It’s great to see some balance about the Signal discussion here at HN. All I could see in the frontpage for several days is how great Signal is but nothing about what’s not so bright. This article brings up the same concerns I always had and I hope we all start being more conscious about it.
We can do better than Signal
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Re: We can do better than Signal
#12> A common defense in favor of Signal is, “But it’s all open source!”. Sure is, but on what basis do I trust them? ...
The open source aspect for me means 2 things.
- I can verify the e2e encryption claim.
- I can reproduce the client builds ensuring that what I run matches the source [1]
Is there a detail relating to the server that would invalidate this?
[1] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/tree/master/repr...
Re: We can do better than Signal
#13As I wrote in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25795575
- WhatsApp: Oh wait, SMS etc. is completely insecure
- Signal: Oh wait, WhatsApp is structurally unable to be a force for privacy
- Matrix: Oh wait, even benevolent centralization is an unnecessary risk
It's not that worse is better, but the general public's imagination can only grow so fast. We need to coax people along. As such, I do think all 3 serve a purpose in certain times and places.
I took advantage of the Signal downtime to get a few people onto Matrix. There will be more opportunities.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#14So one of the things that feels the most damning to me about Signal-like protocols is that you have to inherently trust their server. Consider this paragraph from the Signal protocol > ...For example, they may compare public key fingerprints manually, or by scanning a QR code. Methods for doing this are outside the scope of this document. > If authentication is not performed, the parties receive no cryptographic guar…
You understand wrong. Nothing solves this problem except verifying fingerprints manually (in person!) or scanning the QR code (again in person!).
Re: We can do better than Signal
#15My main complaint about Signal is its reliance on SS7/PSTN and ordinary phone numbers to identify a user.
In an era of SS7 hijacks and social-engineering of mobile phone network customer service reps into SIM-hijacking a target's phone service, by no means should we ever rely upon a phone number as a guaranteed method of identifying an end point device's identity.
These are basically the same reasons why other services' "2FA" by SMS is questionable at best.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#16I'm a bit annoyed at "we can do better than X" when, you know what? Maybe we can't. Yes, it's nice that you and I can install Element and deal with the finicky crypto handshake that for some reason always shows red for me because a friend opened the web UI and closed it before he completed the handshake and now we can never actually make that check go green, and it's nice that Mastodon is distributed but mastodon.hos…
> If we could do better, we would have done better by now.
We should have given up on Linux UIs way back then. They're still garbage when it compares to the alternatives.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#17Being limited to a phone app and requiring phone numbers is severely limiting as well. Matrix is probably the current best-positioned e2e chat app that should be able to encompass more use cases, but it's difficult to convince users to use anything encrypted when alternatives have more network effects and usability. Network effects always seem to be particularly egregious gatekeepers for social apps, often keeping us…
Severely limiting? Please... Signal Desktop can be improved but I use it daily and it works for me™. Also, in many other countries, many people don't even have a PC (outside of work) but they'll definitely have a smartphone. So prioritizing app development is smart imo.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#18The issues highlighted by the author, about Signal, and indeed nearly any messenger app or platform, are societal issues that we keep trying to fix with technology.
There are promising solutions to decentralizing and anonymizing but there remain to be any real tech solutions to the ultimate de-platforming issue. Signal is at risk of having their hosting or connection removed. What prevents the same thing from happening to decentralized services? ISPs have already shown willingness to censor. A decentralized service is at just as much risk of being blocked in a game of whackamole. Or having the apps needed for access removed from major mobile platforms. Apple already blocks magnet links on Safari for iOS. What stops them from blocking a webapp for one of these services?
We need strong laws and regulations protecting everyone’s right to telecommunication infrastructure and the right to install and run our own code on end user devices to prevent another Parler.
Re: We can do better than Signal
#19I'm confused about this piece. If there's true E2E encryption (verified by open source client code and review of released binaries) then why does it matter if the server code is backdoored or not? The whole point of E2E is that you don't need to care about the server being able to ever see the text of your messages because it never can.
Do we have a way to verify that the App Store apps are actually running the open source (as published) code?
Re: We can do better than Signal
#20The article calls out that the Signal server could be compromised. I always thought one design philosophy of Signal was to ensure the server doesn’t matter from the perspective of privacy.
Would having multiple servers help here, anyway? Once your data leaves your own server, you would then be in untrusted territory assuming the server needed to be trusted.