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The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

blogs.scientificamerican.com

131–140 of 257 posts

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#131
post #90
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or for that matter, what existence do you imagine "you" have apart from your body? Even the distinction between brain and body is artificial. Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. The whole unity is "you."

> Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. Well, in some way it is, in that they can cut your hands and feet, and you'll still be you. And perhaps if they could just put your head/brain in a jar, and you were still coscious, you'd still consider yourself you...

Without any of your senses intact, what would your consciousness even mean?

You couldn't even sub-vocalize your thoughts. I don't think the experience would be anything like what you're used to as "consciousness."

The brain still might fire its synapses, but I don't see any reason to believe "consciousness" can exist in a brain removed from a body.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The brain is a deterministic system. We understand the dynamics of deterministic systems from the study of physics, so what is free will in terms of a system with an already decided outcome?

Quantum Physics has perfectly random outcomes

That is debatable. QM is deterministic at the quantum level, and deterministic at the classic level, randomness only (seems to) appear at the cross between them. There are even interpretation such as MWI that don't involve any randomness at a fundamental level.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#133
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You may not decide to be hungry, but regardless of your hunger, you can choose not to eat. Incidentally I think that's also what separates us from other animals. Animals can't fast, for example. If the instinct is present, the animal acts on it. We don't have to. In fact, if it mattered enough to me, I could starve myself to death.

That is not true. Some dogs are famously picky eaters and will not touch the food even when hungry because they learned that their handler will then panic and provide better food. You might interpret that as the dog "choosing" not to eat. Of course it is just a learned response as with humans. You can absolutely train a dog to not eat food, to "fast" if you will. Of course it wont starve itself to death probably, at…

A dog can't starve itself to death in the presence of food.

Mild hunger, sure, abstain in pursuit of preference. The instinct applies to the pursuit of the preference, and while it's stronger than the instinct to eat, can be overridden. But if the hunger gets bad enough, the dog will eat the food. There's no question about "if," only "when."

Just because some humans have weaker wills than others, or would find it harder to override their instincts than those who have practiced, doesn't mean it isn't a uniquely human trait.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#134

I’m not sure why free will is considered such a mystery. In a completely deterministic universe my actions are determined unambiguously by a) the current state of my brain and b) the inputs I receive from my senses. Asking if I could do something other that what I actually chose to do makes no sense. On the other hand, if I later find myself in a near identical situation I may choose a different action as a result of…

Well, in a view similar to the many-worlds interpretation, your decisions may be random, but your observation of those decisions follows the path of your choosing.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#135
post #11

This kind of research shows how deeply dualism is ingrained in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Picture this: You decide to move your hand, then you move your hand. An observer using fMRI or somesuch notes that they observe neural activity before you report making the decision, and they can even predict where and how you are going to move from observations of neural behavior. If you are a materialist, how is th…

I think a modern dualist would view this as hardware vs software. If all were able to measure were voltage levels on a CPU, you would say all computing is inevitably bound to changing electrical voltages/currents. However, you would miss out on all the math and algorithms and the beauty and richness that is software. A dualist might see the “soul” as the software that the physical brain executes. Of course, if all yo…

Hardware + software is a physicalist view. Dualist view is material hardware + astral hardware, ironically they don't quite believe in software.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#136
post #90
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or for that matter, what existence do you imagine "you" have apart from your body? Even the distinction between brain and body is artificial. Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. The whole unity is "you."

> Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. Well, in some way it is, in that they can cut your hands and feet, and you'll still be you. And perhaps if they could just put your head/brain in a jar, and you were still coscious, you'd still consider yourself you...

If my brain was in a jar, but all my sensory perception linked to a robot body on the other face of the planet (without my brain knowing), I would probably consider that robot body me.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#137
post #100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wonder if the notion of free will owes itself to theology, notably the question of God's responsibility for evil, and similar puzzles. Maybe philosophical free will is a solution in search of a non-theological problem.

> Maybe philosophical free will is a solution in search of a non-theological problem. I don't think it's a theological problem; I think it's the way we think about things every day. Consider four situations: 1. You walk into the kitchen and a pan which you'd placed on top of the fridge at a precarious angle falls on your head. 2. You walk into the kitchen, and your spouse, who honestly thinks you're a burglar who has…

In cases 1-3, the outputs are all the same (getting hit wit a pan) but the inputs are different. So it still could be that my spouse's behavior is a function of the surrounding circumstances.

Another analogy is two primitive societies that are both experiencing repeated episodes where gum is found on the floor of buses. In one society, a person is found to be likely to have done it, and is forced to make a speech at the public square about bus etiquette. In another society, a person is chosen at random. Over the generations, the first society is found to have cleaner buses, and without remembering the way that their custom was invented, call it "personal responsibility."

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#138

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think a modern dualist would view this as hardware vs software. If all were able to measure were voltage levels on a CPU, you would say all computing is inevitably bound to changing electrical voltages/currents. However, you would miss out on all the math and algorithms and the beauty and richness that is software. A dualist might see the “soul” as the software that the physical brain executes. Of course, if all yo…

Hardware + software is a physicalist view. Dualist view is material hardware + astral hardware, ironically they don't quite believe in software.

There are plenty of property dualists around: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#ProDua

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#139
post #11

This kind of research shows how deeply dualism is ingrained in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Picture this: You decide to move your hand, then you move your hand. An observer using fMRI or somesuch notes that they observe neural activity before you report making the decision, and they can even predict where and how you are going to move from observations of neural behavior. If you are a materialist, how is th…

> If you are a materialist, how is this surprising?

It's not. But there are other things, which should be surprising to a materialist: we don't see neuronal firings in visual brain areas. We see some kind of an abstraction over those firings. Do abstractions exist alongside the matter?

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#140
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think you can define free-will in the absence of a definition for causality, and I have yet to see that.

Judea Pearl won a Turing award for a definition of causality

For reference, Judea Pearl won the ACM Turing award in 2011 "[f]or fundamental contributions to artificial intelligence through the development of a calculus for probabilistic and causal reasoning."[1]

[1] https://amturing.acm.org/award_winners/pearl_2658896.cfm

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