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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#431

Post by tptacek »

CyanBird wrote: post #360
tptacek wrote: post #216

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal isn't funded by the military, by OTF/BBG, or any branch of the USG government. People who claim otherwise are confused (deeply) about a program OTF ran that sponsored third-party security reviews and development projects (summer-of-code style), none of which was mediated through OTF --- it was just a bucket of money. You should be extremely skeptical about people who bring OTF/BBG up in these discussions. I ha…

> Signal isn't funded by the military Correct, it is not funded by "the military", but this is incorrect > any branch of the USG government Because Signal/TextSecure received considerable amounts of seed capital from Radio Free Asia which is a CIA spinoff with the explicit aim to fund the development of the cryptography at grass roots level, not per se to have full control of it like NSA would have done, but because…

It's like you read 4 words from my comment and stopped.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#432

Post by raxxorrax »

yownie wrote: post #377
SavantIdiot wrote: post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where is any evidence of Tor being a military surveillance project? I find it hard to believe an open source project like this has been infiltrated. Yes, there is suspicion some ECC curves are compromised, but only the ones provided by NIST. I'd really like to see evidence of Tor.

There's a been a suspiciously downplayed number of ephemeral hidden services that get raided / internationally taken down on the Tor network for it to be mere circumstance. No one tries to take notice since they're hosting the worst content on the internet regularly.

Could as well be insiders though and operations that were planned for years.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#433

Post by raxxorrax »

kingcharles wrote: post #224
minerva23 wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> if you have something to hide Most people don't realize that most people have something to hide. The USA has so many laws on its books. Many of which are outright bizarre[0] and some of which normal people might normally break[1]. And that's only counting current/past laws. It wasn't that long ago a US President was suggesting all Muslims should be forced to carry special IDs[2]. If you have a documented history be…

I always liked this one I found in the Illinois statutes - it basically criminalizes every person online: Barratry. If a person wickedly and willfully excites and stirs up actions or quarrels between the people of this State with a view to promote strife and contention, he or she is guilty of the petty offense of common barratry[.] https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=0720...

There is a renaissance of such laws regarding causing offense. That would basically be anybody whose face you don't like? I wonder how much considerations go into suggestions like this. Side effects should normally hit your face like a truck.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#434

Post by hunterb123 »

danShumway wrote: post #323
hunterb123 wrote: post #281

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Again that's a generic response: > There should be a lot of systems, beyond databases. I mean, we should have a lot of systems Beyond databases. What does that mean? That could be analog systems, that could be anything not stored in a computer. Nothing to do with identification which would need a database. It's a generic answer to avoid a hypothetical. It's a nonanswer. He said nothing, not everything. You are attrib…

You're kind of quibbling over details. The below quote is already bad enough: > "We’re going to have to look at the mosques. We’re going to have to look very, very carefully." I already do not trust the person who has said that. Does it really matter if he proposed a full-fledged ID system? He still proposed monitoring mosques. He still proposed surveillance based on religious identity. The correct answer to that que…

Details are important. The media campaigns are claiming he wanted Muslim identification, a system THEY proposed in their hypothetical. When he didn't confirm they said "he wouldn't deny it" as their proof of support.

> The below quote is already bad enough. He still proposed surveillance based on religious identity.

He said nothing about citizens or monitoring them based on religious identity. He said look at mosques, that's all. Mosques are often the target of attacks.

https://search.brave.com/search?q=mosque+coordinated+attack&...

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#435

Post by q1w2 »

throwaway0a5e wrote: post #393
vbezhenar wrote: post #337

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is it prohibited to visit those websites? I once was interested to understand the way radicals think, to read about their arguments, so I spent some time hanging around some radical websites.

To quote a Dartmouth history professor who taught a class on the subject: "if you don't get randomly selected for a search on your next flight you aren't doing your homework" It's not prohibited but they notice and subject you to harassment by the system at every action with every part of the system that is integrated with their database.

This seems like hyperbole.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#436

Post by rootusrootus »

hunterb123 wrote: post #281
rootusrootus wrote: post #255

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's all he said to the interviewer And then the next day, he clarified: Reporter: "Should there be a database or system that tracks Muslims in this country?" Trump: "There should be a lot of systems, beyond databases. I mean, we should have a lot of systems." And then he tried to backpedal. Decided it was a watch list, not a database, etc. Basically the usual shtick of his where he tries to say everything and no…

Again that's a generic response: > There should be a lot of systems, beyond databases. I mean, we should have a lot of systems Beyond databases. What does that mean? That could be analog systems, that could be anything not stored in a computer. Nothing to do with identification which would need a database. It's a generic answer to avoid a hypothetical. It's a nonanswer. He said nothing, not everything. You are attrib…

> Again that's a generic response

Like I said, he always manages to say exactly the right things so the people who support him will read between the lines, but leave just enough ambiguity so those same people can quibble constantly over whether that was what he really meant.

> hypotheticals are always trap

He could have just said "No." Or "I have no such plans at this time." if he wanted to sound like a typical politician. His circumlocution is legendary, because it allows everyone to believe what they want to believe. Politicians all have this problem, but Trump elevates it to a whole new level.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#437

Post by [deleted] »

anon11302100 wrote: post #53
Borgz wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not exactly. Non-secret chats are stored encrypted on Telegram's servers, and separately from keys. The goal seems to be to require multiple jurisdictions to issue a court order before data can be decrypted. https://telegram.org/privacy#3-3-1-cloud-chats https://telegram.org/faq#q-do-you-process-data-requests

"Not exactly" means "completely incorrect" now? Telegram doesn't store your messages forever and they are encrypted and seizing the servers won't allow you to decrypt them unless you also seize the correct servers from another country

[deleted]

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#438

Post by [deleted] »

vadfa wrote: post #421
anon11302100 wrote: post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Not exactly" means "completely incorrect" now? Telegram doesn't store your messages forever and they are encrypted and seizing the servers won't allow you to decrypt them unless you also seize the correct servers from another country

Of course they store your messages forever... They've kept all of my messages for over 7 years now.

[deleted]

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#439

Post by pphysch »

adamfisk wrote: post #316
pphysch wrote: post #298

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Is there something you would add? Let's start with "not being created/funded by the State Department or Pentagon". > You would prefer…what exactly? Again, let's start with "not being blatant propaganda produced by warmongers".

First, there’s a vast difference between the state department and the pentagon. Lumping those two together just reflects an unsophisticated understanding of the federal government. Signal has never received any state department or pentagon money. Tor had a significant early contribution from a researcher at Naval Research. That’s the extent of any pentagon funding. They have received significant state department fund…

Please stop spreading misinformation. From the Tor Project's public IRS documents:

> WHILE FUNDING FOR TOR ORIGINALLY FOCUSED ON BASIC RESEARCH TO BETTER UNDERSTAND ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND CENSORSHIP-RESISTANCE, THE MAJORITY OF FUNDING NOW FALLS INTO THREE CATERGORIES: DEVELOPMENT FUNDING FROM GROUPS LIKE RADIO FREE ASIA AND DARPA TO DESIGN AND BUILD PR OTOTYPES BASED ON RESEARCH DONE BOTH INSIDE TOR AND ALSO AT OTHER INSTITUTIONS; DEPLOYMENT FUNDING FROM ORGANIZATIONS LIKE THE US STATE DEPARTMENT AND SWEDEN'S FOREIGN MINISTRY; AND UNRESTRICTED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, CORPORATIONS, AND INDIVIDUAL DONORS FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF THE TOR PROJECT'S FUNDING SOURCES FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 2020: FUNDING FROM US GOVERNMENT SOURCES US STATE DEPT - BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RI GHTS AND LABOR 752,154 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 98,727 RADIO FR EE ASIA/OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND 908,744 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY - INSTITUTE OF MUSEUM AND LIBRARY SERVICES 101,549 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY 392,00 8 FUNDING FROM NON-US GOVERNMENT SOURCES DIGITAL IMPACT ALLIANCE - UNITED NATIONS 25,000 S WEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY (SIDA) 284,697 FUNDING FROM CORPORATE SOURCES MOZILLA 157,500 AVAST 50,000 MULLVAD 50,000 FUNDING FROM PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS OPEN SOURCE COLLECTIVE 23,100 MEDIA DEMOCRACY FUND 270,000 ZCASH FOUNDATION 51,122 MOZILLA OPEN SOURCE SUPPORT MOSS 75,000 RIPE 53,114 CRAIG NEWMARK PHILANTHROPIC FUND 50,000 STEFAN THO MAS CHARITABLE FOUNDATION 50,000 KAO FOUNDATION 10,000 MARIN COMMUNITY FOUNDATION 1,000 IN DIVIDUAL DONATIONS 890,353

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