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When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

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Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#21
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

MANPADs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIM-92_Stinger#Soviet_War_in_A...

MANPADs were not delivered until 1986: by that time my dad already completed two 18-month rotations to Herat. Anyway MANPAD handling skills are irrelevant to what we discuss here.

Not so irrelevant, because at USD 40k per, they were a bit more than teaching jumping jacks. I mentioned them specifically because they seem to have been the least-deniable part of the package.

The author of the lines «Горы стреляют, Стингер взлетает / Если нарваться, то парни второй раз умрут» also seems to have accorded them more respect than you do...

I've heard the Chechens were able to manufacture their own small arms. Afghanis certainly had that capability; did they have it at the scale provided? Would they have been able to source their own MANPADs?

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#22
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

MANPADs were not delivered until 1986: by that time my dad already completed two 18-month rotations to Herat. Anyway MANPAD handling skills are irrelevant to what we discuss here.

Not so irrelevant, because at USD 40k per, they were a bit more than teaching jumping jacks. I mentioned them specifically because they seem to have been the least-deniable part of the package. The author of the lines «Горы стреляют, Стингер взлетает / Если нарваться, то парни второй раз умрут» also seems to have accorded them more respect than you do... I've heard the Chechens were able to manufacture their own smal…

Vastly more Soviet troops were killed by Communist Chinese AK clones than by Stingers. But of course the impact on morale and logistics was profound.

This is however not what we discuss here. How much US attrition was due to Islamic fundamentalist MANPAD use, during the whole War of Terror?

See, it's irrelevant.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#23
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a delusion of Western blamelessness to think that any supposed relationship between the actions of Islamic fundamentalists, their strategies and growth, implies that "Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action". Islamic fundamentalism was around before American involvement and it'll be around after. Nobody is claiming otherwise.

The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion. It was the 120,000 troops of Soviet mechanised infantry over 10 years that made Mujahedeen who they are, not a dozen CIA instructors showing them jumping jacks in Pakistan.

> The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion

They also resisted the British quite well in 1842 [0].

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1842_retreat_from_Kabul

[Edit] In fact I think I'm right in saying that the last person to successfully invade Afghanistan was Alexander the Great, and even he had to stop campaigning when his army mutinied rather than continue ops in the Indian subcontinent.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#24
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion. It was the 120,000 troops of Soviet mechanised infantry over 10 years that made Mujahedeen who they are, not a dozen CIA instructors showing them jumping jacks in Pakistan.

> The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion They also resisted the British quite well in 1842 [0]. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1842_retreat_from_Kabul [Edit] In fact I think I'm right in saying that the last person to successfully invade Afghanistan was Alexander the Great, and even he had to stop campaigning when his army mutinied rather than continue ops in the Indian subcontinent.

True, "The Graveyard of Empires" is an old metaphor.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#25
post #4
post #2

Fascinating though this is, the negative long term impact of these guys tends to be much greater than their positive short-term impact. You go in, you train a bunch of locals as guerrillas, you achieve the objective, and then you get out, leaving the local guerrillas behind. These guys now have the knowledge, experience and organisation to make the place ungovernable. At least some of them will proceed to do so; eith…

It's a delusion of grandeur to think that Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action. American exceptionalism but from the Left.

Perhaps a better example would be America's operation TPAJAX, that removed Iran's democracy and delivered its modern day Islamic theocracy. America certainly did not invent Islamic fundamentalism, but it had no issue using it to further its own cause.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#26
“Staff with indigenous forces with US NCO/O’s from conventional (not SOF) forces...” is a great idea on paper.

When was this last tried? The SFAB.

As someone who helped train the SFAB, which is basically what the author is cribbing the idea from, it was a joke in application and reeked of the hot idea from whatever O6 was gunning for O7.

Of 8-9 SFAB companies supposed to do this out in the bush in AFG with local forces, only 1 ended up doing it. This was an Army-wide initiative mind you that dragged in multiple other units to help train, changed deployment schedules, changed funding, and so on.

The institutional willpower to put the 5-10 years of culture change behind conventional army who just wants to shoot artillery just isn’t there at the moment.

And perhaps the regular army should do just that and stay good at it. Past efforts at conventional -> SFAB transition efforts, i.e. “everyone deploys as the infantry” rotted the skill sets of the NCO corps in high skill branches like artillery.

Military thinkers keep advocating for conventional army to be anything and everything, and end up just reinventing SF units and jobs the state department needs to be doing. Then, those same thinkers get confused why gunnery certifications get failed en masse by line units who have to train back and forth across these conflicting priorities.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#27
post #2

Fascinating though this is, the negative long term impact of these guys tends to be much greater than their positive short-term impact. You go in, you train a bunch of locals as guerrillas, you achieve the objective, and then you get out, leaving the local guerrillas behind. These guys now have the knowledge, experience and organisation to make the place ungovernable. At least some of them will proceed to do so; eith…

> Most of the Islamic fundamentalism that the USA is fighting today can be traced back to that one event.

This is just plain false. A nice book that I can recommend on the actual history of it is Ghost Wars by Steve Coll.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#28
post #2

Fascinating though this is, the negative long term impact of these guys tends to be much greater than their positive short-term impact. You go in, you train a bunch of locals as guerrillas, you achieve the objective, and then you get out, leaving the local guerrillas behind. These guys now have the knowledge, experience and organisation to make the place ungovernable. At least some of them will proceed to do so; eith…

>Afganistan is probably the best example. It was never easy to govern, but after the US trained a guerilla resistance to the Soviet invasion it became impossible. Most of the Islamic fundamentalism that the USA is fighting today can be traced back to that one event.

I disagree, but with some context. If you just go back to the cold war, you would be correct, but in a longer time-frame context, I would posit instead it was mostly at the British backing of the Saud's that created the later environment exploited in the 80s and then again later. I recently read a book, sorry I can't remember the name right now, written by an AQ guy turned intel-asset who actually spent time inside the Afghan camps. He mentioned enough times for it to stick in my mind how the funding came from SA, and how the more powerful people in the groups (trainers, etc) were either from SA or Wahhabists. That sent me on a journey of reading up on SA that left me really feeling a lot of it was due to Britain wanting to maintain the tendrils of Empire, not taking into account the possibility of blowback later, or rather, finding it an acceptable price to pay.

Mark Curtis wrote a book that I found most illuminating on the subject, "Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam":

"As Britain withdrew its military forces from the Middle East in the late 1960s, Islamist forces such as the Saudi regime and, once again, the Muslim Brotherhood, were often seen as proxies to maintain British interests in the region, to continue to destabilise communist or nationalist regimes or as ‘muscle’ to bolster pro-British, right-wing governments. By the 1970s, Arab nationalism had been virtually defeated as a political force, partly thanks to Anglo–American opposition; it was largely replaced by the rising force of radical Islam, which London again often saw as a handy weapon to counter the remnants of secular nationalism and communism in key states such as Egypt and Jordan."..." Britain continued to see some of these groups as useful, principally as proxy guerilla forces in places as diverse as Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Kosovo and Libya; there,they were used either to help break up the Soviet Union and secure major oil interests or to fight nationalist regimes," ... "Whitehall not only tolerated but encouraged the development of ‘Londonistan’–the capital acting as a base and organising centre for numerous jihadist groups –even as this provided a de facto ‘green light’to that terrorism.I suggest that some elements, at least, in the British establishment may have allowed some Islamist groups to operate from London not only because they provided information to the security services but also because they were seen as useful to British foreign policy, notably in maintaining a politically divided Middle East –a long-standing goal of imperial and postwar planners –and as a lever to influence foreign governments’ policies."... "Churchill later wrote that 'my admiration for him [Ibn Saud] was deep, because of his unfailing loyalty to us'"

Yes, as another commenter said, I can also recommend Ghost Wars as one of my favorite books on Afghanistan, and Steve Colls more recent work Directorate S is also extremely well written in the same vein.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#29
post #2

Fascinating though this is, the negative long term impact of these guys tends to be much greater than their positive short-term impact. You go in, you train a bunch of locals as guerrillas, you achieve the objective, and then you get out, leaving the local guerrillas behind. These guys now have the knowledge, experience and organisation to make the place ungovernable. At least some of them will proceed to do so; eith…

> Most of the Islamic fundamentalism that the USA is fighting today can be traced back to that one event. This is just plain false. A nice book that I can recommend on the actual history of it is Ghost Wars by Steve Coll.

Assume that most of us haven't read that book, or even if we have that we don't recall it perfectly. What specific information in it would lead us to agree with the blanket statement "this is just plain false"?

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#30
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Fighting being the relevant word. If they hadn’t been armed and trained, the fight would have been over before it began.

It's hilarious how you can simultaneously make 10 years of Afghan and Soviet fighting a secondary act in this supposedly American performance. Just proves my point.

>It's hilarious how you can simultaneously make 10 years of Afghan and Soviet fighting a secondary act in this supposedly American performance. Just proves my point.

You're making his by ignoring the fact that the Afghans were trained and armed by US to fight the Soviets. That training remains, just who they're fighting has changed.

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