one of the countries sales of devices just stopped in? And the other already was announced to be a US org? And you need the intersection of both?
- "And the other already was announced to be a US org?" Then one rogue employee in a US org could be sufficient to get selective root to every Apple device everywhere? That's easy for a nation-state adversary. Here's demonstrated examples: MBS had US-based moles in Twitter corporate spying on Khashoggi [0], and Xi had Chinese-based Zoom employees spying on dissidents in America [1]. [0] https://www.npr.org/2019/11/06…
https://www.pilotonline.com/nation-world/article_b02c37d2-ca...
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
1.35 million deaths per year caused by car accidents. That doesn't even account for the people who survive, but are maimed.
Self-driving cars are unproven tech. Just pointing to the harm that humans contribute towards doesn't mean much. Soldiers also accidentally kill innocent civilians - are you in favor of AI-drones and AI-soldiers??
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#74I'm fine with child (prepubescent) rapists whom are adults to be sentenced to death. If you were an accomplice to that, as a videographer or similar, I'm also OK with death. (There's a really weird social area from 13-18, with the weirdness and illegality going away up at 18. Stuff in this realm, especially around 2 similar ages, gets very stupid. This is where you can get 2 16yo's sexting and being charged with CSAM…
You say this as if it's bad to identify people who are distributing or collecting known child pornography. Are you recommending that companies implement technologies which go beyond this by not depending on a corpus of existing materials?
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#75Earlier quoted context omitted.
CSAM is, by definition, photography or videography of something that has already happened. Therefore, quite literally, doing absolutely nothing about CSAM itself would result in no harm to any child, as the harm has already occurred. Now you're probably going to then cry about incentivising or normalising CSAM - but that's a different argument. And if you then try to argue that the normalisation of CSAM would somehow…
> the harm has already occurred Circulating images of a minor child engaged in sexual abuse do not constitute an ongoing harm to that child? That's a fascinating viewpoint. > Apple and everybody else can fuck right off with this Orwellian shit. Right along with people who think child abuse images should be okay to keep as long as you aren't the one who made them.
When you do it, it does. When law enforcement does it, apparently not...
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#76Earlier quoted context omitted.
Come up with something like: X51!P%@AP[4\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-CHILD-ABUSE-CONTENT-TEST-FILE!$H+H* https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/EICAR_test_file
I thought about this, but you're still stuck trusting the implementation unless you test with actual illegal data, which is often criminal and immoral to obtain. Example: How does a researcher test whether algorithmically-classified illegal imagery stored on user devices is being scanned and reported home to Apple's servers, and what those bounds of AI-classified criminality are? (presumably with respect to what is i…
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#77Earlier quoted context omitted.
What’s the right number of lives to destroy from CSAM? There’s a middle ground between doing nothing and totalitarianism. “Destroyed lives” from false positives are at this point hypothetical. Child abuse is not. It’s fair to be concerned about false positives and ensure the system handles such failures appropriately. It’s also fair to directly intervene in the widespread circulation of CSAM.
CSAM is, by definition, photography or videography of something that has already happened. Therefore, quite literally, doing absolutely nothing about CSAM itself would result in no harm to any child, as the harm has already occurred. Now you're probably going to then cry about incentivising or normalising CSAM - but that's a different argument. And if you then try to argue that the normalisation of CSAM would somehow…
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#78Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#79Earlier quoted context omitted.
CSAM is, by definition, photography or videography of something that has already happened. Therefore, quite literally, doing absolutely nothing about CSAM itself would result in no harm to any child, as the harm has already occurred. Now you're probably going to then cry about incentivising or normalising CSAM - but that's a different argument. And if you then try to argue that the normalisation of CSAM would somehow…
> the harm has already occurred Circulating images of a minor child engaged in sexual abuse do not constitute an ongoing harm to that child? That's a fascinating viewpoint. > Apple and everybody else can fuck right off with this Orwellian shit. Right along with people who think child abuse images should be okay to keep as long as you aren't the one who made them.
Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?
#80Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why can't they just scan iCloud uploads on-server then? Why does anything need to be done on-device?
This scheme is obviously designed to work when Apple has no direct access to the photos. Because of this, there is a lot of speculation that Apple plans on making iCloud photos encrypted. This scheme would continue to work in that situation, whereas the on-server approach would fail. However that’s just speculation, Apple haven’t announced anything.