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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#181
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings: - Use a strong pass phrase - Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day - Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. -…

In most cases you are going to want to separately passphrase your messaging stuff so it is locked up when you are not using it. That makes every thing else a lot easier. For example, there is a Signal fork that supports such operation:

* https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#182
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know whether Telegram is E2EE by default (probably not.) When you do a call on telegram you are given a series of emoji and they are supposed to match what the person on the other side has, and that's supposed to indicate E2EE for that call.

Verification in band seems pretty meaningless, approaching security theatre.

Real privacy is too burdensome for most users, so they feel just fine if the service owner promises in a stern voice that their chats are really secure.

It is not necessary to provide real security, do fingerprint verification, etc if the users are already happy with the level of security they are promised.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#183
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Source for Telegram storing the information unencrypted at rest?

It is widely known and confirmed by Telegram themselves that your messages are encrypted at rest by keys they possess. This is a similar process to what Dropbox, iCloud, Google Drive, and Facebook Messenger do. Your files with cloud services aren’t stored unencrypted on a hard drive - they’re encrypted, with the keys kept somewhere else by the cloud provider. This way somebody can’t walk out with a rack and access us…

How do they provide near-instant full text search on server side if the chats are "encrypted at rest"?

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#185
post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To err on the side of caution, it's best to make all your passcodes themselves an admission to a crime.

They don't actually need your passphrase to unlock your phone - they just need somebody with the passphrase to unlock in for them. And if there's any doubt about who that is, then having that passphrase counts as testimonial; but if there's not - it might not count as testimonial. Although there are apparently a whole bunch of legal details that matter here; courts have in some cases held that defendants can be force…

We really should up our game on encryption, perhaps some kind of time-based crypto rotation that inherently self-destructs rendering the data unusable if you don't authenticate with it every so often. If you are physically unable to unlock a device you can't be compelled to do so.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#186
post #170

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Telegram defaults to no encryption, does not do encrypted group chats, has a home-rolled encryption protocol which almost guarantees it's weak as nearly every home-rolled encryption system always is (if not also backdoored). Coupled with it being headquartered in Russia means it is completely untrustable. The only reason Telegram comes out on top of Whatsapp in the document in question is because Telegram is a foreig…

That is a lot of speculation. If you read the encryption protocol, actual methods being used for encryption are well known. Client is open source and supports reproducible builds. If there is a backdoor, it is in front of our eyes. > What that list doesn't show is what Telegram does when the FSB knocks. By all means, give your potentially embarassing message content to a hostile nation's intelligence service. Telegra…

Telegram's block in Russia was likely a very successful PR action coordinated with authorities.

It was never removed from national appstores, and Google/Apple usually comply with such requests, and the fact that it was unbanned is unprecedented.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#187
post #175

They left off one very popular messenger, SMS: * Message content: All * Subpoena: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * 18 U.S.C 2703(d): can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Search warrant: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Vague suspicion plus a small fee to the carrier: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years

You forgot email... and they don't need a warrant for messages older then 180 days if in the cloud (they never delete them, too): https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/house-passes-bil...

IIRC the only reason this amendment was made was because the 180 day limit was found unconstitutional anyway by an appellate court. So, technically the amendment did nothing.

It doesn't matter where your data is held, locally or cloud, (if you are an American resident and your data is in the USA) as it is _your_ data and it is unconstitutional for them to read it without a warrant. In theory.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#188
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings: - Use a strong pass phrase - Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day - Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. -…

> Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase

On my Pixel (Android), it's hold the power button for ~2 seconds then select Lockdown.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#189
post #162

This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…

Yasha Levine is a conspiracy theorist hack. There’s really no other way to say it. His narrative is attractive to a left leaning audience with shallow knowledge in this area, but the reality is that without publicly funded software like Tor, Signal, OTF, and my own Lantern, our world would be more fully saturated with corporate control of the internet. We need more public funding for open source software (with public…

I don't disagree with what you're saying. I'm not sure your statement is in disagreement with mine either? I don't think he's saying less OSS is better or anything dogmatic? All he's saying is that using Tor/Signal shouldn't be the end all be all of your surveillance concerns.

> would be more fully saturated with corporate control of the internet

You might disagree. His point was that the "corporate controllers of the internet" support projects like Tor because A) it gives a (somewhat ineffective) channel for people to focus on rather than political recourses and B) there's no real threat to the corporate model. What would you do in this e2e encrypted internet without corporate services?

> such as reproducible builds

Seems like a tangential point. You can have an untampered copy of a client with a vulnerability.

> funding from the government while fulfilling missions with extraordinary humanitarian benefits

I don't think this is in disagreement with anything either

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#190

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sounds like an easy way to have your case tossed out in court. It's funny how much this differs from my own personal experience with law enforcement. The friends I know are timid as hell and don't do anything without a warrant just to stay on the safe side- even if they probably don't need one.

I'm just glad you're here to stick up for your friends without any corroboration or linking story. It's just a good thing to do.

Being charitable, let’s assume his friends work as homicide or theft detectives. If so, they need a high standard for admissible evidence to build their case.

If on the other hand his friends are street cops tasked with clearing a corner of drug dealers because some neighbor complained to their council person who complained to the police chief then those cops don’t necessarily care about extrajudicial activities.

Having been harassed by street cops and interacted with homicide detectives, I can tell you they vary tremendously in professionalism.

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