FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

Post by fumar » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:23 PM UTC

amatecha wrote: post #32

fumar wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Has Apple made any public statements regarding iCloud's lack of privacy features. It takes the wind out of their privacy marketing that is effectively hurting ad tech but not truly protecting consumers from state-level actors with data access.

Kind of. These details are indeed publicly written on their website[0]. Do many users ever read this page? Probably not. [0] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

Post by Consultant32452 » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:23 PM UTC

heavyset_go wrote: post #56

xanaxagoras wrote: post #43

They left off one very popular messenger, SMS: * Message content: All * Subpoena: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * 18 U.S.C 2703(d): can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Search warrant: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Vague suspicion plus a small fee to the carrier: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years

There's also: * Law enforcement simply asks nicely: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years

Post by inetknght » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:24 PM UTC

makeworld wrote: post #39

georgyo wrote: post #6

It says Telegram has no message content. Isn't telegram not E2EE by default, instead required explicit steps to make a conversation encrypted? Either way looks like Signal wins by a lot. The size of it spot is so small, it seems almost squeezed in. But only because they have nothing to share.

> the FBI's ability to legally access secure content Maybe there are laws preventing legal access to message content? Maybe related to wherever Telegram is incorporated.

Post by cronix » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:25 PM UTC

FalconSensei wrote: post #69

nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

> do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone but can't they force you to put your password in that case, instead of your finger?

Post by 14 » Tue, Nov 30, 2021, 9:26 PM UTC

leokennis wrote: post #65

nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings: - Use a strong pass phrase - Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day - Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. -…