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U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

reuters.com

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Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#101

Post by shock »

TylerE wrote: post #78
dimitrios1 wrote: post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is not a good argument. You can control this level of risk. Taking on any unnecessary risk when you don't have to is not a wise choice.

How are you getting to the airport? However the method, it's far more likely to injure you than flying on a 737 MAX.

> However the method, it's far more likely to injure you than flying on a 737 MAX.

That depends. If you take a bus to go to the airport and it takes you an hour to get there, then your flight also lasts an hour (for simplicity's sake), you are almost 3 times more likely(on average) to die during the flight than you are during the bus ride [0]. In terms of number of journeys by plane and bus, for the same number of journeys you are 27 times more likely to die in a plane accident.

People repeat the "plane is the safest way to travel" mantra, but it's only true in terms of nr. of km traveled.

[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_safety

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#102

Post by nawgz »

cockpitherald wrote: post #57

This proposed AD would require installing new flight control computer (FCC) software, revising the existing Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to incorporate new and revised flight crew procedures, installing new MAX display system (MDS) software, changing the horizontal stabilizer trim wire routing installations, completing an angle of attack sensor system test, and performing an operational readiness flight. https://kokp…

It's wild that this wasn't the result out of the FAA the first pass around with these airplanes. This is basically everything Boeing wanted to and "managed" to avoid with this design, wrapped up and stamped "haha you fools don't do that". So why did it take 346 deaths?

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#103

Post by tgsovlerkhgsel »

im_down_w_otp wrote: post #28
zaroth wrote: post #3

https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/19_035n-R3-8-3-20... > "To address the unsafe condition, the FAA proposes to require four design changes: (1) installing updated flight control software (with new control laws) for the FCC operational program software (OPS), (2) installing updated MDS display processing computer (DPC) software to generate an AOA disagree alert, (3) revising certain AFM flightcrew operating p…

That's interesting though I suppose unsurprising. We did a PoC with Infineon, and demoed at CES this last January, something related to the limitations of Fail-Safe mechanisms in autonomous systems and what changes in deisgn & runtime context are essential for moving from Fail-Safe to Fault-Tolerant systems. In the case of MCAS this probably works out okay because the remediation is to disable and hand control back t…

> something that I'm frankly shocked wasn't already part of the hazard and risk assessment

That wasn't an option because they didn't want to tell pilots about the existence of the system, to avoid additional training requirements.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#104

Post by SomeHacker44 »

Nacdor wrote: post #6

Given the option, would anyone choose to book a trip on one of these new Boeing aircraft rather than anything else? I know I wouldn't, my family wouldn't, and none of the friends or co-workers I've discussed this with would. Something tells me airlines are going to be making it even more difficult to determine which aircraft you'll be flying on when you book a ticket. As far as I know they're not required to tell you…

As a pilot, I intend never to fly on a 737 Max.

The only thing that might change my mind is putting the plane on its own type certificate solely for this plane.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#105

Post by tgsovlerkhgsel »

tzs wrote: post #70
karmelapple wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This might be oversimplification, but I'll venture it and hope someone corrects me if I'm wrong: If MCAS is disabled, then the airplane will fly very differently from the 737s that everyone with an existing 737 flight rating is used to. So the plane can fly, but it'll feel different. And that sure does seem like a problem to get back safely to the ground.

MCAS only kicks in at high angle of attack with the flaps up. I believe that most flights never come near having it activate. If it disables due to faulty sensors and the pilots are told it is disabled, most flights won't have to do anything different at that point. The plane will handle just like it normally does. If there are flights that are supposed to have maneuvers that would trigger MCAS, pilots are going to n…

But if a MCAS failure and an unexpected unusual attitude does line up, there will be another crater.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#106

Post by tgsovlerkhgsel »

inamberclad wrote: post #51

Their requirement is to make the AoA disagree light standard? Wow that's next to nothing. For those that don't remember, the AoA disagree light is an optional, costs-extra safety feature on this model. How about we add a big fat MCAS disengage button to the yoke instead, and make it separate from the trim cutout switch?

Or repurpose the existing second trim cutout switch... (AFAIK there are two, that used to serve different purposes, and are now both left in to keep the same type rating).

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#107

Post by philjohn »

kube-system wrote: post #79
yellow_postit wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Given the amount of additional scrutiny these models are getting I wouldn’t be surprised if in the long run of their lifetime they have a better safety record.

This has happened with other planes before, like the DC-10.

Or the De Havilland Comet ... arguably killed off the nascent UK jet aviation sector until we joined Airbus.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#108

Post by valuearb »

bedhead wrote: post #13

Can we just scrap this thing and move on already? Isn’t all of this back-and-forth alone evidence that this thing shouldn’t be flying?? It’s over, Boeing, you lose.

Because it’s far cheaper to make them safe than to trash them. The problem isn’t the basic airplane, it’s the short shrift Boeing gave the safety systems.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#109

Post by philjohn »

vkou wrote: post #71
Nacdor wrote: post #6

Given the option, would anyone choose to book a trip on one of these new Boeing aircraft rather than anything else? I know I wouldn't, my family wouldn't, and none of the friends or co-workers I've discussed this with would. Something tells me airlines are going to be making it even more difficult to determine which aircraft you'll be flying on when you book a ticket. As far as I know they're not required to tell you…

> Given the option, would anyone choose to book a trip on one of these new Boeing aircraft rather than anything else? I know I wouldn't, my family wouldn't, and none of the friends or co-workers I've discussed this with would. You wouldn't, but the thing is - you don't get the option. Your airline won't tell you which plane you'll be flying until boarding time. You then have the option of cancelling your flight witho…

If flying long haul with a big carrier, Expert Flyer is pretty accurate, barring a late substitution if there's a fault with the original plane.

Re: U.S. FAA proposes requiring key Boeing 737 MAX design changes

#110

Post by valuearb »

inamberclad wrote: post #51

Their requirement is to make the AoA disagree light standard? Wow that's next to nothing. For those that don't remember, the AoA disagree light is an optional, costs-extra safety feature on this model. How about we add a big fat MCAS disengage button to the yoke instead, and make it separate from the trim cutout switch?

It should have been standard from the beginning, since it likely would have prevented both crashes.
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