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In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

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Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#51

Post by ReactiveJelly »

silverpepsi wrote: post #42

I've often wondered why with the prevalence of Echo, Google Assistant, and engines that recognize what copywritten song you're using in a YouTube video... They haven't extended the code on our phones to listen for the sound signature of anyone watching a well-known child abuse video. Surely if they use the microphone they can get a lot more positives. Instead of just catching people who watched it on the phone direct…

Assuming that "CSAM" is a euphemism for "CP", then...

Isn't it pretty rare for people to watch porn with the sound on?

Speaking as a frequent consumer of legal and ethical porn, I almost never turn the sound on. It's easier to contain leaks of light than of sound.

You can cast that net, I just doubt it'll catch many fish.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#52

Post by strogonoff »

pseudalopex wrote: post #50
strogonoff wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I believe a lot of the outrage brewing now against Apple’s CSAM scanning is misdirected, and might actually be hurting the larger cause. Most ordinary people, especially those who have kids, won’t have a problem with a well-implemented, E2E encryption compatible scheme that is legally limited to only apply to this type of material. If explained the hash collision issue, they’d reasonably point out that Apple does man…

It isn't E2E when the middle can decrypt. Rare is an assumption.

Read up on technical fundamentals, specifically homomorphic encryption.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#53

Post by ReactiveJelly »

swamp40 wrote: post #30

The phone could nag you mercilessly about any disturbing pictures on your phone, without notifying any outside authorities. That would accomplish 50-75% of their goals.

Would it?

I thought their strategy is similar to Valve's anti-cheat - Tell the offenders absolutely nothing up until you snap shut on them.

The consequences between cheating in pub Counter-Strike are obviously less serious, but Valve does let people cheat for a while and then bin people into "ban waves" (last I heard, anyway) to try to throw off the trail and prevent cheaters from figuring out exactly which actions got them in trouble. It's also similar to the concept of hellbanning trolls from a forum. They won't comply with kind messaging, they'll just instantly shed their accounts. So don't let them know they're banned.

There is a whole (even more fraught) conversation about how to get pedophiles in touch with psychiatrists before they commit any crimes, but telling them "pst, I'm onto you" peacefully probably isn't the way.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#54

Post by sumeno »

pseudalopex wrote: post #46
sumeno wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

According to Apple's docs photos are encrypted in transit and on server but not end to end encrypted https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

The technical summary describes a new system where Apple just has keys for suspect images.

They just have keys for the safety voucher for the suspect images. It's not entirely clear that the payload in the safety voucher is the only copy of the image or if this CSAM system is in addition to what happens today.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#55

Post by pseudalopex »

strogonoff wrote: post #52
pseudalopex wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It isn't E2E when the middle can decrypt. Rare is an assumption.

Read up on technical fundamentals, specifically homomorphic encryption.

The point of homomorphic encryption is the middle can do things without decrypting. And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#56

Post by strogonoff »

pseudalopex wrote: post #55
strogonoff wrote: post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Read up on technical fundamentals, specifically homomorphic encryption.

The point of homomorphic encryption is the middle can do things without decrypting. And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption.

> And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption.

Do you work for Apple?

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#57

Post by pseudalopex »

strogonoff wrote: post #56
pseudalopex wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The point of homomorphic encryption is the middle can do things without decrypting. And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption.

> And Apple's system doesn't use homomorphic encryption. Do you work for Apple?

I read the technical summary.[1]

[1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#58

Post by ASalazarMX »

Someone1234 wrote: post #38

Apple's mistake is that they seemingly believe there is pushback because people misunderstand how it works. The reality is more nuanced: People understand exactly how it works, and how it works is that it is turn-key onboard spyware, that Apple pinky-swears isn't being used wrong today . For example if the scope/mission expands (e.g. foreign governments), suddenly you've created a drag-net for whatever "badness" is o…

Sometimes the slippery slope is not a fallacy, but the natural consequence of seeking more control. This feature can be horribly misused in the future, for example, to find people who have sent/received/downloaded Tiannanmen pictures, because instant messaging pictures can be automatically added to your albums.

You can't trust a feature whose only impediment from being abused in the future is such pinky promise.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#59

Post by hippari »

sumeno wrote: post #45
bassman9000 wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This 2021 swatting

You seem to be conflating the two systems. For the CSAM detection this wouldn't do anything at all because you aren't uploading it to iCloud. For the child iMessage system it would notify the parents, not law enforcement. It's nothing like swatting

Wait until they start scanning offline photos, because this is designed with the intention to.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#60

Post by modeless »

pseudalopex wrote: post #46
sumeno wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

According to Apple's docs photos are encrypted in transit and on server but not end to end encrypted https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

The technical summary describes a new system where Apple just has keys for suspect images.

The technical summary describes the detection system, not the rest of the product. The rest of iCloud photos is not end-to-end encrypted. If Apple was planning to introduce end-to-end encryption for iCloud photos then they should have announced it at the same time.
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