So one of the things that feels the most damning to me about Signal-like protocols is that you have to inherently trust their server. Consider this paragraph from the Signal protocol > ...For example, they may compare public key fingerprints manually, or by scanning a QR code. Methods for doing this are outside the scope of this document. > If authentication is not performed, the parties receive no cryptographic guar…
You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).
We can do better than Signal
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Re: We can do better than Signal
#22I'm confused about this piece. If there's true E2E encryption (verified by open source client code and review of released binaries) then why does it matter if the server code is backdoored or not? The whole point of E2E is that you don't need to care about the server being able to ever see the text of your messages because it never can.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#23Lots of FUD in the opening paragraphs ("no changes to server code since April!!1!"). I stopped reading after that
Re: We can do better than Signal
#24I wanted to disagree with the headline. Then I read the article and do see their point. I’ve been a big proponent of Signal for years and donated for the first time during their outage. But I do think this is a conversation worth having. I’d also like to understand more about this: > In fact, the Signal server code [0] hasn’t even been updated since April 2020. You’re telling me it’s undergone no changes? [0]: https:…
Re: We can do better than Signal
#25Do it and let us know when you're finished ;)
Re: We can do better than Signal
#26Re: We can do better than Signal
#27The article calls out that the Signal server could be compromised. I always thought one design philosophy of Signal was to ensure the server doesn’t matter from the perspective of privacy. Would having multiple servers help here, anyway? Once your data leaves your own server, you would then be in untrusted territory assuming the server needed to be trusted.
Basically the same threat model the Signal people themselves address when talking about court orders and subpoeanas received by their corporation for "customer" data.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#28So one of the things that feels the most damning to me about Signal-like protocols is that you have to inherently trust their server. Consider this paragraph from the Signal protocol > ...For example, they may compare public key fingerprints manually, or by scanning a QR code. Methods for doing this are outside the scope of this document. > If authentication is not performed, the parties receive no cryptographic guar…
You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).
Re: We can do better than Signal
#29Assuming you trust the client builds (or use a verified build) and verify the public key, all of these arguments go out the window with the exception of exposing your phone number. This situation seems like a prime example of a company (Signal) being so transparent that people need to find fault.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).
Why? I trust that my own server is not backdoored (thus reducing the need for off-channel fingerprint verification), I have no such guarantee about Signal's server.