Earlier quoted context omitted.
>hard to forge paper Except that history has proven the plenty of crime organizations can fake those really well and pass undetected and maybe you missed it, but the authenticity of your passport or any ID document is proven and validated by the secure cryptographic element in the chip within it, not the fancy features in the plastic/paper of the document, that's why chipped passports are now the norm. Fancy physical…
> Except that history has proven the plenty of crime organizations can fake those really well and pass undetected and maybe you missed it, but the authenticity of your passport or any ID document is proven and validated by the secure cryptographic element in the chip within it, not the fancy features in the plastic/paper of the document, that's why chipped passports are now the norm. In any case, the forging scales m…
Just, how? A pickpocket can steal your passport and anyone, even a police officer on the street could have a hard time figuring out if it's actually you or not if your photo looks remotely like the thief. How is it easier to steal passport crypto keys (not the passport number) from a secure government database than someone's passport off the street?
Also, the authorities can cancel your stolen passport, but the pickpocket will still own it physically and can use it to enter places like nightclubs or worse (other than airports and hard borders, nobody checks the passport electronically vs the government database, they all just glance at it and call it a day).
I have the feeling you have no idea how secure passport crypto chips and NFC chips are and you assume all passport crypto keys are some databases sitting randomly on the internet.
Or are you simply assuming that something physically printed must be inherently safer than "some bits"?