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In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

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Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#41

Post by sumeno »

pseudalopex wrote: post #23
modeless wrote: post #13

I don't understand the claim that this system improves their ability to detect anything. If it's really true that the system only works on data uploaded to icloud then apple could have easily just done all the scanning in the cloud, because icloud is not end-to-end encrypted. In that case, all this feature does is move the computational cost of scanning from Apple's datacenters to Apple's users, saving Apple money an…

Photos are encrypted in Apple's technical summary.[1] [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...

According to Apple's docs photos are encrypted in transit and on server but not end to end encrypted

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#42

Post by silverpepsi »

I've often wondered why with the prevalence of Echo, Google Assistant, and engines that recognize what copywritten song you're using in a YouTube video... They haven't extended the code on our phones to listen for the sound signature of anyone watching a well-known child abuse video. Surely if they use the microphone they can get a lot more positives. Instead of just catching people who watched it on the phone directly they'll pick up all those who watched it on an old TV or highly secure Linux rig like Tails (but that inadvertently left their phone near the speaker).

I'm sure the government has tens of thousands of hours of audio and will gladly supply the sound signatures. Think I should submit my idea to Apple??!

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#43

Post by worlek »

The real children abuser here is Marita Rodriguez.

Abusing the suffering of children for her own political and financial benefits. Hiding behind the shield of abused children to not be held accountable for her claims and actions. Intentionally using tragedies to bully, shame, and silence legitimate concerns.

Marita Rodriguez, here's a huge middle finger to you that will be held up until you prove that you've saved a single fucking child.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#45

Post by sumeno »

bassman9000 wrote: post #36
wslh wrote: post #29

Imagine an attack where bots send suspicious photos to every phone in the planet.

This 2021 swatting

You seem to be conflating the two systems. For the CSAM detection this wouldn't do anything at all because you aren't uploading it to iCloud.

For the child iMessage system it would notify the parents, not law enforcement.

It's nothing like swatting

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#46

Post by pseudalopex »

sumeno wrote: post #41
pseudalopex wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Photos are encrypted in Apple's technical summary.[1] [1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_Techni...

According to Apple's docs photos are encrypted in transit and on server but not end to end encrypted https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

The technical summary describes a new system where Apple just has keys for suspect images.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#47

Post by strogonoff »

gowld wrote: post #22
fitblipper wrote: post #8

To me it is clear they are bowing to government pressure to add this feature. I cannot imagine any other reason they would go from drawing so much attention to privacy of their platform in their communication and general PR around the launch of the privacy labels in the app store to then make this change which is a clear violation of their user's privacy.

A lot of people not in government are also fiercely opposed to raping children and are willing to compromise, and understand that Apple can already do whatever they want to your phone, so this specific thing isn't the straw that breaks the camel's back. All the "what if Apple turns evil one day" applies equally well to iOS without this feature.

I believe a lot of the outrage brewing now against Apple’s CSAM scanning is misdirected, and might actually be hurting the larger cause.

Most ordinary people, especially those who have kids, won’t have a problem with a well-implemented, E2E encryption compatible scheme that is legally limited to only apply to this type of material. If explained the hash collision issue, they’d reasonably point out that Apple does manual review before notifying law enforcement, so this rare eventuality is something they can live with. Meanwhile, in the other camp, many of the vocally outraged fail to understand that no E2E encryption breakage has to be taking place for this feature to work.

What’s actually a problem is that earlier, back in 2019, Apple changed their ToS to allow pre-screening of generally any “potentially illegal” content[0]. This should trigger much wider audience, and for legitimate reasons (the phrasing is clearly unnecessarily broad, and opposing this does not undermine kids’ safety in any way), yet no one is talking about it to my knowledge.

[0] https://www.macobserver.com/analysis/apple-scans-uploaded-co...

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#48

Post by shuckles »

feross wrote: post #17
gowld wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How is this system, where Apple sees far less photos, worse? You can't audit anything Apple does on their servers.

Now that a fully built system for breaking end-to-end encryption is shipped directly in the OS, we're one configuration change away from massive scope creep. First terrorist content, then "misinformation", then political speech. Apple will be unable to resist government demands to use this preexisting backdoor with a different set of perceptual hashes.

Disabling end to end encryption is always “one configuration change” away, presumably by substituting keys. How closely do you keep track of which keys are used to encrypt Health data - which is end to end encrypted - versus photos - which are not?

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#49

Post by sumeno »

feross wrote: post #17
gowld wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How is this system, where Apple sees far less photos, worse? You can't audit anything Apple does on their servers.

Now that a fully built system for breaking end-to-end encryption is shipped directly in the OS, we're one configuration change away from massive scope creep. First terrorist content, then "misinformation", then political speech. Apple will be unable to resist government demands to use this preexisting backdoor with a different set of perceptual hashes.

It's not built to break end-to-end encryption because photos in iCloud aren't end-to-end encrypted

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#50

Post by pseudalopex »

strogonoff wrote: post #47
gowld wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A lot of people not in government are also fiercely opposed to raping children and are willing to compromise, and understand that Apple can already do whatever they want to your phone, so this specific thing isn't the straw that breaks the camel's back. All the "what if Apple turns evil one day" applies equally well to iOS without this feature.

I believe a lot of the outrage brewing now against Apple’s CSAM scanning is misdirected, and might actually be hurting the larger cause. Most ordinary people, especially those who have kids, won’t have a problem with a well-implemented, E2E encryption compatible scheme that is legally limited to only apply to this type of material. If explained the hash collision issue, they’d reasonably point out that Apple does man…

It isn't E2E when the middle can decrypt.

Rare is an assumption.

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