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The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

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Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#81

Post by simondw »

netizen-936824 wrote: post #48
alisonkisk wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What is your definition of free will? > unfolding of those deterministic processes Doesn't sound free to me. Is a computer running a program exercising its free will?

I think this actually perfectly shows how nebulous our definition of "free will" is. I sure can't define it, I can only observe what other people seem to think it means. The definition I tend to observe is one that fits in with a dualistic view, of some outside force making decisions for our body.

But that just pushes it back a level. How does the outside force arrive at its decisions? Whatever it is, it has an effect on a body, so it must be measurable; could we perform something like Libet's experiment on it?

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#82

Post by PixyMisa »

cwalv wrote: post #79
PixyMisa wrote: post #68

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nebulous means "hard to define" or "lacking a clear definition".

Maybe a better distinction is how some things are "hard to define" but "easy to understand".

That's the problem. If you can't define it, you don't actually understand it.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#83

Post by heisenzombie »

myWindoonn wrote: post #57
chr1 wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If numbers cannot have infinite strings of digits, then the future can never be perfectly preordained. Why? A simple cellular automaton like Rule 30 doesn't use any infinite data but it's future is perfectly preordained. But being preordained doesn't mean that there can't be free will. Because having the initial state, and being able to predict later state are very different. Even simplest cellular automata are com…

Nobody in the simulation you've described would actually make any choices; the choices are predetermined, baked into the heap of the CA/TM being used to drive the computation. Conway's Free Will concerns situations where the choices cannot be predetermined, as a consequence of the Kochen-Specker lemma.

Yes, I think the parent would accept that the automata in the simulation do not have free will of the "Conway" type. I believe he is saying the agents have free will of the "compatibilist" type.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#84

Post by cardanome »

smeej wrote: post #66
cardanome wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A deterministic machine is still able to react based on external stimulus and able to reason about the world and itself. And we don't even need to go the full determinism route to disprove free will. What can free will be other than an illusion? Am I really deciding to be hungry, to want companionship, and so on? Am I simply doing what needs to be done to fulfill my needs while my brain is inventing reasons? What am…

You may not decide to be hungry, but regardless of your hunger, you can choose not to eat. Incidentally I think that's also what separates us from other animals. Animals can't fast, for example. If the instinct is present, the animal acts on it. We don't have to. In fact, if it mattered enough to me, I could starve myself to death.

That is not true.

Some dogs are famously picky eaters and will not touch the food even when hungry because they learned that their handler will then panic and provide better food. You might interpret that as the dog "choosing" not to eat. Of course it is just a learned response as with humans.

You can absolutely train a dog to not eat food, to "fast" if you will. Of course it wont starve itself to death probably, at some point survival instinct will kick in. This is the same with humans. Let's be honest. Most humans are barely able to keep their target weight, most are not able to fast for any extended period of time. They are still slaves to survival instincts. So much for the power of the free will.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#85

Post by nathias »

peterburkimsher wrote: post #36
joefourier wrote: post #10

Can someone actually provide a definition of free will? Apart from the legalistic definition - the ability to make decisions without being coerced by third parties or external factors - any other meaning seems to require dualism, the existence of some external force that can affect the brain and make decisions with some magical non-causal mechanism, which is to me a rather illogical concept. It seems it is just a neb…

The late John H Conway deduced a consistency proof that if people have free will, so do elementary particles. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem He discusses it more in the following lecture: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmx2tpcdKZY&feature=youtu.be... Free will doesn't mean "I can do anything." I'm not good at singing, so I can't ever be a famous rock star. Free will is to make a choice between a fin…

contingency is necessary but not sufficient for free will, Conway's definition is philosophically weak as it equivocates 'choice' and therefore the whole issue. The definition of choice includes not only possible options but also a selection mechanism, where for particles/random there is no selection mechanism (contingency)

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#86

Post by feanaro »

> They can be made on a partly intuitive, impulsive level, without clear conscious awareness. But this doesn't necessarily mean that you haven't made the decision.

The only thing this shows, IMO, is the mental gymnastics human are willing to go through in order to keep a feel-good notion that it is, in fact, some you that makes the decision. Since you are the entirety of your physical being, which extends via physical interactions into the rest of the universe (and thus has a very fuzzy border), of course there is some fuzzy, handwavey definition of "you" which could be said to have "made" the decision.

That doesn't bring us any closer to having the kind of agency people have traditionally ascribed to the term "free will".

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#87

Post by anothernewdude »

twodave wrote: post #4

This sort of debate always struck me as nonsense. If our actions are not derived of our own free will, but just exist as a small part of nature, then if you follow that thread far enough you’ll understand that all reason and truth would also be invalid, being just the effect to some coincidental cause. This incidentally would render theories about the subject of free will invalid as well. Thus if there is no free wil…

Free will is almost axiomatic.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#88

Post by feanaro »

taneq wrote: post #58
mcguire wrote: post #11

This kind of research shows how deeply dualism is ingrained in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Picture this: You decide to move your hand, then you move your hand. An observer using fMRI or somesuch notes that they observe neural activity before you report making the decision, and they can even predict where and how you are going to move from observations of neural behavior. If you are a materialist, how is th…

Exactly! All of the "YOU don't actually choose to move your hand, it's THIS PART OF YOUR BRAIN" stuff makes no sense. What do you think 'you' are if not your brain plus your body?

The "you" is not simply your body. It is also the entirety of that body's physical interactions with the rest of the universe.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#89

Post by feanaro »

finghin wrote: post #56
joefourier wrote: post #10

Can someone actually provide a definition of free will? Apart from the legalistic definition - the ability to make decisions without being coerced by third parties or external factors - any other meaning seems to require dualism, the existence of some external force that can affect the brain and make decisions with some magical non-causal mechanism, which is to me a rather illogical concept. It seems it is just a neb…

I never understood this line of argument. It is difficult to see why something being hard to define makes it nebulous. The use of the concept of free will (which is incredibly intuitive—try asking a stranger if they have it, and they will certainly be able to answer) is only in this rather useless discussion associated with physical determinism (which is certainly not being thought of by the mentioned stranger). Can…

Your post exemplifies why it is hard to define and discuss. You implicitly take on one particular definition of free will (though you leave it unstated) and then discuss it as if it is the only obvious thing one could consider when they say the words "free will". While this is a perfectly useful notion that you are targeting, it simply omits some other important aspects which people care to discuss.

A more nuanced discussion with strangers which actually asks them questions about e.g. physical determinism will reveal that such strangers often do, in fact, hold some rather suspicious and unlikely beliefs about the role physical determinism plays in their lives.

Re: The Libet experiment doesn't disprove free will (2019)

#90

Post by coldtea »

smeej wrote: post #67
taneq wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly! All of the "YOU don't actually choose to move your hand, it's THIS PART OF YOUR BRAIN" stuff makes no sense. What do you think 'you' are if not your brain plus your body?

Or for that matter, what existence do you imagine "you" have apart from your body? Even the distinction between brain and body is artificial. Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't. The whole unity is "you."

>Your brain isn't "you" in some special way that the rest of your body isn't.

Well, in some way it is, in that they can cut your hands and feet, and you'll still be you.

And perhaps if they could just put your head/brain in a jar, and you were still coscious, you'd still consider yourself you...

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