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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#61

Post by viro »

no_time wrote: post #30
colechristensen wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not if they want to operate in the United States or have access to our banking system. You don’t get to pick your jurisdiction and then operate globally. You’re obligated to follow the laws where you want to operate.

I wonder how this affects nonprofits like Matrix/Element and Signal. What can they do with them? Gangstalk their developers? Coerce big tech to ban them from their appstores?

Refusing a valid court issued search warrant/order is a criminal offense. I think 180 days for each refusal of a legal order.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#62

Post by noasaservice »

timbit42 wrote: post #47
nimbius wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

Signal recently added 'disappearing messages' which lets you specify how long a chat you initiate remains before being deleted.

And a screenshot, or another camera, or a rooted phone can easily defeat that.

The analog hole ALWAYS exists. Pretending it doesnt is ridiculous.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#63

Post by ajsnigrutin »

Muromec wrote: post #49
nitrogen wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For voice? It's hard to fake the voice of someone you know.

you don't have to fake the voice, just mitm and record cleartext

But they have to fake the voice, if I call the other person and say "my emoji sequence is this, this and that" for the other person to verify and vice-versa.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#64

Post by er4hn »

no_time wrote: post #11

LINE,telegram,threema and WeChat are not even american companies. Can't they just tell the FBI to suck a fat one when they ask for user data?

Telegram, as I understand it, can access your messages when stored in their Cloud[1]. They just make a choice to not provide the content of those to anyone.

[1] - https://telegram.org/privacy#4-1-storing-data

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#65

Post by leokennis »

nimbius wrote: post #38
georgyo wrote: post #6

It says Telegram has no message content. Isn't telegram not E2EE by default, instead required explicit steps to make a conversation encrypted? Either way looks like Signal wins by a lot. The size of it spot is so small, it seems almost squeezed in. But only because they have nothing to share.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings:

- Use a strong pass phrase

- Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day

- Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. - on iPhone this is mashing the side button 5 times

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#66

Post by anonporridge »

the_optimist wrote: post #48

Isn’t this simply imaginary, where in practice all the FBI has to do to up the ante is to request military-grade interception from a willing foreign counterpart?

The point of promoting and using privacy respecting software is not necessarily to make it impossible for law enforcement to get what they want. It's to make it somewhat expensive and require targeted probes.

You simply want it to be cost prohibitive to engage in mass surveillance on everyone, because that is an immensely powerful tool of totalitarian oppression that get really bad if we happen to elect the wrong person once.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#67

Post by wizzwizz4 »

noasaservice wrote: post #62
timbit42 wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal recently added 'disappearing messages' which lets you specify how long a chat you initiate remains before being deleted.

And a screenshot, or another camera, or a rooted phone can easily defeat that. The analog hole ALWAYS exists. Pretending it doesnt is ridiculous.

> And a screenshot, or another camera, or a rooted phone can easily defeat that.

Not if the message has already been deleted. Auto-deleting messages are so the recipient doesn't have to delete them manually, not so the recipient can't possibly keep a copy.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#68

Post by basilgohar »

catlikesshrimp wrote: post #52
fractal618 wrote: post #33

Now I just have to get my friends and family to use Signal.

I have been trying to get people to install signal for 2 years. No one has budged. The day facebook went down for some hours I got phone calls.

I have had some success. It helps that many of the people I regularly contact were willing to migrate, even after some time. Most already used WhatsApp, so the friction to installing a new app was less than someone not accustomed to using a dedicated app for messaging.

But most of my American friends that don't have international contacts still just use SMS because they are not really accustomed to an app such as WhatsApp and so on.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#69

Post by FalconSensei »

nimbius wrote: post #38
georgyo wrote: post #6

It says Telegram has no message content. Isn't telegram not E2EE by default, instead required explicit steps to make a conversation encrypted? Either way looks like Signal wins by a lot. The size of it spot is so small, it seems almost squeezed in. But only because they have nothing to share.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

> do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone

but can't they force you to put your password in that case, instead of your finger?

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#70

Post by [deleted] »

noasaservice wrote: post #62
timbit42 wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal recently added 'disappearing messages' which lets you specify how long a chat you initiate remains before being deleted.

And a screenshot, or another camera, or a rooted phone can easily defeat that. The analog hole ALWAYS exists. Pretending it doesnt is ridiculous.

[deleted]
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