isn't it sufficient that they change the function every day or something ?
Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
311–320 of 363 posts
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#312Earlier quoted context omitted.
If some commenters can be believed about their experience with the database, there are a bunch of completely innocuous images in it because they're from the same photosets or distributed alongside CSAM. Is that enough to cause an investigation? Maybe, maybe not, but I wouldn't want it to be a risk.
Photos in the database are classified for their content. Only images classified as A1 (A: prepubescent minor, 1: sex act) are being included in the hash set on iOS. So this doesn't even include A2 (2: lascivious exhibition), B1 or B2 (B: pubescent minor) let alone images which are in the database and aren't classified as any of A1, A2, B1 or B2. While I've no doubt that there's a lot of "before and after" images (whi…
If someone is deliberately targeting you with them, 30 isn't very hard to reach.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#313A lot has been said about using this as an attack vector by possibly poisoning a victims iPhone with an image that matches a CSAM hash. But could this not also be used to circumvent the CSAM scanning by converting images that are in the CSAM database to visually similar images that won't match the hash anymore? That would effectively defeat the CSAM scanning Apple and others are trying to put into place completely an…
Or am I missing something here? Wouldn't it be easier for offenders to avoid Apple products? That requires no special computer expertise and involves no risk on their part.
That would be more effective! But that's not something Apple is trying to solve here (or could ever solve).
They are trying to prevent CSAM images from being stored and distributed using Apple products. If that goal is easily circumvented, the whole motivation for this (anti-)feature becomes invalid.
I a way, this architecture could potentially even make Apple products more attractive for CSAM distributors, since they now have a known way to fly under the radar (something that is arguably harder/riskier on other image sharing platforms, where the matching happens server-side).
One reasonable strategy Apple could have against that is through constantly finetuning the NeuralHash algorithm to hopefully catch more and more offenders. If that works reasonably well, it might deter criminals from their platform because an image that flies under the radar now might not fly under the radar in the future.
NB. I'm not trying to say Apple is doing the right thing here, especially since the above arguments put the efficacy of this architecture under scrutiny.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#314A lot has been said about using this as an attack vector by possibly poisoning a victims iPhone with an image that matches a CSAM hash. But could this not also be used to circumvent the CSAM scanning by converting images that are in the CSAM database to visually similar images that won't match the hash anymore? That would effectively defeat the CSAM scanning Apple and others are trying to put into place completely an…
Or am I missing something here? Wouldn't it be easier for offenders to avoid Apple products? That requires no special computer expertise and involves no risk on their part.
Allegedly other image sharing services already do CSAM detection after the upload. Switching handset OS removes any image-level defensive capability the abusers may employ, so they might face a higher risk using these other services.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#315Despite that Apple scanning our images is a horrible privacy practice, I don't get why 𝚜̶𝚘̶ ̶𝚖̶𝚊̶𝚗̶𝚢̶ some people think this is an ineffective idea. Surely you can easily fabricate innocent images whose NeuralHash matches the database. But in what way are you going to send them to victims and convince them to save them to their photo library? The moment you send it via WhatsApp FB will stop you because (they th…
It's a good question, and unfortunately you're probably right.
It boils down to this: If you can prevent [some organisation] from potentially destroying civilisation, how much effort would be too much effort, and how much uncertainty is too much uncertainty?
For most, there's a trade off. If someone believes that the technology is sufficient for any country to implement a brutal civil rights destruction campaign, and that this is 50% likely, and all you need to do is upload some harmless images to your icloud to thwart it, why wouldn't you? For example, maybe a certain political party could regain power in a massive way and start doing away with gay rights, locking up anyone with pictures of men kissing each other on their phones. Of course, other countries have other types of extremists that look like they might take over government, or have already taken over governments. In those countries, tools like this are already in place, and this new one could be very powerful.
So if you could upload some innocuous images and save hundreds of lives in 20 or more countries in the world, even if you don't fear for your own country, would you?
Assuming you said yes, the question is, could everyone who agrees give Apple enough false positives, force enough human moderators to have to inspect the images, that the whole scheme becomes financially un-viable on Apple's end?
Of course, the only thing we could do here is slow this "progress" down. Maybe we can use that extra time to share the message that "this kind of technology is not ok" and that being naive about what this tech will be used for is almost guaranteed to kill more people than it saves.
But while so few people are thinking of it in these terms, or if everyone believes the attempt to be futile, it can't work. It's like anything - by the time people realise there's a problem, it's often too late to fix the problem.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#316To me the most interesting findings from this fiasco were: 1. People actually do use generally publicly available services to store and distribute CP (as suggested by the amount of reports done by Facebook) 2. A lot of people evidently use iCloud Photo Library to store images of things other than pictures they took themselves. This is not really surprising, I've learned that the answer of "does anybody ever?" questio…
My iCloud Photo Library is full of pictures saved from the Web and screenshots. That is just the way it works on iOS and it is really annoying to have random cute dog pictures saved from Reddit crop up in "Your Furry Friends"-Compilations.
Before Files I've never actually saved any pictures and painstakingly routinely deleted screenshots.
The first is now a bit easier since the share sheet also has "save to files" (only some of the time though, for no apparent reason). The second is a bit easier as there at least is a Screenshot automatic album.
But yes, I see why people do this, but I wish apple provided a better way to not pollute the iCloud library.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#317To me the most interesting findings from this fiasco were: 1. People actually do use generally publicly available services to store and distribute CP (as suggested by the amount of reports done by Facebook) 2. A lot of people evidently use iCloud Photo Library to store images of things other than pictures they took themselves. This is not really surprising, I've learned that the answer of "does anybody ever?" questio…
> 2. A lot of people evidently use iCloud Photo Library to store images of things other than pictures they took themselves Not in the context of CSAM, but this is iOS’s “appliance” user interface coming back to bite it. The iOS photos app doesn’t appear to have a way to show the user only the photos they took. Apps like Twitter, browsers, chat apps, screenshots all get to save their photos in the photo library. I bel…
I also remember that WhatsApp has a default where it stores any viewed message in conversation in the library.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#318Hi, this looks interesting but I have no idea what this all means lol Is this some way of hiding a picture within a picture, or am I way off the mark?
Apple began scanning for CSAM with Neuralhash. This allows you to turn an image into a specific neuralhash thus possibly triggering its (automatic) CSAM detection. Imagine if a picture of a cat could cause Apple to think you have CP on your device.
You're not trying hard enough on how to bypass the human component methinks.
Use porn as the base images. The more petite, flat and young looking, the better. The moderators are already going to be tuned in to csam, so all you need to do is to give them a slight push.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#319The integrity of this entire system now relies on the security of the CSAM hash database, which has just dramatically increased in value to potential attackers. All it would take now, is for one CSAM hash to be known to the public, then uploading collided iPhone wallpapers to wallpaper download sites. That many false positives will overload whatever administrative capacity there is to review reports in a matter of da…
To assume CP is reviewed manually is simply wrong. You don't want to put such weight on an individual. You want to automate it as much as possible, with as little false positives (and false negatives) as possible. For example, in case of a wallpaper, let's say its the Windows XP wallpaper. There's no human skin color in it at all, so you can easily be reasonably sure it isn't CP. You would not need an advanced ML for…
Apple explicitly states that it is reviewed manually.
Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash
#320Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or am I missing something here? Wouldn't it be easier for offenders to avoid Apple products? That requires no special computer expertise and involves no risk on their part.
That would be more effective! But that's not something Apple is trying to solve here (or could ever solve). They are trying to prevent CSAM images from being stored and distributed using Apple products. If that goal is easily circumvented, the whole motivation for this (anti-)feature becomes invalid. I a way, this architecture could potentially even make Apple products more attractive for CSAM distributors, since the…
> They are trying to prevent CSAM images from being stored and distributed using Apple products.
If what Apple is aiming for is a more complete version of E2EE on their servers, maybe that's just an unintended consequence of the implementation, and the very reason why they're surprised that this received so much pushback. If Apple wanted to offer encryption for all user files in iCloud and leave no capability to decrypt the files themselves, they'd still need to be able to detect CSAM to protect themselves from liability. In that case, scanning on the device would be the only way to make it work.
If that were the case, I still wouldn't believe that moving the scan to the device fundamentally changes anything. Apple has to conduct a scan regardless, or they'll become a viable option for criminals to store CSAM. But in Apple's view, their implementation would mean they'd likely be the first cloud company that could claim to have zero knowledge of the data on on their servers while still satisfying the demands of the law.
Supposing that's the case, maybe what it would demonstrate is that no matter how you slice it, trying to offer a fully encrypted, no-knowledge solution for storing user data is fundamentally incompatible with societal demands.
But since Apple didn't provide such an explanation, we can only guess what their strategy is. They could have done a lot better job at describing their motivations, instead of hoping that the forces of public sentiment would allow it to pass like all the other scanning mechanisms actually had in the past.