> It's not scanning on the client side, it's hashing.
They are (their code is) looking at every item and reviewing it opaquely to us, and deciding if they should have an employee look at tiny thumbnails to tell the cops the owner is a pedophile. Its (a) not real hashing - its "perceptual" which is fancy math that says they're looking at thumbnails and (b) cycling through every item in a list and running an Algo against it is what I'd call scanning - lets not get bogged down on the terms.
We all know the tech details they shared, people on this site all understand the difference. We know the algorithm is easy enough to produce collisions. We know that apple said multiple 3 letter agencies can determine what goes in the bloom filter, and it would be downloaded from the internet and not audited. We know they are going to open it up to other countries governments too. We know that its on if you want to use opt-out services.
> The alternative, as many have pointed out, is them uploading your whole image to be scanned server side.
> Smart money is that this is a move in front of Apple encrypting your whole icloud backup
The whole image is being uploaded server side anyways.
My smart money says that this won't lead to encrypted backups anytime soon. Too many other things in those backups.
> social liability of being a free encrypted cloud storage for CSAM
I don't really think there is much tbh. That said, it is clear people would rather have non-absolutely-private cloud than a non-absolutely-private personal device. I know I would!
People criticize apple for "not letting you own the device" and this is a much bigger step down that road. I would rather a less-absolutely-private cloud service than an absolutely-private-everything where my local stuff is scanned.
> There's lots of reasons to criticise Apple, this isn't one.
There's lots of reasons to criticize Apple. Including this one.