Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

propertyofthepeople.org

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

451–460 of 474 posts

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#451

Post by SturgeonsLaw »

throaway46546 wrote: post #361
lrvick wrote: post #343

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was visited by the FBI for doing security research that made them at least pretend to assume I was a blackhat they wanted to take down. Use Tor browser if you are going to research anything a criminal might regardless of pure motives. If you so much as want to research lock picking, use Tor. ISP traffic logs can and will be twisted against you in a court of law.

I openly participate in locksport communities and I haven't had any visits from the FBI.

OPSEC is about lowering the probability of things going sideways, there are no guarantees either way

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#452

Post by the_optimist »

freeflight wrote: post #420
phonethrowaway wrote: post #363

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The NSA doesn't need to illegally spy on Americans when an ally can do it for them and then share the data legally. https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukusa/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Eyes

That's not really how it works. Sure, it is also a way to circumvent such local legislature, but for that to work American allies would need to run actual surveillance structures in the US mainland proper out in the open.. You know, like the US does in the countries of it's "allies" like Germany [0] Do you really think the US would allow German intelligence agencies to build whole complexes, plugged right into the US…

To this rhetorical question, a resounding “yes” answer. There is credible suggestion that GCHQ has been invited to operate US facilities on US soil for this explicit purpose.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gch...

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#453

Post by adamfisk »

pphysch wrote: post #439
adamfisk wrote: post #316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

First, there’s a vast difference between the state department and the pentagon. Lumping those two together just reflects an unsophisticated understanding of the federal government. Signal has never received any state department or pentagon money. Tor had a significant early contribution from a researcher at Naval Research. That’s the extent of any pentagon funding. They have received significant state department fund…

Please stop spreading misinformation. From the Tor Project's public IRS documents: > WHILE FUNDING FOR TOR ORIGINALLY FOCUSED ON BASIC RESEARCH TO BETTER UNDERSTAND ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND CENSORSHIP-RESISTANCE, THE MAJORITY OF FUNDING NOW FALLS INTO THREE CATERGORIES: DEVELOPMENT FUNDING FROM GROUPS LIKE RADIO FREE ASIA AND DARPA TO DESIGN AND BUILD PR OTOTYPES BASED ON RESEARCH DONE BOTH INSIDE TOR AND ALSO AT OTHE…

Yes they’ve received funding from DARPA. I realized I forgot that after I posted. Good catch. To my knowledge, that funding is for new anti-censorship transports to sneak traffic in and out of censored countries.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#454

Post by MaxBarraclough »

donw wrote: post #327
CrazyCatDog wrote: post #310

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Actually, I think they had no intel. You NEED intel for a judge to order a subpoena—and if a subpoena was issued, the ISP would open their firehose, and overwhelm the FBI with evidence suggesting that there’s nothing to investigate. And having visited extremist sites a handful of times—even if advertantly—is probably not going to meet the threshold for a subpoena. If the FBI visited me and casually asked about my web…

> Then again, I can’t even fathom the upside for the FBI. The upside is power. You yourself said as much: "If the agent was accompanied with someone from my employer, I would eagerly cart up every single device in my home and offer to carry it out to their vehicle." You fear them. Rightly so. The FBI has incredible power, backed by the full might of corporate media. To cross them is to be crushed. Why would they need…

Apple have famously refused FBI requests.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI%E2%80%93Apple_encryption_d...

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#455

Post by jfrunyon »

kingcharles wrote: post #207
jfrunyon wrote: post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The fifth amendment doesn't protect either speech or biometrics. Nor does it protect passwords.

You are wrong. It protects passwords as speech, as they are testimonial, per many court rulings. It does not protect biometrics based on law that basically says the police can force you to give up your fingerprints for their records, so they can sure as fuck force your finger onto a reader.

> It protects passwords as speech, as they are testimonial, per many court rulings.

Not true.

https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/us-supreme-court-nixe... for example.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#456

Post by normaler »

leokennis wrote: post #65
nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings: - Use a strong pass phrase - Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day - Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. -…

I use this app on my phone

https://f-droid.org/en/packages/com.wesaphzt.privatelock/

It locks the phone when a movement threshold is broken, and then requires the password instead of biometrics to unlock the phone.

So the snatch the phone when it is unlocked vector gets harder.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#457

Post by [deleted] »

danShumway wrote: post #450
hunterb123 wrote: post #434

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Details are important. The media campaigns are claiming he wanted Muslim identification, a system THEY proposed in their hypothetical. When he didn't confirm they said "he wouldn't deny it" as their proof of support. > The below quote is already bad enough. He still proposed surveillance based on religious identity. He said nothing about citizens or monitoring them based on religious identity. He said look at mosques…

Are you proposing that increased surveillance of mosques is to protect them? That requires a certain level of imagination given the full context of the quote: > "Certain things will be done that we never thought would happen in this country in terms of information and learning about the enemy," he added. "We’re going to have to do things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago." > "We’re going to have to look at a l…

[deleted]

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#458

Post by pphysch »

adamfisk wrote: post #453
pphysch wrote: post #439

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please stop spreading misinformation. From the Tor Project's public IRS documents: > WHILE FUNDING FOR TOR ORIGINALLY FOCUSED ON BASIC RESEARCH TO BETTER UNDERSTAND ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND CENSORSHIP-RESISTANCE, THE MAJORITY OF FUNDING NOW FALLS INTO THREE CATERGORIES: DEVELOPMENT FUNDING FROM GROUPS LIKE RADIO FREE ASIA AND DARPA TO DESIGN AND BUILD PR OTOTYPES BASED ON RESEARCH DONE BOTH INSIDE TOR AND ALSO AT OTHE…

Yes they’ve received funding from DARPA. I realized I forgot that after I posted. Good catch. To my knowledge, that funding is for new anti-censorship transports to sneak traffic in and out of censored countries.

And the State Department are definitely warmongers.

SecState Kissinger orchestrated the incineration of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

SecState Powell orchestrated the flattening of Iraq.

SecState Clinton orchestrated the butchering of Libya.

SecState Pompeo tried and failed to orchestrate the annihilation of Iran by assassinating top officials and drawing them into war.

And so on and so forth. These aren't even theories. The State Department is closely involved in destabilizing sovereign governments through the full spectrum of means, including war, to advance Washington's interests.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#459

Post by jc01480 »

Terretta wrote: post #399
jc01480 wrote: post #331

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Major service providers do not maintain SMS history beyond 24 hours, let alone 1-7 years (last time I worked a case that is). They’re transparent about it as well. Look up the LE liaison contacts on their sites and they’ll clearly list what is available or not available. That’s why it’s crucial to get the actual devices themselves. Reason: the infrastructure to manage SMS content for every customer for 7 years with z…

> Major service providers do not maintain SMS history beyond 24 hours, let alone 1-7 years Nobody should make decisions based on this comment.

Agreed. Do your own due diligence.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#460

Post by jc01480 »

lrvick wrote: post #344
jc01480 wrote: post #331

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Major service providers do not maintain SMS history beyond 24 hours, let alone 1-7 years (last time I worked a case that is). They’re transparent about it as well. Look up the LE liaison contacts on their sites and they’ll clearly list what is available or not available. That’s why it’s crucial to get the actual devices themselves. Reason: the infrastructure to manage SMS content for every customer for 7 years with z…

I went to a major cell provider and asked them nicely for access to SMS for all their customers and they happily took money and gave me an API. This was for a startup. I have no doubt they do the same for governments.

If I understand this correctly you’re saying a major cell provider is selling you access to subscriber SMS message content?
Post reply on HN