> What isn't occurring, is a good-faith discussion on solving the issues faced by law enforcement and the IC related to the growing entropy of E2EE wielded at scale by folks
What would a "solution" for the IC allow them to do, and what would be the limits on it? Would the IC stop asking to weaken encryption after it was granted?
"Meet us halfway" is meaningless if we don't know what halfway is or what the extent is of what you're asking for, and proponents of these bills never give an answer to that question because they don't have an answer to that question. Is "meet us halfway" on CSAM zero CSAM, because I've people advocate for that -- and if that's the position and any time that encryption gets in the way of that we need to compromise, then you are effectively asking to abolish encryption. Is it that there should never be any information that law enforcement can't access -- because if so, you're asking to ban encryption.
Others have pointed out (correctly) that law enforcement today has unprecedented tools to monitor civilians and catch criminals, everything from facial recognition (which has largely not been banned across America) to digital dragnets to public social media to cooperation with companies that hoover up tons of PII. We carry devices that allow law enforcement with a warrant to ask cell companies for the name and location of everyone inside of a radius. That is a frankly wild amount of power.
You have already been met hecking way more than halfway on the issue of privacy vs law enforcement, and it's just utterly dishonest to claim otherwise. What we're seeing is that on the one issue where law enforcement has less access than they used to have, that's suddenly an existential problem. And my takeaway from that is that what law enforcement is asking for is not to be met halfway, law enforcement is asking to weaken and disrupt literally any tool that makes their job harder in any way at all. Any technology that weakens their level of access to anything is an existential problem to them.
It is not Libertarian to ask for end to end encryption, that is a normal, moderate position for people across all political spectrums to take. The characterization of "maybe police shouldn't be able to access everything about me at time, including my location and every single one of my conversations" as a Libertarian view is just so utterly disingenuous and dishonest. So what is a halfway position where people in the government will stop calling to weaken encryption? I do not believe that position exists, and I have never heard anyone try to articulate it using measurable criteria that don't boil down to "we'll constantly balance and use the courts". I have never seen law enforcement as a unified group argue, "you know what, we have too much access here and maybe we should have less, and it's good that this technology makes our job harder." It doesn't happen.
There is not a solution to this problem that law enforcement will ever be satisfied with other than complete surveillance of everyone in the United States. And these are the people that whine that privacy advocates are "absolutists." I carry a hecking cell phone already; you have monitoring tools, stop acting like you don't. Stop pretending that an era of unprecedented surveillance at a level that has never before been seen in all of human history is actually super awful and hard for you because you can't also read every single text message I've ever sent across all of time.