Earlier quoted context omitted.
Very funny, of course, but one can easily reply that those who do believe consciousness is a hard problem are just deluding themselves. Especially when (as is usually the case) a clear definition of the concept "hard problem" is not even given.
I hardly think Chalmers (and others) forgot to define what the problem is. It's more likely you haven't read and/or understood them.
By the way, there is a whole line of debate on the sense or nonsense of the ever-present "what it is like" phrasing:
>‘What it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’) — the use of phrases such as ‘what it is like’ — is ubiquitous in discussions of phenomenal consciousness. It is used to define, make claims about, and to offer arguments concerning consciousness. But what this talk means is unclear, as is how it means what it does: how, by putting these words in this order, we communicate something about consciousness. Without a good account of WIL-talk, we cannot be sure this talk sheds light, rather than casts shadows, on our investigations of consciousness.
(Jonathan Farrell - ‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk)