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Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

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Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#351

Earlier quoted context omitted.

now im afraid, i have two young children < 5 years old. i have occasionally took pictures of them naked with some bumps on the skin or mosquito bite and sent them to my wife over whatsapp to look at and decide do we need to send them to doctor, do i have to fear now that i will be marked as distributing CP.

It’s not just you. I have pictures of my kids playing in the bath. No genitals are in shot and it’s just kids innocently playing with bubbles. The photos aren’t even shared but they’d still get scanned by this tool. This kind of thing isn’t even unusual either. I know my parents have pictures of myself and my siblings playing in the bath (obviously taken on film rather than digital photography) and I know friends hav…

> While the difference between innocent images and something explicit easy for a human to identify, I’m not sure I’d trust AI to understand that nuance.

I recall a story several years ago where someone was getting the film developed at a local drugstore, and the employee reported them for CP because of bath photos. This was definitely a thing before computers with normal every day humans.

Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#352
post #278

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The best bet is probably a pixel phone with GrapheneOS. (Do note, that copperhead os is a scam and is not to be used ) Gnu/linux phones have nonexistent security, other than being niche (so security by obscurity at most). And also, they are not yet usable as a daily driver for me personally, at least.

"Nonexistent security" is not an accurate description. It's just a totally different approach to security. It's verifiability . https://puri.sm/posts/defending-against-spyware-like-pegasus... https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/community-wiki/-/wikis/Freque...

That’s not how security works.

Whether or not I am allowed to check that my entrance has no locks whatsoever doesn’t make it harder to open it. And the reverse, even if I don’t know the details of the lock in my door, it will not let others pass through.

Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#354

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> "What is the utopian perspective of this which counterbalances the risks for this to be a path worth taking?" Basically victims of rape don't want imagery of their rape freely distributed as pornography. They consider that a violation of their rights. It's interesting how many users in this thread are instinctively siding with the offenders in this, and not the victims. Presumably because they made it through their…

You are actually creating a false dichotomy here. There are more sides to this. And you are creating (as said a false) black and white image here. I strongly believe that nobody wants to further victimize people by publicly showing images of their abuse. And I believe very strongly that putting hundreds of millions of people under blanket general suspicion is a dangerous first step. Imagine if every bank had to searc…

Using your bank analogy for a second: banks already do report on activity to authorities who can then identify people to investigate based on patterns. I've heard that large transactions (>10k) or near-sized ones are flagged.

A great deal of skepticism is being given to the NCMEC database in these comments, which I'm surprised by as from what information I have I think this is being exaggerated. At the same time we have no idea whether Apple would even be using that database or another one that they may have created themselves.

Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#356
post #227

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a situation where different people's privacy is in conflict. What's infantile is claiming sole ownership of privacy advocacy while so-whating the worst privacy violation imaginable, from the victims' perspective.

That's an interesting point. However, I'm not sure victim privacy is the reason for CSAM regulations. Rather, it's reducing the creation of CSAM by discouraging its exchange. For example, suppose instead of deleting/reporting the images, Apple would detect and modify the images with Deepfake so the victim is no longer identifiable. That would protect the victim's privacy but wouldn't reduce the creation or exchange.…

There is an utterly perverse incentive to consider as well.

If the median shelf-life of abuse evidence is shortened, in that the item in question can no longer be forwarded/viewed/stored/..., what does that imply in a world where the demand remains relatively stable?

I despise the abusers for what they do, and the ecosystem they enable. But I also remember first having this argument more than ten years ago. If you, as a member of law enforcement or a child wellbeing charity, only flag the awful content but do not do anything else about it, you are - in my mind - guilty of criminal neglect. The ability to add an entry to a database is nothing more than going, "at least nobody else will see that in the future". That does NOTHING to prevent the creation of more such material, and thus implicitly endorses the ongoing abuse and crimes against children.

Every one of these images and videos is a piece of evidence. Of a horrifying crime committed against a child or children.

Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#358
post #326
post #221

Dear humans, 1) You willingly delegated the decision of what code is allowed to run on your devices to the manufacturer (2009). Smart voices warned you of today's present even then. 2) You willingly got yourself irrevocably vendor-locked by participating in their closed social networks, so that it's almost impossible to leave (2006). 3) You willingly switched over essentially all human communication to said social ne…

The fact that even the 'smart' people from HN can't wait for their new M1 laptop to arrive convinced me that humans are a lost cause.

"People like Coldplay and voted for the Nazis. You can't trust people" - Super Hans :)

Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#359

The terrifying part about this is potential abuse. We have seen people arrested for having child porn in their web cache just from clicking on a bad link. I could inject your cache with any image I want using JS. Presumably the same could apply to your phone. Most messengers save images automatically. I presume the images are immediately scanned against hashes once saved. And the report is immediately made if it pass…

I've read that people intentionally bomb telegram groups with CP. Telegram automatically downloads shared images. This is going to be a crapfest.

Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow

#360

How easy is it to generate an image that has the same “perceptual hash” or whatever that are calling it? My guess is it has to be easier than cracking a non fuzzy hash? Do we know the algorithm they are using?

No, it's undisclosed:

>Hashes using a new and proprietary neural hashing algorithm Apple has developed, and gotten NCMEC to agree to use.

>We don’t know much about this algorithm. What if someone can make collisions?

https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/14230792585163448...

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