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Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

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Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#141
post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Encryption isn't useful because you can be tortured" is a bizarre and ridiculous argument. The police can only make you talk if they know who to make talk in the first place. Reading your messages tells them who to interrogate, where to find them, who else is involved, etc. Encryption is important especially in such countries.

It is encrypted, just not e2ee. The police need to crack the encryption protocol (not impossible, telegram use non-standard crypto), or somehow gain access to telegram's server farm.

Wasn't it fixed? It was almost e2ee, but not really due to a bug as it trusted the server, but it was fixed save for key verification, but AFAIK, key verification is an open problem in e2ee.

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#142

People are consistently surprised that Telegram is not encrypted by default in any setting. You have to create a device-to-device-specific encrypted chat with your counter-party. It's not a reasonable security model, vastly outclassed by (the still quite flawed) Signal. Ultimately, we need encrypted-by-default messaging based on public/private key pairs (obscured from the uninterested user, of course).

Nobody I know gives a shit that it's not E2E encrypted. It's a kick ass instant messenger, that's all that matters to most people. Vastly superior to Signal and others in almost every way.

Sure, but it’s for some reason framed as a WhatsApp competitor even in countries where Facebook Messenger is relatively popular, which seems silly to me. It appears to fill a similar feature niche as Facebook Messenger, not WhatsApp, even if these two categories can be somewhat conflated for most uses.

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#143

People are consistently surprised that Telegram is not encrypted by default in any setting. You have to create a device-to-device-specific encrypted chat with your counter-party. It's not a reasonable security model, vastly outclassed by (the still quite flawed) Signal. Ultimately, we need encrypted-by-default messaging based on public/private key pairs (obscured from the uninterested user, of course).

let's be realistic:

(outside of certain self-referential bubbles - like this site) no one cares anything about encryption, if in public chats I am anonymous and untraceable (example: no one can know my phone number and there are granular privacy settings) this is enough for 98% of people out here

"yes, encryption is useful if I want to send nudes to my partner or if I want to buy drugs but not while I'm asking mom for the sufflè recipe or I'm organizing a dinner with friends" this is what people think, and they are not completely wrong

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#146

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's just made by a Russian but the Russian gov is mad at him and he's living abroad.

Exactly. People read "Russian" and freak out without any nuance.

Not really strange, given what this country has done on social media to control foreign elections, allegedly, just saying.

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ok. After all, what do I know about encryption? I only directed the development of communication products that had OTR, OMEMO and PGP/GPG encryption in them. Please, enlighten me how exactly Element/Matrix practically do that. Thank you in advance.

It backups your keys encrypted with a password only you know at server side (opt in) When you login, you provide that password, and Element can use that to decrypt the keys and use these to decrypt the messages stored in the cloud Alternatively, you can solely rely on syncing keys between verified devices.

That is not 'true e2ee' at all, and more of a security theater.

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#148

People are consistently surprised that Telegram is not encrypted by default in any setting. You have to create a device-to-device-specific encrypted chat with your counter-party. It's not a reasonable security model, vastly outclassed by (the still quite flawed) Signal. Ultimately, we need encrypted-by-default messaging based on public/private key pairs (obscured from the uninterested user, of course).

Nobody I know gives a shit that it's not E2E encrypted. It's a kick ass instant messenger, that's all that matters to most people. Vastly superior to Signal and others in almost every way.

If your friends don’t care but you do, educate them. The good old “I’ve got nothing to hide” is de-facto a synonym of self-censorship or recklessness due to lack of awareness.

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#149

People are consistently surprised that Telegram is not encrypted by default in any setting. You have to create a device-to-device-specific encrypted chat with your counter-party. It's not a reasonable security model, vastly outclassed by (the still quite flawed) Signal. Ultimately, we need encrypted-by-default messaging based on public/private key pairs (obscured from the uninterested user, of course).

The source code is available, so if you don't like the defaults, you can change them?

Re: Telegram Became the Anti-Facebook

#150

People are consistently surprised that Telegram is not encrypted by default in any setting. You have to create a device-to-device-specific encrypted chat with your counter-party. It's not a reasonable security model, vastly outclassed by (the still quite flawed) Signal. Ultimately, we need encrypted-by-default messaging based on public/private key pairs (obscured from the uninterested user, of course).

> based on public/private key pairs

I said it many times and I'll say it again: this can't possibly work in the real world, period. People are notoriously terrible with passwords already. So terrible in fact that VKontakte (I worked there, both with Pavel and after he was ousted) had, and still has, a department dedicated to account recovery. And those are passwords, short strings that you can actually remember. You can't possibly expect an average person to keep their private key (a file you can't store in your head) absolutely secret and never lose it at the same time.

In my world, the ability to recover your account if you lose everything is a hard requirement for any product that is meant to reach mass adoption.

The ability to revoke access is also a hard requirement. People share their credentials — it's a fact of life. In the usual setup, you can change your password and terminate sessions. But if your private key is your identity, you can't do shit to prevent someone who has gained access to it from impersonating you for the rest of eternity.

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