Earlier quoted context omitted.
When faced with a choice between: - causality is less widely applicable than we like to think - our behavior is more complex than we like to think I'm more inclined to doubt causality. Not that it's not a useful framework in general, but that is less useful when applied by humans to humans regarding human constructs like kindness.
What does that even mean? What's the difference between A and B? I assume You don't think a spirit comes down and mediates inter-human interactions- they're not beyond physics- but rather that they're "beyond causality" as in 'normal' models don't have as much predictive power as you'd hope? But if it's that, then I don't see a practical difference between both choices.
But I am proposing that we should have some skepticism when importing an explanatory style that has worked well in physics and expecting it to perform equally well everywhere. I think we're likely to make mistakes of this sort:
If a cat's head appears from behind the couch, and then later its tail becomes visible--you wouldn't say that the cat's head caused the cat's tail--they're just different parts of the same phenomenon. We're familiar with cats, so we don't make this exact mistake, but I think that we are quite susceptible to misapplying causation to things that we don't understand well, like happiness.
Years ago I had this idea that many of our ideas about causation are flawed in this way. So I developed a habit of taking a causal claim that seems true, flipping the arrow around, and then testing the mutated hypothesis--just to see if it worked backwards. I was surprised by how often it did.
I don't have the data to convince you that the habit of mistrusting my instincts about causation and using "deep down, it probably goes both ways" as a heuristic has caused me to reap benefits that I would have otherwise ignored, but I suspect it strongly enough that I plan to keep doing it.
So the difference between the alternative perspectives is that if you're skeptical about the universal utility of causal nitpicking, you'll learn to recognize when you're wasting your time trying to prove that the laws of physics demand whatever you've noticed. You'll bail sooner on perspectives that don't work, and you'll be more creative about finding new ones.
On the other hand, if you demand a certain style of causal argument, you're more likely to double down against the opacity of human behavior to other humans. You'll design experiments and write articles that inspire further nitpicking about which is a cause and which is an effect, and the matter will remain in stasis--perhaps indefinitely--where its capacity to positively affect people's heath is limited.
I'm not saying that we shouldn't try to uncover underlying mechanisms when we can. When that's in cards it's pretty great. I'm just saying that we shouldn't always expect results of that sort to be within reach, and that reasoning from correlation alone can get us further than we tend to let it.