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The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

blogs.scientificamerican.com

251–257 of 257 posts

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#251

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Do I understand correctly that there's a physical mechanism, which creates something akin to a phase boundary from electrochemical brain processes and that "phase boundary" happens to be me and my perceptions?

Well, no, what I was trying to say is that the behavior of individual water molecules or the electrochemical activity in the brain is not necessarily descriptive of the overall pot of boiling water or personal behavior.

If we accept that there's nothing but physics, then there are no boiling pots or humans. There's only a complex multi-particle wave function.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#252

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I am surprised at how you can't understand that there are terms that are insanely useful and yet can't be defined exactly 100%. Oh I understand that. What I don’t understand is how you and other people think that your use of an ill-defined term in this context is the least bit helpful when the actual referent of that term is the subject of the discussion. > But ok I agree to play this game if you first define the t…

So I guess "love" is to you also a nonsensical incoherent term? It is not to me, it is very useful and produces a lot of great ressults in my life, and the same goes for free will. Then we live in a very differnet universes. If you're not going to put more effort into understand something new, it is not my job to make you understand it. Also I couldn't because without understanding what kind of "logical definition" y…

> If you're not going to put more effort into understand something new, it is not my job to make you understand it.

I’m quite confident in my understanding that ‘free will’ is nonsensical and useless but that confidence doesn’t extend to assuming that I couldn’t be incorrect. However you’re asserting that its useful and so the correct response is to invite you to teach me. Now your response is that (after days of discussion and many replies) you can’t be bothered to explain yourself to someone who won’t educate themselves. Well that implies that I should have explained why ‘free will’ is nonsense in order to prompt you. This reveals a lack of understanding of the issue. My arguments are going to be unpersuasive unless I use the same definition of ‘free will’ as you (which you refuse to provide). Of course if I had made the argument, the natural response would be to say that I didn’t understand, used the wrong definition, etc. so we can avoid all that useless banter by having you explain to us what ‘free will’ means and how it is so logical and useful of a concept.

> There is like 10 differnet ways to explain it with different kinds of logic, how am I supposed to know which one you want to hear?

The context of the discussion is clear as to what sort of definition would be appropriate.

> So you couldn't even find one example huh? That link not people talking to GPT as a converstaion with an sentient being.

I see you have shifted the goalposts by invoking another ill-defined concept. Thanks for the reply.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#253

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Copenhagen interpretation is an interpreation. The thing being interpreted has probabilities. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics#Uncertainty_...

The uncertainty principle is a pretty high-level compaction and it gets it probabilities only through the Copenhagen Interpretation.

Thats not really true, the probabilities are the literal explanation that precedes any interpretation.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#254

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Do you see the speed of light?

You can measure it quite easily, in fact in a high school lab. So yes, in a non-pedantic sense, "see".

But ultimately that's still an observation of a measurement; any 'truth' is necessarily abstracted into an internal ontological representation of that observation. One person's understanding of the measurement of the speed of light may absolutely be different than the next. These represntations may converge more strongly than, say, something more ephemerate like the human condition, but regression towards shared observation via scientific processes (or otherwise) doesn't have to imply truth. Ultimately the definition of 'truth' dictates the extent of it's subjectivity, so this discussion is necessarily pedantic. I'm not well enough studied in ontological theory to have a horse in the race, but I don't know that the conclusions of relativistic experiments are enough to indicate universality of experiential truth.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#255

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> "you are within physics" necessarily bridges these two explanations. But, it doesn't. The reason dualism and free-will are so deeply tied up is because “you are within physics” does not provide a means by which “you” can be the root cause of anything; if you are merely within physics, then you are simply a product of material causes and can only be (to the extent physics is deterministic) a fully-externally-determi…

I think people feel like they're the cause of something when they make a choice and then cause something by that choice. That whole choice process is carried out by physical reactions in our mind. Neurons fire and produce the thoughts representing alternative choices, the neurons fire to process the choices, to come up with different ways of judging the choices, the neurons fire in a way that picks the choice with th…

> That whole choice process is carried out by physical reactions in our mind.

That is a common assumption, but I am not aware of any evidence that it is the case. If someone knows of any, then please share.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#256
post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If my brain was in a jar, but all my sensory perception linked to a robot body on the other face of the planet (without my brain knowing), I would probably consider that robot body me.

And if someone managed to build a model of the human brain and "uploaded" your brain into it such that it acted identically to your biological brain, would you also consider that "you"? Are there two of "you" now? Note: I'm not disagreeing with you, just kind of following the road your comment lays out.

Short answer: yes, as long as I'm unaware I'm an upload.

I was mostly trying to make the point how much of our existence is rooted in our senses. Even though we can meditate/daydream/dream/etc, most of it processes experiences already had.

I have no idea how a brain without any I/O would contemplate its existence, but I don't think our current psychological models apply.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#257

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As J.B.S. Haldane wrote, nearly 100 years ago: [begin quote] If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason for supposing that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. [end quote] If you truly can't see how nonsensical it sounds to say on the one hand, "The universe is just a random assortment of matter that hap…

>If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason for supposing that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. Oh man, Haldane wrote this 100 years ago so it must be true amirite? All Philosophers and Physicists are crushed by these 2 sentences... >If you truly can't see how nonsensical it sounds to say on the one…

First you say, "I don't know anyone who has ever said this," all the while appealing to the age and authority of your own philosophy. Then I bring you evidence that people have been saying this for 100 years and you imply it's too old to be relevant.

And really, why would I care about whether my ideas would receive good marks or not from the most ego-stroking subject in all of modern academics? My philosophy professor at university was a self-absorbed little man who I didn't envy then and still don't 15 years later. Why would I bother having an authentic discussion with such a person?

Two obvious hallmarks of disingenuous debate are belittlement and sarcasm.

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