Earlier quoted context omitted.
No cryptography engineer seriously believes the NIST P-curves are backdoored, and they are in widespread use. Ed25519 is a signing scheme; it isn't a replacement for the RSA in classic TLS --- you'd be thinking of Curve25519, its sibling. The benefit of the 25519s isn't "no magic numbers", it's a structure that makes it easy to implement relatively safely. And all these curves work over prime subfields. This is all 1…
I wouldn't contest that no crypto engineer "seriously believes NIST P-curves are backdoored", but I know some high profile crypto engineers who seriously think and demonstrate how they might be flawed and could have been backdoored since day one. [1] [2] It's almost impossible to prove they were backdoored, but considering the sensitivity of the subject, I understand why many consider this unknown a reason to distrus…
The most well-known failure has to be the PS3 jailbreak [2]. Sony just failed to implement their RNG (or alternatively copied their RNG code from xkcd #221), which rendered their ECDSA-based crypto completely worthless.
Another famous case is the long list of JWT/JWE libraries which were vulnerable to invalid curve attacks, again completely destroying the security of their NIST p-curves (when used for encryption) [3].
Really, I don't think nobody should be using NIST P-curves if they have any choice, unless you verified your implementation yourself. And I don't even want to claim to be able to do it.
(I don't think tptacek ever said you should use the NIST curves[4], so there's no controversy there)
[1] https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/
[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LP1t_pzxKyE
[3] https://auth0.com/blog/critical-vulnerability-in-json-web-en...
[4] https://latacora.micro.blog/2018/04/03/cryptographic-right-a...