Earlier quoted context omitted.
Oh, sweet, naive child.
I'm not american, I'm just asking a simple question.
The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
281–290 of 440 posts
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#282Earlier quoted context omitted.
Corruption. Lack of evidence on some other cases. Personal revenge. Who knows, but list is big.
Ok but but what ends?
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#283The problem of hash or NN based matching is, the authority can avoid explaining the mismatch. Suppose the authority want to false-arrest you. They prepare a hash that matches to an innocent image they knew the target has in his Apple product. They hand that hash to the Apple, claiming it's a hash from a child abuse image and demand privacy-invasive searching for the greater good. Then, Apple report you have a file th…
> like the dogs which conveniently bark at police's secret hand sign This isn't necessary; the state of the art is for drug dogs to alert 100% of the time. They're graded on whether they ever miss drugs. It's easy to never miss.
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#284Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Suppose the authority want to false-arrest you. Why would they want that?
Oh, sweet, naive child.
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#285> These cases will be manually reviewed. That is, according to Apple, an Apple employee will then look at your (flagged) pictures. I'm surprised this hasn't gotten enough traction outside of tech news media. Remember the mass celebrity "hacking" of iCloud accounts a few years ago? I wonder how those celebrities would feel knowing that some of their photos may be falsely flagged and shown to other people. And that we…
They wouldn't be falsely flagged. It doesn't detect naked photos, it detects photos matching real confirmed CSAM based on the NCMEC's database.
It doesn't necessarily mean that all flagged photos would be of explicit content, but even if it's not, is Apple telling us that we should have no expectation of privacy for any photos uploaded to iCloud, after running so many marketing campaigns on privacy? The on-device scanning is also under the guise of privacy too, so they wouldn't have to decrypt the photos on their iCloud servers with the keys they hold (and also save some processing power, maybe).
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#286Earlier quoted context omitted.
Couldn't the hack just be as simple as sending someone an iMessage with the images attached? Or somehow identify/modify non-illegal images to match the perceptual hash -- since it's not a cryptographic hash.
Does iCloud automatically upload iMessage attachments?
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#287Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can reveal your files and people can accuse you you deleted the incriminating ones.
Not if you show the file that matches the perceptual hash that "caught" you.
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#288Apple’s documents said they require multiple hits before anything happens, as the article notes. They can (and have) adjusted that number to any desired balance of false positive to negatives. How can they say it’s 1 in a trillion? You test the algorithm on a bunch of random negatives, see how many positives you get, and do one division and one multiplication. This isn’t rocket science. So, while there are many argum…
I was unhappy to find this comment so far down and even unhappier to see it downvoted. I'm not a fan of the decrease in privacy Apple is creating with this move but I think this forum has gotten its feelings for Apple caught up with its response to a completely valid criticism of an anti-Apple article. To explain things even further, let's say that the perceptual algorithm makes a false positive 1% of the time. That…
An inability to follow even the most elementary argument from statistics isn’t really surprising. Although I can’t quite say if it’s actual inability, or follows from the fact that it supports the wrong outcome.
Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#289Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes
#290Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you really believe that if they scan your photo library at 10am and don't get any false positives, another scan five hours later, with no changes to the library, has the same chance of getting false positives as the first one, independent of that result?
Even if the library doesn’t change, doesn’t the possibility of the list of “bad” hashes changing exist? I.e., in your example, a new hash is added to by Apple to the list at 11:30am, and then checked against your unchanged library.