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When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

warontherocks.com

11–20 of 63 posts

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#11
post #8
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Huh? This is about military training, equipment, and logistics, not religion.

Most of the Islamic fundamentalism that the USA is fighting today can be traced back to that one event.

Fighting being the relevant word. If they hadn’t been armed and trained, the fight would have been over before it began.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#12
> Per 10 U.S. Code Section 127e, the Pentagon can spend up to $100 million annually on support to foreign forces for counter-terrorism operations. In these programs foreign units conduct combat operations with US operational guidance. However, unlike 127e programs the Special Night Squads and the Gideon Force in Ethiopia were directly led by conventional British officers and non-commissioned officers embedded in those units.

...

> Two insights appear to have particular salience still today. First, the use of irregular forces largely made up of foreigners with a backbone of British officers and non-commissioned officers was a force multiplier that had dramatic impacts in multiple theaters for the British.

The article seems to argue that the US should emulate the British use of troops made up of colonial subjects commanded by the titular "British masters". But unlike the British colonial empire, the American sphere of influence is mostly comprised of sovereign countries whose governments might object to foreign-controlled guerillas operating in their territory primarily to protect American interests. So I'm not sure whether that's really an "insight of particular salience still today".

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#13
post #9
post #2

Fascinating though this is, the negative long term impact of these guys tends to be much greater than their positive short-term impact. You go in, you train a bunch of locals as guerrillas, you achieve the objective, and then you get out, leaving the local guerrillas behind. These guys now have the knowledge, experience and organisation to make the place ungovernable. At least some of them will proceed to do so; eith…

Chechnya after the 1994-1996 war is also an excellent example.

Indeed: Kadyrov (the current Marcher Lord) ought to know a thing or two, having been supported by both anti-Kremlin and pro-Kremlin regimes at varying times.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#14
A more recent example would be the book "The Utility of Force" by General Rupert Smith. He argues that conventional militaries and tactics revolve around a concept of war that was made obsolete by nuclear weapons, and goes in depth regarding recent failings of NATO and the Iraq invasion, and how the conflicts should be handled in the age of instant global communication and media coverage.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#15
post #10
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This does happen but is not necessary. Cases in point: Norway, France, Eastern Europe, Germany after WW2. The crucial difference seems to be that the winner must immediately invest in nation building or the defeated must be crushed.

Yea, firing the Iraqi Army after the 03 invasion was a small whoopsie.

Cynically put, the impending Cold War gave more of an impetus for nation building mid-century than existed by the turn-of-the-century.

Hitler in his bunker doesn't seem so crazy if he'd had cause (such as foreign intelligence reports, or incidents of separate negotiations?) to believe the Allies would have fallen out much sooner than they actually did, and of course someone in his position might've believed that Nazi Germany had been worth more as a wholesale bargain, than (as actually happened) picked up individual by individual at retail.

As to commitment to nation building, the (premature?) end of it in the former CSA came relatively rapidly: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compromise_of_1877

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#16
post #4
post #2

Fascinating though this is, the negative long term impact of these guys tends to be much greater than their positive short-term impact. You go in, you train a bunch of locals as guerrillas, you achieve the objective, and then you get out, leaving the local guerrillas behind. These guys now have the knowledge, experience and organisation to make the place ungovernable. At least some of them will proceed to do so; eith…

It's a delusion of grandeur to think that Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action. American exceptionalism but from the Left.

It's a delusion of Western blamelessness to think that any supposed relationship between the actions of Islamic fundamentalists, their strategies and growth, implies that "Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action".

Islamic fundamentalism was around before American involvement and it'll be around after. Nobody is claiming otherwise.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#17
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Most of the Islamic fundamentalism that the USA is fighting today can be traced back to that one event.

Fighting being the relevant word. If they hadn’t been armed and trained, the fight would have been over before it began.

It's hilarious how you can simultaneously make 10 years of Afghan and Soviet fighting a secondary act in this supposedly American performance. Just proves my point.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#18
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a delusion of grandeur to think that Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action. American exceptionalism but from the Left.

It's a delusion of Western blamelessness to think that any supposed relationship between the actions of Islamic fundamentalists, their strategies and growth, implies that "Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action". Islamic fundamentalism was around before American involvement and it'll be around after. Nobody is claiming otherwise.

The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion. It was the 120,000 troops of Soviet mechanised infantry over 10 years that made Mujahedeen who they are, not a dozen CIA instructors showing them jumping jacks in Pakistan.

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#19
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a delusion of Western blamelessness to think that any supposed relationship between the actions of Islamic fundamentalists, their strategies and growth, implies that "Islamic fundamentalism owes its existence to a transient American action". Islamic fundamentalism was around before American involvement and it'll be around after. Nobody is claiming otherwise.

The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion. It was the 120,000 troops of Soviet mechanised infantry over 10 years that made Mujahedeen who they are, not a dozen CIA instructors showing them jumping jacks in Pakistan.

MANPADs

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIM-92_Stinger#Soviet_War_in_A...

Re: When You’re Outnumbered: Lessons from Two British Masters of Irregular Warfare

#20
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The origin of Afghan resistance was Soviet invasion. It was the 120,000 troops of Soviet mechanised infantry over 10 years that made Mujahedeen who they are, not a dozen CIA instructors showing them jumping jacks in Pakistan.

MANPADs https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIM-92_Stinger#Soviet_War_in_A...

MANPADs were not delivered until 1986: by that time my dad already completed two 18-month rotations to Herat.

Anyway MANPAD handling skills are irrelevant to what we discuss here.

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