The rebuttal to this view is "provide a principled definition of intelligence". Doesn't seem like the article does this. A hint appears partway through: "computers will not be able to match humans in their ability to reason abstractly about real-world situations". Does human intelligence distinguish itself by its "abstractness" and by its application to "the real world"? There's also "the systems do not form the kind…
> For my money, we will never consider any machine intelligent as long as we mass produce it. We won't consider machines intelligent until they have and demonstrate the capacity to consider us not-intelligent. It's an open question of how long we will consider anything after that point.
I can't see how this claim is even slightly illuminating aside from it's pure "quip-ness". A robot playing, say, the game of go, might spit-out "you are not intelligent" whenever it wins. Is that "the capacity to consider us not-intelligent"?
You could even set-up a micro-world where virtual entities interact, evolve and rate their opponent. It wouldn't be hard for these entities to compete with humans in this arena, to do better than humans and so to give human poor poor evaluations but the entities to be pretty simplistic and far from what humans consider intelligent and far from fit outside the micro-world (you could do it with adaptive game-theory solvers, say).