Live data from Hacker News

We can do better than Signal

icyphox.sh

21–30 of 290 posts

Re: We can do better than Signal

#21
post #14
post #9

So one of the things that feels the most damning to me about Signal-like protocols is that you have to inherently trust their server. Consider this paragraph from the Signal protocol > ...For example, they may compare public key fingerprints manually, or by scanning a QR code. Methods for doing this are outside the scope of this document. > If authentication is not performed, the parties receive no cryptographic guar…

You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).

Why? I trust that my own server is not backdoored (thus reducing the need for off-channel fingerprint verification), I have no such guarantee about Signal's server.

Re: We can do better than Signal

#22
post #8

I'm confused about this piece. If there's true E2E encryption (verified by open source client code and review of released binaries) then why does it matter if the server code is backdoored or not? The whole point of E2E is that you don't need to care about the server being able to ever see the text of your messages because it never can.

It's certainly much better than the norm! But there's also metadata retention, which Signal frequently brags about being good at not doing, but which is unverifiable unless it's you serving the warrant and coming up disappointed.

Re: We can do better than Signal

#24

I wanted to disagree with the headline. Then I read the article and do see their point. I’ve been a big proponent of Signal for years and donated for the first time during their outage. But I do think this is a conversation worth having. I’d also like to understand more about this: > In fact, the Signal server code [0] hasn’t even been updated since April 2020. You’re telling me it’s undergone no changes? [0]: https:…

If all the interesting stuff happens on the client and the server "just" forwards encrypted messages, why would the server need frequent updates?

Re: We can do better than Signal

#26
It’s hard enough getting random non tech friends and family to move to Signal. Going even further from mainstream means they will encounter usability issues and they will eventually revert back to WhatsApp. I don’t want any of this. And if “we can do better than Signal,” go make it then and get wide adoption instead of bitching in a blog post about how it’s not as good as some fringe products.

Re: We can do better than Signal

#27
post #20

The article calls out that the Signal server could be compromised. I always thought one design philosophy of Signal was to ensure the server doesn’t matter from the perspective of privacy. Would having multiple servers help here, anyway? Once your data leaves your own server, you would then be in untrusted territory assuming the server needed to be trusted.

It's my understanding that the main concern about a compromised Signal server is that metadata of which phone numbers are registered as user IDs could be compromised.

Basically the same threat model the Signal people themselves address when talking about court orders and subpoeanas received by their corporation for "customer" data.

Re: We can do better than Signal

#28
post #14
post #9

So one of the things that feels the most damning to me about Signal-like protocols is that you have to inherently trust their server. Consider this paragraph from the Signal protocol > ...For example, they may compare public key fingerprints manually, or by scanning a QR code. Methods for doing this are outside the scope of this document. > If authentication is not performed, the parties receive no cryptographic guar…

You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).

Keybase solves this problem.

Re: We can do better than Signal

#29
I feel like Signal is held to a ridiculously high bar when it comes to anything. Is it perfect? No. But come on now; I see other threads on HN where people are debating/bashing their use of Intel SGX, really?

Assuming you trust the client builds (or use a verified build) and verify the public key, all of these arguments go out the window with the exception of exposing your phone number. This situation seems like a prime example of a company (Signal) being so transparent that people need to find fault.

Re: We can do better than Signal

#30
post #21
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).

Why? I trust that my own server is not backdoored (thus reducing the need for off-channel fingerprint verification), I have no such guarantee about Signal's server.

Because you can never be sure that the other person's server or connection (or your connection) aren't being MitMed.
Post reply on HN